The Silent Service
While Japanese forces fought in the Solomon Islands, others were fighting an increasingly desperate battle to keep them supplied. The improved performance of US torpedoes, coupled with slowly improving tactics and assignment of operational zones – hunting grounds, as the sub skippers called them – were making the US submarine force one of the most deadly weapons being wielded against Japan.
By the end of 1943 over a third of the Japanese pre-war merchant fleet had been sunk, the vast majority of the losses being inflicted by submarines. During 1943 Japanese merchant ships were being sunk ten times faster than they could be built. Dozens of destroyers, numerous lighter combatants, and several major combatants had been lost as well.
In November of 1943 Yamamoto recommended that construction on all ships larger than destroyers not at least 50% complete be suspended, work being shifted to escorts and merchant ships. Condemned by some as defeatist, this recommendation was supported at least in part by others, who noted that at the present rate the Japanese destroyer force would cease to exist by the end of 1945, despite new construction.
The reasons for Japan’s plight were many. Convoys had been slow to form and even at the end of 1943 many ships sailed alone. Escorts were scarce due to low pre-war priorities, and only so many destroyers could be withdrawn from Combined Fleet for escort work. The need for light forces to fight in the Solomons had further drained the escort pool. What escorts were available were poorly trained for ASW and equipment varied dramatically. In particular depth-charge patterns were usually set fairly shallow, meaning that a US submarine that managed to evade the initial attack was typically able to break contact without damage. This stood in sharp contrast to Allied ASW, who were able to prosecute-to-kill on a regular basis.
The US ability to mass-produce good fleet boats also played a key part. While Japan seldom built more than half a dozen boats to a single design, the US built over 30 Gato-class boats in 1942 and again in 1943, along with two dozen Balao-class boats that had only slight modification from the Gato-class. This standardization was a tremendous benefit in training crews and applying tactical lessons.
The vaunted U-boats loudly threatened Britain. The Gatos silently strangled Japan.
Monday, June 27, 2011
Friday, June 24, 2011
December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part XVI
Bougainville
On December 16th the US decoded Japanese signals that indicated a major convoy would be running from Rabaul to Bougainville. The troops and supplies would then be ferried to New Georgia by barges. The Navy decided to intercept the convoy just short of Bougainville with MTBRons 1, 9, and 11, with 29 PT boats between them. The PTs would attack during the night of the 17th/18th, delaying the convoy so that aircraft from New Georgia could destroy them before they could unload at Bougainville.
The US plan fell apart almost from the beginning. The senior officer of the three squadrons, newly promoted CDR Taylor, had to return to base due to an engine failure on his boat. Taylor ordered a message to be relayed via blinker light to LtCDR Kelly of MTBRon 9, informing him that he was in command, but the message never reached him. Most of MTBRon 11 had been informed, however, and waited for orders from Kelly which never came. The two squadrons missed a planned course change, and it was an hour before Kelly discovered he was in command and attempted to rectify the situation.
MTBRon 1 had taken a different course from the other two squadrons, intending to catch the Japanese in a crossfire. Its 12 boats were under the command of LT John F. Kennedy and had only arrived a few weeks earlier. Taking advantage of lessons learned by the earlier PT actions the boats had been heavily refitted. The heavy torpedo tubes with the mediocre MkVIII torpedoes had been landed and replaced with MkXIII aircraft torpedoes in roll-off mounts. The weight savings had been used to heavily upgrade the gun armament – each boat carried a 37mm M4 cannon forward, single 20mm Oerlikon cannons forward and aft, and the usual pair of twin 0.50cal machineguns.
The Japanese convoy consisted of three old Minekaze class DDs, two small Wakatake class DDs, five Type A patrol boats, four Momi class fast tranports, three minesweepers, and 19 cargo ships of one to six thousand tons displacement. Kennedy’s squadron was outnumber three to one in hulls, and heavily outgunned.
MTBRon 1 made contact just after midnight. The twelve boats, unaware that they were unsupported, accelerated to flank speed and charged the Japanese force. Gunfire shattered the night, and 48 torpedoes rolled into the sea. The PTs briefly turned away, then turned back in to follow their torpedoes. The plan had been to actually pass through the Japanese formation, relying on the superior maneuverability of the PTs to avoid collision, while hopefully creating additional chaos in the Japanese formation and causing them to fire on their own ships.
Eleven torpedoes found targets, one of them hitting a 1C type freighter loaded with ammunition. The explosion lit up the entire battle, and rained burning debris onto several nearby ships. MTBRon 1 raced through the Japanese formation, already beginning to unravel, at over 40 knots. Two boats were lost, one to gunfire and one to ramming. The ten survivors realized at this point that they were alone. Kennedy quickly ordered his boats to penetrate the formation once again, and this time to fire flares while in the enemy’s midst. Kennedy hoped to provide a visual signal for the other two squadrons to home in on, and perhaps make the Japanese think that heavier forces were nearby waiting for a signal.
The second attack threw the Japanese into chaos. At least two collisions occurred, and several PTs reported Japanese ships firing on each other. Kennedy’s PT314 scored a direct hit with 37mm fire on Sawakaze’s bridge, and the destroyer veered off course and rammed a 1TS type tanker.
Three more PTs were lost, and two more suffered casualties. Kennedy himself was lightly wounded by shrapnel but remained at his post and led his seven remaining boats home.
The