Malaya
On December 29th Hong Kong and Malaya were invaded. Hong Kong fell quickly.
On the morning of January 3rd, 1942, a mixed force of Japanese land-based bombers located and sank the battlecruiser HMS Repulse and the carrier HMS Indomitable, despite desperate efforts from the latter’s air wing. The 9 Sea Hurricanes and 12 Fulmars did manage to destroy 23 Japanese aircraft and damaged a dozen more, but the loss of their carrier sealed their fate. A second wave later in the day sank the battleship HMS Prince of Wales and the destroyer HMS Vampire. Japanese losses were 32 aircraft destroyed and 21 damaged.
In Malaya, as in the Philippines, the attacking Japanese were outnumbered. However, the Commonwealth forces (notably the 8th Australian Division), while riddled with problems, were still far more organized then the American and Philippine forces. Gen. Yamashita also had far worse logistical problems. These factors, along with unfavorable weather, caused the Japanese offensive to run out of steam just short of Singapore in late February. Now aware of the force disparity against them, the Japanese began to shift troops from the Philippines to reduce Singapore. Gen. Wainwright’s offensive in the Philippines then caused troops to be shifted back, and the Malaya front became a stalemate.
The ABDA (American British Dutch Australian) command had been struggling to keep a supply line open to Singapore almost since the war began, and to interfere with Japanese operations in the area. They had been barely successful at the former and a failure at the latter while suffering heavy losses. The arrival in the area of Kido Butai, fresh from a string of victories, spelled the final defeat of this force in the Battle of the Java Sea on March 26th. Now cut off and subjected to a series of carrier airstrikes, Singapore joined Corregidor as “the Alamos of the Pacific.” The Alamo, of course, fell, and so did Singapore on April 30th. Kido Butai followed up on this victory by raiding into the Indian Ocean, making a whirlwind series of attacks. In ten days, the British lost the light carrier HMS Hermes, the cruiser HMS Cornwall, two destroyers, and a number of merchant ships and aircraft. Japanese losses were only a handful of aircraft.
Kido Butai had ravaged the world’s two largest navies, sinking or crippling almost everything they encountered and losing not a single ship themselves in the process. The dominance of the aircraft carrier had been established. But the raids had a cost: the IJN’s elite carrier pilots had lost many of their number. By the time Kido Butai returned to Japan only a third of the aircraft it had sailed for Pearl Harbor with were still operational. A determined effort would repair many of these and replace others, but the experienced aircrews were a larger problem, one that would never be fully solved.
Dutch East Indies
The oil and mineral wealth of the Dutch East Indies made them one of the most important objectives of the initial Japanese offensive. The first landings on Borneo occurred on January 7th. The ABDA command attempted to coordinate the defense, but fared no better than they did at sea. On April 6th, the last allied troops in the Dutch East Indies surrendered. Some of the Japanese veterans of this campaign would participate in the final assault on Singapore three and a half weeks later.
While organized fighting would continue in the Philippines until the surrender of Corregidor on August 8th, and guerrilla warfare would continue for years, the opening phase of the war is generally considered to have ended with the fall of Singapore on April 30th. The Japanese had sunk or destroyed three fleet carriers, four battleships, a battlecruiser, a light carrier, three heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, a score of destroyers, hundreds smaller vessels and merchant ships, almost 1,000 aircraft, and killed or captured tens of thousands of allied troops. In exchange they had lost no warship larger than a destroyer (and only two dozen warships of any size), less than a hundred merchant ships and transports, a few hundred aircraft, and a few thousand men. They had met every objective of their pre-war plans, some of them ahead of schedule, with lower than expected losses. The few temporary reverses were blamed on local commanders in a surge of what later historians would characterize as ‘victory disease’; the superiority of the Japanese race had been clearly demonstrated for all the world to see.
Thursday, May 5, 2011
Wednesday, May 4, 2011
December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part II
“When this war is over, the Japanese language will be spoken only in Hell.” Adm. Halsey, surveying the wreckage of USS Enterprise from Ford Island, December 28th, 1941.
“The USS Lexington just became the most important ship in the world.” Capt. Sherman, upon receiving word of the losses at Pearl Harbor.
The IJN aircraft flying away from Pearl Harbor left behind them a shattered Pacific Fleet and an atmosphere of panic tempered only by rage. Admiral Kimmel had woken up in the morning in command of twelve capital ships. By the time the sun set, only one was fully operational: the USS Lexington. Four would never fight again, and five would be in yard hands for months, or in one case years.
Only hours after the Pearl Harbor raid, 36 G3M bombers approached Wake. Here, the new radar was manned by equally green but far more aggressive personnel, and the island’s entire force of aircraft - 12 F4F Wildcats of VMF 211 – scrambled aloft to meet them. The Marine pilots managed to shoot down eight of the “Nells” and damaged several others, but the Japanese pressed the attack and did moderate damage to the base facilities.
Three days later the Japanese invasion force arrived. Major Devereux ordered his gunners to hold their fire until the enemy ships closed into effective range. His patience was rewarded by the destruction of DD Hayate and heavy damage to CL Yubari. Minutes later, bombs from VMF 211 destroyed DD Kisaragi. The Japanese invasion force withdrew. Two weeks of air attacks followed, including carrier aircraft from CV Hiryu and Soryu returning from the Pearl Harbor raid. VMF 211’s kills continued to mount until they met A6M’s from Hiryu and Soryu. The Marine squadron was destroyed in nine furious minutes of combat, though they took three Zeros with them.
Several senior officers, notably Adm. Halsey, proposed a relief expedition be sent to Wake covered by a task force built around the USS Lexington. Before this expedition could be sent, on January 5th Admiral Nimitz replaced Admiral Kimmel as commander, Pacific Fleet, and quickly vetoed any suggestion to risk the Pacific Fleet’s only operational capital ship so far from any possible support.
On January 15th the Japanese launched their second amphibious assault. The Marine defenders once again destroyed several ships and inflicted heavy losses on the landing force, but three days later the defenders were out of ammunition and water. Over 300 of the island’s defenders had been killed. Japanese ground losses alone were over 1,000. The defense of Wake, while ultimately a defeat, would claim the first IJN warship sunk and the first Japanese defeat of the war.
“We shall return.” Gen. Wainwright, just before boarding PT 34 to leave the Philippines.
While a small island north of Luzon had been occupied on the 28th, the invasion of the Philippines is generally recorded as beginning on the 30th, with the first landing on Luzon. Officially, Gen. MacArthur’s plans called for a forward defense, taking advantage of the nearly 400 aircraft available to him including what was perceived as his ace: over 70 B-17’s of the 7th and 19th Bombardment Groups (Heavy). Also available were the 27th Bombardment Group (Light) of A-24 dive-bombers, which would wind up being equally useful, and over 100 P-40’s. Ground forces were also substantial, with 12 divisions, several independent infantry regiments, the 1st Provisional Tank Group, and an assortment of independent artillery units. On paper, The US Armed Forces, Far East, and the Philippine Army appeared capable of holding indefinitely against the few divisions the Japanese could spare.
The reality on the ground, however, was quite different. Many of the Philippine Army units had only been allowed to fire their rifles for the first time less than two weeks before the outbreak of war, so short had been stocks of ammunition. Drill had been all but non-existent and language barriers were many.
Worst of all, however, was the commander himself. While no proof has survived to the present day, it now seems clear that MacArthur was, at least, aware that President Quezon hoped to keep the Philippines neutral and was willing to aid in that endeavor. To repeated requests from Gen. Brereton to allow the FEAF to attack Formosa, MacArthur made no response. As a result, many of the FEAF aircraft were on the ground or circling their fields when the Japanese air attacks arrived on the first day of the war. Almost half of the vaunted B-17’s and numerous other aircraft were destroyed in under an hour, without dropping a single bomb.
MacArthur’s plan of forward defense fared little better. Although reports from the front consistently praise the fighting spirit and determination of the Philippine and US troops, especially the Philippine Scouts, command failures existed at every level. Co-ordination was poor to non-existent and complicated when it occurred by multiple language barriers. Japanese forces, by contrast, were able to execute a number of complex flanking and encircling attacks, chopping the defenders into bits and forcing them to retreat. By late February, it was clear that the Philippines were doomed.
One of MacArthur’s last acts (in early March, 1942) was to accept half a million dollars from Quezon’s government, just before Quezon and his family were evacuated from the Philippines at MacArthur’s orders. Two days later MacArthur, along with Chief of Staff Gen. Sutherland, were killed in a Japanese air attack. Command passed to Gen. Wainwright.
Gen. Wainwright proved to be a quite different commander from MacArthur. While MacArthur never visited the front lines, earning him the nickname “Dugout Doug”, Wainwright “appeared to be everywhere – at the front, at his headquarters, in conference with the Navy, or right behind you if you weren’t doing your job,” as one staff officer related. While MacArthur had retreated under pressure, Wainwright counter-attacked at every perceived opportunity. He ordered aggressive use be made of the remnants of the FEAF, particularly the A-24’s in a close-air support role. The Japanese, who had begun to withdraw forces as the campaign appeared to wind down, were caught by surprise and were forced to pull forces from everywhere they could just to hold their lines.
Although some criticized his attacks as reckless, Wainwright had a deeper plan. MacArthur’s uncoordinated retreat had involved few preparations for a siege at Corregidor, but called for such a siege in any case. Wainwright, by throwing the Japanese off balance, hoped to create a window of opportunity. In the process, he became a hero: the Lion of the Philippines.
Roosevelt decided that a hero was necessary, and accordingly ordered Wainwright to remove himself and his staff from the Philippines in late April, when the Japanese again began to push the defenders back. Wainwright fought against this order almost as hard as he fought the Japanese; he ordered his signals section to lose messages and report others garbled, and appealed to everyone in his chain of command, as well as senior naval officers, to be allowed to remain with his troops.
The end, however, was not in doubt. Bataan fell on July 3rd, and Wainwright received an order direct from Roosevelt, specifying the exact times and means by which he would be transported to Australia. Just before boarding PT 34 for the first leg of his journey, Wainwright addressed a group of US and Philippine army officers and men with just three words: “We shall return.”
On August 8th, the troops on Corregidor surrendered, and the last organized defense ended. Guerrilla warfare would continue, involving almost a third of the US personnel in the Philippines and hundreds of thousands of natives, until the islands were liberated.
“The USS Lexington just became the most important ship in the world.” Capt. Sherman, upon receiving word of the losses at Pearl Harbor.
The IJN aircraft flying away from Pearl Harbor left behind them a shattered Pacific Fleet and an atmosphere of panic tempered only by rage. Admiral Kimmel had woken up in the morning in command of twelve capital ships. By the time the sun set, only one was fully operational: the USS Lexington. Four would never fight again, and five would be in yard hands for months, or in one case years.
Only hours after the Pearl Harbor raid, 36 G3M bombers approached Wake. Here, the new radar was manned by equally green but far more aggressive personnel, and the island’s entire force of aircraft - 12 F4F Wildcats of VMF 211 – scrambled aloft to meet them. The Marine pilots managed to shoot down eight of the “Nells” and damaged several others, but the Japanese pressed the attack and did moderate damage to the base facilities.
Three days later the Japanese invasion force arrived. Major Devereux ordered his gunners to hold their fire until the enemy ships closed into effective range. His patience was rewarded by the destruction of DD Hayate and heavy damage to CL Yubari. Minutes later, bombs from VMF 211 destroyed DD Kisaragi. The Japanese invasion force withdrew. Two weeks of air attacks followed, including carrier aircraft from CV Hiryu and Soryu returning from the Pearl Harbor raid. VMF 211’s kills continued to mount until they met A6M’s from Hiryu and Soryu. The Marine squadron was destroyed in nine furious minutes of combat, though they took three Zeros with them.
Several senior officers, notably Adm. Halsey, proposed a relief expedition be sent to Wake covered by a task force built around the USS Lexington. Before this expedition could be sent, on January 5th Admiral Nimitz replaced Admiral Kimmel as commander, Pacific Fleet, and quickly vetoed any suggestion to risk the Pacific Fleet’s only operational capital ship so far from any possible support.
On January 15th the Japanese launched their second amphibious assault. The Marine defenders once again destroyed several ships and inflicted heavy losses on the landing force, but three days later the defenders were out of ammunition and water. Over 300 of the island’s defenders had been killed. Japanese ground losses alone were over 1,000. The defense of Wake, while ultimately a defeat, would claim the first IJN warship sunk and the first Japanese defeat of the war.
“We shall return.” Gen. Wainwright, just before boarding PT 34 to leave the Philippines.
While a small island north of Luzon had been occupied on the 28th, the invasion of the Philippines is generally recorded as beginning on the 30th, with the first landing on Luzon. Officially, Gen. MacArthur’s plans called for a forward defense, taking advantage of the nearly 400 aircraft available to him including what was perceived as his ace: over 70 B-17’s of the 7th and 19th Bombardment Groups (Heavy). Also available were the 27th Bombardment Group (Light) of A-24 dive-bombers, which would wind up being equally useful, and over 100 P-40’s. Ground forces were also substantial, with 12 divisions, several independent infantry regiments, the 1st Provisional Tank Group, and an assortment of independent artillery units. On paper, The US Armed Forces, Far East, and the Philippine Army appeared capable of holding indefinitely against the few divisions the Japanese could spare.
The reality on the ground, however, was quite different. Many of the Philippine Army units had only been allowed to fire their rifles for the first time less than two weeks before the outbreak of war, so short had been stocks of ammunition. Drill had been all but non-existent and language barriers were many.
Worst of all, however, was the commander himself. While no proof has survived to the present day, it now seems clear that MacArthur was, at least, aware that President Quezon hoped to keep the Philippines neutral and was willing to aid in that endeavor. To repeated requests from Gen. Brereton to allow the FEAF to attack Formosa, MacArthur made no response. As a result, many of the FEAF aircraft were on the ground or circling their fields when the Japanese air attacks arrived on the first day of the war. Almost half of the vaunted B-17’s and numerous other aircraft were destroyed in under an hour, without dropping a single bomb.
MacArthur’s plan of forward defense fared little better. Although reports from the front consistently praise the fighting spirit and determination of the Philippine and US troops, especially the Philippine Scouts, command failures existed at every level. Co-ordination was poor to non-existent and complicated when it occurred by multiple language barriers. Japanese forces, by contrast, were able to execute a number of complex flanking and encircling attacks, chopping the defenders into bits and forcing them to retreat. By late February, it was clear that the Philippines were doomed.
One of MacArthur’s last acts (in early March, 1942) was to accept half a million dollars from Quezon’s government, just before Quezon and his family were evacuated from the Philippines at MacArthur’s orders. Two days later MacArthur, along with Chief of Staff Gen. Sutherland, were killed in a Japanese air attack. Command passed to Gen. Wainwright.
Gen. Wainwright proved to be a quite different commander from MacArthur. While MacArthur never visited the front lines, earning him the nickname “Dugout Doug”, Wainwright “appeared to be everywhere – at the front, at his headquarters, in conference with the Navy, or right behind you if you weren’t doing your job,” as one staff officer related. While MacArthur had retreated under pressure, Wainwright counter-attacked at every perceived opportunity. He ordered aggressive use be made of the remnants of the FEAF, particularly the A-24’s in a close-air support role. The Japanese, who had begun to withdraw forces as the campaign appeared to wind down, were caught by surprise and were forced to pull forces from everywhere they could just to hold their lines.
Although some criticized his attacks as reckless, Wainwright had a deeper plan. MacArthur’s uncoordinated retreat had involved few preparations for a siege at Corregidor, but called for such a siege in any case. Wainwright, by throwing the Japanese off balance, hoped to create a window of opportunity. In the process, he became a hero: the Lion of the Philippines.
Roosevelt decided that a hero was necessary, and accordingly ordered Wainwright to remove himself and his staff from the Philippines in late April, when the Japanese again began to push the defenders back. Wainwright fought against this order almost as hard as he fought the Japanese; he ordered his signals section to lose messages and report others garbled, and appealed to everyone in his chain of command, as well as senior naval officers, to be allowed to remain with his troops.
The end, however, was not in doubt. Bataan fell on July 3rd, and Wainwright received an order direct from Roosevelt, specifying the exact times and means by which he would be transported to Australia. Just before boarding PT 34 for the first leg of his journey, Wainwright addressed a group of US and Philippine army officers and men with just three words: “We shall return.”
On August 8th, the troops on Corregidor surrendered, and the last organized defense ended. Guerrilla warfare would continue, involving almost a third of the US personnel in the Philippines and hundreds of thousands of natives, until the islands were liberated.
Monday, May 2, 2011
December 28th – the Day of Infamy, Part I
On a lighter note (yes, I think a globe-spanning war is lighter than what I just posted. What does that say about me?) this is a piece of fiction I wrote up for an alternate history board I participate in. Thought I'd post it here as well.
November 5th, 1941, aboard CV Akagi, at sea off Yokosuka, Japan.
Admiral Nagumo cursed as the line connecting his flagship to the tanker parted. The first such mishap had drawn no reaction from him at all – accidents happen at sea, especially when practicing new techniques. Two men injured, one seriously, and a cable lost was a small price to pay for learning the ability to refuel ships at sea.
The second time a cable had parted had drawn a frown, quickly suppressed. The frown had returned briefly when word was brought to him that this time there had been a fatality.
That had been three hours, four broken cables, eighteen injuries, five fatalities, and one near-collision ago.
“Enough!” Nagumo snapped. “Signal ‘discontinue evolution’ and make preparations for returning to Yokosuka.”
“Hai.”
November 10th, 1941, aboard BB Nagato, Iwakuni, Japan.
Admiral Yamamoto managed to restrain his curse. “Two weeks?”
“If we are to count on underway refueling for the upcoming operations, yes,” Nagumo replied calmly. “The additional time would be of great benefit in other ways. Zuikaku has been in commission for less than two months, and Shokaku barely three. Their air groups are inexperienced.”
“It is less than a month to the target date. Your force is to sail in sixteen days, and you want two extra weeks? Impossible.”
“Perhaps, then, the operation should be cancelled,” Nagumo replied, still with his maddening calm.
“The operation is vital. It can not be cancelled.”
“Then in order to have Kido Butai ready, I shall require two additional weeks of training.”
“You were able to transfer fuel from the tanker to Akagi, and to the destroyers, were you not?” Yamamoto countered.
“Barely more than half the time, in moderate seas, with our most experienced tanker crew and one of our best carriers. The destroyers fared even worse.”
This time, Yamamoto only barely managed to restrain his curse. “I shall speak to Nagano. Many operations would have to be delayed. Oil is running short. You are to continue to make all possible preparations to depart on schedule.”
November 12th, 1941, Imperial General HQ, Tokyo, Japan.
“THREE weeks?!”
“If we are not to strike on the 8th, then that would be the ideal time. Task Force 1 is scheduled to sail on the 12th, and then Task Force 2 on the 17th. They will not both be in port again until the 27th. The 28th, Hawaii time, allows time for any delays and is a Sunday, just like the original target date of the 7th, Hawaii time,” the Intelligence officer replied.
“More than just the Oahu raid is involved in this operation! More than just the Navy is involved! Malaya, the Philippines, everything will have to change,” General Sugiyama protested.
“Yamamoto is most insistent…” Shimada began.
“Enough.” Tojo’s single word silenced the room. “Our meetings with The Emperor continue. A decision of this magnitude can not be made without him. Whatever the plans may say, the final date is not set until it is set by him.”
December 19th, 1941, aboard BB Nagato, Hashirajima, Japan.
“So, it is to be war,” Yamamoto said quietly.
“The Emperor has so ordered. War with the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands will begin on December 29th.”
“So be it. Signal to Kido Butai: Climb Mount Niitaka, 1229.”
*
On the morning of December 28th, 1941, over two-thirds of the US Pacific Fleet was in port in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The ships present included two aircraft carriers, eight battleships, four heavy cruisers, seven light cruisers, and over thirty destroyers.
Cryptanalysts in Washington D.C. had decoded a message to the Japanese embassy, and a war warning was sent to all commands. Due to poor radio conditions, the message did not reach Pearl Harbor until ten minutes after the attack began.
Pearl Harbor’s only warning was from the Army radar teams, which picked up the 1st attack wave as it approached the island almost an hour before the attack. However the operators initially believed the blip, the largest any of them had ever seen, to be a malfunction, and failed to pass word to the brand-new fighter direction center for 6 vital minutes. The senior officer there, apparently also believing this must be a mistake of some sort, ordered a single flight of fighters to be sent up to check out the blip, and did not send out a general alert. He was later court-martialed and discharged. A quartet of P-40B’s from the 73rd Interceptor Squadron were the first to make contact with the enemy just minutes before the 1st wave arrived over their targets.
Fuchida, who had prepared for the possibility that complete surprise would not be achieved, fired two smoke signals to order his dive-bombers and fighters to attack first in order to draw fire from the torpedo bombers. The torpedo bombers failed to see one of the signals, and thus believed surprise had been achieved. All of the 1st wave aircraft thus attacked at once. The torpedo bombers did the most damage, hitting both carriers, four battleships, a heavy cruiser, and the target ship USS Utah with a total of 20 torpedoes from 40 aircraft. USS Saratoga, USS Enterprise, USS Oklahoma, and USS Utah were capsized, and USS Nevada was sunk, though heroic damage control efforts allowed her to settle on an even keel.
The most spectacular damage was later determined to have been caused by a single bomb, actually a modified 16” shell, which penetrated the deck armor of USS California and caused an explosion in her forward magazine. Over 1,000 men were killed and the ship began to sink rapidly.
The second wave of IJN aircraft encountered much increased resistance from anti-aircraft fire and the few aircraft which managed to get off the ground, but were able to bomb the capsized hulls of USS Saratoga, USS Enterprise, and USS Utah, ensuring that these ships could not be salvaged later. Two bombs from the second wave struck USS Craven (DD382), which exploded and sank in less than 5 minutes with the loss of 170 of her crew.
Of nearly 600 aircraft present, 135 were destroyed and 144 were damaged. Particularly high losses were taken by the Navy Patrol Wings; every single aircraft on the ground at the start of the attack was destroyed or damaged.
Japanese losses were 37 aircraft destroyed, with 61 aircrew killed.
Capital ships & cruisers present:
USS Saratoga CV3 – sunk by 4 torpedoes, unsalvageable
USS Enterprise CV6 – sunk by 3 torpedoes, unsalvageable
USS Nevada BB36 – sunk by 3 torpedoes
USS Oklahoma BB37 – sunk by 4 torpedoes, unsalvageable
USS Pennsylvania BB38 – lightly damaged
USS Arizona BB39 – damaged by torpedo and bombs
USS Tennessee BB43 – damaged by 2 torpedoes and bombs
USS California BB44 – sunk by bomb, unsalvageable
USS Maryland BB46 – damaged by bombs
USS West Virginia BB48 – lightly damaged
USS Northampton CA26
USS Chester CA27 – damaged by torpedo
USS Louisville CA28 – lightly damaged
USS Portland CA33
USS Raleigh CL7
USS Detroit CL8
USS Phoenix CL46
USS Boise CL47 – lightly damaged
USS Honolulu CL48
USS St. Louis CL49
USS Helena CL50
Other ships damaged or destroyed:
USS Tucker DD374 – damaged by bombs
USS Craven DD382 – sunk by bombs, unsalvageable
USS Blue DD387 – damaged by bombs
USS Whitney AD4 – lightly damaged
USS Utah AG16 – sunk by 2 torpedoes, unsalvageable
A few notes are in order. First, the international date line makes dates somewhat complicated. For TTL, the Japanese will, as they historically did, refer to Tokyo time unless explicitly stated otherwise. The US will generally refer to local time.
The PoD is the IJN deciding to conduct underway replenishment exercises prior to the fleet sailing for the Pearl Harbor operation. These do not go well (casualties occurred during the OTL raid), and as shown above the end result is that the raid will take place on 12/28, not 12/7. According to CINCPAC File No. A4-3/FF12/(13), Serial 01254, US Pacific Fleet, August 13th, 1941, Task Forces 1 and 2 (with all the battleships plus USS Saratoga CV3 and USS Enterprise CV6) were scheduled to be in port that day. USS Saratoga would have returned from the refit on the Pacific Coast that kept her out of Pearl IOTL, and USS Enterprise will be back from her delivery run. As far as I can tell, the quarterly employment schedule’s contents were known to the Japanese, though further details (like USS Saratoga’s refit) were not. IOTL USS Enterprise’s ferry mission departed on November 28th, per the schedule, partly in order not to arouse suspicion.
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/410813apac.html
This timeline will mostly be in “textbook” form; but I felt the introduction should be a little more personal.
Questions, comments, suggestions, and constructive criticism are welcome.
November 5th, 1941, aboard CV Akagi, at sea off Yokosuka, Japan.
Admiral Nagumo cursed as the line connecting his flagship to the tanker parted. The first such mishap had drawn no reaction from him at all – accidents happen at sea, especially when practicing new techniques. Two men injured, one seriously, and a cable lost was a small price to pay for learning the ability to refuel ships at sea.
The second time a cable had parted had drawn a frown, quickly suppressed. The frown had returned briefly when word was brought to him that this time there had been a fatality.
That had been three hours, four broken cables, eighteen injuries, five fatalities, and one near-collision ago.
“Enough!” Nagumo snapped. “Signal ‘discontinue evolution’ and make preparations for returning to Yokosuka.”
“Hai.”
November 10th, 1941, aboard BB Nagato, Iwakuni, Japan.
Admiral Yamamoto managed to restrain his curse. “Two weeks?”
“If we are to count on underway refueling for the upcoming operations, yes,” Nagumo replied calmly. “The additional time would be of great benefit in other ways. Zuikaku has been in commission for less than two months, and Shokaku barely three. Their air groups are inexperienced.”
“It is less than a month to the target date. Your force is to sail in sixteen days, and you want two extra weeks? Impossible.”
“Perhaps, then, the operation should be cancelled,” Nagumo replied, still with his maddening calm.
“The operation is vital. It can not be cancelled.”
“Then in order to have Kido Butai ready, I shall require two additional weeks of training.”
“You were able to transfer fuel from the tanker to Akagi, and to the destroyers, were you not?” Yamamoto countered.
“Barely more than half the time, in moderate seas, with our most experienced tanker crew and one of our best carriers. The destroyers fared even worse.”
This time, Yamamoto only barely managed to restrain his curse. “I shall speak to Nagano. Many operations would have to be delayed. Oil is running short. You are to continue to make all possible preparations to depart on schedule.”
November 12th, 1941, Imperial General HQ, Tokyo, Japan.
“THREE weeks?!”
“If we are not to strike on the 8th, then that would be the ideal time. Task Force 1 is scheduled to sail on the 12th, and then Task Force 2 on the 17th. They will not both be in port again until the 27th. The 28th, Hawaii time, allows time for any delays and is a Sunday, just like the original target date of the 7th, Hawaii time,” the Intelligence officer replied.
“More than just the Oahu raid is involved in this operation! More than just the Navy is involved! Malaya, the Philippines, everything will have to change,” General Sugiyama protested.
“Yamamoto is most insistent…” Shimada began.
“Enough.” Tojo’s single word silenced the room. “Our meetings with The Emperor continue. A decision of this magnitude can not be made without him. Whatever the plans may say, the final date is not set until it is set by him.”
December 19th, 1941, aboard BB Nagato, Hashirajima, Japan.
“So, it is to be war,” Yamamoto said quietly.
“The Emperor has so ordered. War with the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands will begin on December 29th.”
“So be it. Signal to Kido Butai: Climb Mount Niitaka, 1229.”
*
On the morning of December 28th, 1941, over two-thirds of the US Pacific Fleet was in port in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The ships present included two aircraft carriers, eight battleships, four heavy cruisers, seven light cruisers, and over thirty destroyers.
Cryptanalysts in Washington D.C. had decoded a message to the Japanese embassy, and a war warning was sent to all commands. Due to poor radio conditions, the message did not reach Pearl Harbor until ten minutes after the attack began.
Pearl Harbor’s only warning was from the Army radar teams, which picked up the 1st attack wave as it approached the island almost an hour before the attack. However the operators initially believed the blip, the largest any of them had ever seen, to be a malfunction, and failed to pass word to the brand-new fighter direction center for 6 vital minutes. The senior officer there, apparently also believing this must be a mistake of some sort, ordered a single flight of fighters to be sent up to check out the blip, and did not send out a general alert. He was later court-martialed and discharged. A quartet of P-40B’s from the 73rd Interceptor Squadron were the first to make contact with the enemy just minutes before the 1st wave arrived over their targets.
Fuchida, who had prepared for the possibility that complete surprise would not be achieved, fired two smoke signals to order his dive-bombers and fighters to attack first in order to draw fire from the torpedo bombers. The torpedo bombers failed to see one of the signals, and thus believed surprise had been achieved. All of the 1st wave aircraft thus attacked at once. The torpedo bombers did the most damage, hitting both carriers, four battleships, a heavy cruiser, and the target ship USS Utah with a total of 20 torpedoes from 40 aircraft. USS Saratoga, USS Enterprise, USS Oklahoma, and USS Utah were capsized, and USS Nevada was sunk, though heroic damage control efforts allowed her to settle on an even keel.
The most spectacular damage was later determined to have been caused by a single bomb, actually a modified 16” shell, which penetrated the deck armor of USS California and caused an explosion in her forward magazine. Over 1,000 men were killed and the ship began to sink rapidly.
The second wave of IJN aircraft encountered much increased resistance from anti-aircraft fire and the few aircraft which managed to get off the ground, but were able to bomb the capsized hulls of USS Saratoga, USS Enterprise, and USS Utah, ensuring that these ships could not be salvaged later. Two bombs from the second wave struck USS Craven (DD382), which exploded and sank in less than 5 minutes with the loss of 170 of her crew.
Of nearly 600 aircraft present, 135 were destroyed and 144 were damaged. Particularly high losses were taken by the Navy Patrol Wings; every single aircraft on the ground at the start of the attack was destroyed or damaged.
Japanese losses were 37 aircraft destroyed, with 61 aircrew killed.
Capital ships & cruisers present:
USS Saratoga CV3 – sunk by 4 torpedoes, unsalvageable
USS Enterprise CV6 – sunk by 3 torpedoes, unsalvageable
USS Nevada BB36 – sunk by 3 torpedoes
USS Oklahoma BB37 – sunk by 4 torpedoes, unsalvageable
USS Pennsylvania BB38 – lightly damaged
USS Arizona BB39 – damaged by torpedo and bombs
USS Tennessee BB43 – damaged by 2 torpedoes and bombs
USS California BB44 – sunk by bomb, unsalvageable
USS Maryland BB46 – damaged by bombs
USS West Virginia BB48 – lightly damaged
USS Northampton CA26
USS Chester CA27 – damaged by torpedo
USS Louisville CA28 – lightly damaged
USS Portland CA33
USS Raleigh CL7
USS Detroit CL8
USS Phoenix CL46
USS Boise CL47 – lightly damaged
USS Honolulu CL48
USS St. Louis CL49
USS Helena CL50
Other ships damaged or destroyed:
USS Tucker DD374 – damaged by bombs
USS Craven DD382 – sunk by bombs, unsalvageable
USS Blue DD387 – damaged by bombs
USS Whitney AD4 – lightly damaged
USS Utah AG16 – sunk by 2 torpedoes, unsalvageable
A few notes are in order. First, the international date line makes dates somewhat complicated. For TTL, the Japanese will, as they historically did, refer to Tokyo time unless explicitly stated otherwise. The US will generally refer to local time.
The PoD is the IJN deciding to conduct underway replenishment exercises prior to the fleet sailing for the Pearl Harbor operation. These do not go well (casualties occurred during the OTL raid), and as shown above the end result is that the raid will take place on 12/28, not 12/7. According to CINCPAC File No. A4-3/FF12/(13), Serial 01254, US Pacific Fleet, August 13th, 1941, Task Forces 1 and 2 (with all the battleships plus USS Saratoga CV3 and USS Enterprise CV6) were scheduled to be in port that day. USS Saratoga would have returned from the refit on the Pacific Coast that kept her out of Pearl IOTL, and USS Enterprise will be back from her delivery run. As far as I can tell, the quarterly employment schedule’s contents were known to the Japanese, though further details (like USS Saratoga’s refit) were not. IOTL USS Enterprise’s ferry mission departed on November 28th, per the schedule, partly in order not to arouse suspicion.
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/410813apac.html
This timeline will mostly be in “textbook” form; but I felt the introduction should be a little more personal.
Questions, comments, suggestions, and constructive criticism are welcome.
Terrorists: 5, USA: 1
Just days after 9/11/01 I posted on a BBoard at Carnegie Mellon noting that the terrorists had not yet won. Today some people are celebrating because Osama Bin Laden is dead. I'm not, because even with his death the terrorists are still winning.
On 9/11 I was an undergraduate at C-MU; I saw a note that the first tower had been hit by a plane on the AP news wire and forwarded it to several bboards; several people told me later that my post was the first word they had of the attacks. I remember watching the towers fall, over and over again. I remember hearing an airplane and being one of scores of people who went outside to look up at the sky, and look for reassurance in each other. I remember great relief identifying the plane as a fighter, not an airliner. I was scared on 9/11.
But not as scared as I was when I heard President Bush tell the world 'you are either with us or against us.' That was a victory for the terrorists: they had just been recognized as a global power by the most powerful nation on earth. Not even in WWII, fighting some of the most evil monsters ever to wear human skin, did the allies lay such a declaration before the world.
The disgustingly named Patriot Act and the formation of the TSA were another pair of victories: the terrorists had made us sacrifice our essential liberties for an illusion of security.
Then the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Why those countries? Why not pick the nation in the Mid East that had done more than any other to aid in the 9/11 attacks? Why Saudi Arabia's immunity? Or why not the nation(s) Osama was believed to be hiding in? Even in October of 2001 it was an open secret that Pakistan was a possible location - perhaps he was not there then, of course, but with what we know now it is hard to believe that officials, many of them quite senior, in Pakistan were not aware of his general location.
But now, almost ten full years after the 9/11 attacks, we have finally killed the ring leader. Rejoice! So will the TSA be stood down? No, our current administration is already warning us that this may lead to retaliatory attacks. So those 'temporary' 'emergency' measures turn out to have been neither temporary nor effective, and the 'emergency' appears to be permanent.
Don't get me wrong, some things have improved since 9/11: the armored cockpit doors on commercial aircraft and the measures to prevent people from rushing the cockpit are good, effective steps that have the added bonus of in no way compromising our rights. But groping by the TSA in no way adds to our security and is yet another erosion of our liberty.
It is a sign of the times that when I was thinking of the scorecard for the title I considered assigning three points for the TSA and their escalating steps along the road to bureaucratic waste and ineffectiveness. Then I couldn't decide if it should actually be four, or five, and finally decided to simply award them one for simplicity's sake.
So we've won a single battle, but we are still loosing the war.
On the bright side, we haven't lost yet. In commemoration both of the 100th anniversary of its adoption as the US Army's principle sidearm and the 10th anniversary of 9/11, this summer I am going to purchase a Colt 1911. Because while the right to keep and bear arms has been eroded, it still remains. Because while we are loosing, we have not yet lost. We can still win.
We can repeal the ill-named Patriot Act's provisions, and all other legislation contrary to the US Constitution. We can disband the TSA entirely, and let the airlines, individually, decide what they will allow on their planes and bear any expenses they choose to spend searching. We can punish the nations that actually bore responsibility for 9/11.
On 9/11 I was an undergraduate at C-MU; I saw a note that the first tower had been hit by a plane on the AP news wire and forwarded it to several bboards; several people told me later that my post was the first word they had of the attacks. I remember watching the towers fall, over and over again. I remember hearing an airplane and being one of scores of people who went outside to look up at the sky, and look for reassurance in each other. I remember great relief identifying the plane as a fighter, not an airliner. I was scared on 9/11.
But not as scared as I was when I heard President Bush tell the world 'you are either with us or against us.' That was a victory for the terrorists: they had just been recognized as a global power by the most powerful nation on earth. Not even in WWII, fighting some of the most evil monsters ever to wear human skin, did the allies lay such a declaration before the world.
The disgustingly named Patriot Act and the formation of the TSA were another pair of victories: the terrorists had made us sacrifice our essential liberties for an illusion of security.
Then the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Why those countries? Why not pick the nation in the Mid East that had done more than any other to aid in the 9/11 attacks? Why Saudi Arabia's immunity? Or why not the nation(s) Osama was believed to be hiding in? Even in October of 2001 it was an open secret that Pakistan was a possible location - perhaps he was not there then, of course, but with what we know now it is hard to believe that officials, many of them quite senior, in Pakistan were not aware of his general location.
But now, almost ten full years after the 9/11 attacks, we have finally killed the ring leader. Rejoice! So will the TSA be stood down? No, our current administration is already warning us that this may lead to retaliatory attacks. So those 'temporary' 'emergency' measures turn out to have been neither temporary nor effective, and the 'emergency' appears to be permanent.
Don't get me wrong, some things have improved since 9/11: the armored cockpit doors on commercial aircraft and the measures to prevent people from rushing the cockpit are good, effective steps that have the added bonus of in no way compromising our rights. But groping by the TSA in no way adds to our security and is yet another erosion of our liberty.
It is a sign of the times that when I was thinking of the scorecard for the title I considered assigning three points for the TSA and their escalating steps along the road to bureaucratic waste and ineffectiveness. Then I couldn't decide if it should actually be four, or five, and finally decided to simply award them one for simplicity's sake.
So we've won a single battle, but we are still loosing the war.
On the bright side, we haven't lost yet. In commemoration both of the 100th anniversary of its adoption as the US Army's principle sidearm and the 10th anniversary of 9/11, this summer I am going to purchase a Colt 1911. Because while the right to keep and bear arms has been eroded, it still remains. Because while we are loosing, we have not yet lost. We can still win.
We can repeal the ill-named Patriot Act's provisions, and all other legislation contrary to the US Constitution. We can disband the TSA entirely, and let the airlines, individually, decide what they will allow on their planes and bear any expenses they choose to spend searching. We can punish the nations that actually bore responsibility for 9/11.
Friday, April 15, 2011
Two things are certain in life...
Here's a very interesting post:
http://larrycorreia.wordpress.com/2011/04/15/happy-tax-day/
An accountant (who is also a self-confessed gun nut and a successful sci-fi author, which is how I know him) talks about the current budget situation.
My own take: we need to amputate federal spending.
Amputate?
Well, 'cuts' are small, right? Amputations have a tendency to be larger.
Amputation is usually rather drastic, isn't it?
Yeah, only done in life-or-death situations. I still say: amputate.
Cutting thirty-odd billion is a drop in the bucket. That's less than 1% of our budget. We're spending over 150% of what we earned in FY2010. We need to amputate ONE THIRD of Federal spending. ONE THIRD. If Federal spending were a person, that'd be both its legs. Amputate.
Oh, and cutting a third of the budget? That'd just mean things aren't getting any worse. To actually pay off the debt would mean cutting even more.
My proposal? Cut half, across the board. Every federal agency, without exception, will have its budget halved and must lay off half its work force. Yes, that includes the military. Half of our serving personnel are going to be discharged. Every subsidy, every program, every grant, halved.
I'd love to be more selective, but we don't have time. We're on a train heading at full speed for a cliff edge. We need to put the breaks on now, hard, and pray we don't jackknife. The fall WILL kill us. Putting on the breaks WILL hurt... but we MAY survive.
An across-the-board cut is also the only way I see to get past the debate. I'd like to eliminate the entire TSA - lock, stock, and groping. But I'd never get half of Congress to agree to that. Meanwhile, they'd like to cut federal rail subsidies I'd like to see raised. The only way to make the cuts 'fair' is to make it clear we're cutting EVERYTHING.
Yeah. We're cutting the legs off the federal government. The patient might not survive the surgery. However we can be absolutely sure they'll bleed to death if we DON'T amputate. Any decent doctor would know what to do. Cut... and pray.
http://larrycorreia.wordpress.com/2011/04/15/happy-tax-day/
An accountant (who is also a self-confessed gun nut and a successful sci-fi author, which is how I know him) talks about the current budget situation.
My own take: we need to amputate federal spending.
Amputate?
Well, 'cuts' are small, right? Amputations have a tendency to be larger.
Amputation is usually rather drastic, isn't it?
Yeah, only done in life-or-death situations. I still say: amputate.
Cutting thirty-odd billion is a drop in the bucket. That's less than 1% of our budget. We're spending over 150% of what we earned in FY2010. We need to amputate ONE THIRD of Federal spending. ONE THIRD. If Federal spending were a person, that'd be both its legs. Amputate.
Oh, and cutting a third of the budget? That'd just mean things aren't getting any worse. To actually pay off the debt would mean cutting even more.
My proposal? Cut half, across the board. Every federal agency, without exception, will have its budget halved and must lay off half its work force. Yes, that includes the military. Half of our serving personnel are going to be discharged. Every subsidy, every program, every grant, halved.
I'd love to be more selective, but we don't have time. We're on a train heading at full speed for a cliff edge. We need to put the breaks on now, hard, and pray we don't jackknife. The fall WILL kill us. Putting on the breaks WILL hurt... but we MAY survive.
An across-the-board cut is also the only way I see to get past the debate. I'd like to eliminate the entire TSA - lock, stock, and groping. But I'd never get half of Congress to agree to that. Meanwhile, they'd like to cut federal rail subsidies I'd like to see raised. The only way to make the cuts 'fair' is to make it clear we're cutting EVERYTHING.
Yeah. We're cutting the legs off the federal government. The patient might not survive the surgery. However we can be absolutely sure they'll bleed to death if we DON'T amputate. Any decent doctor would know what to do. Cut... and pray.
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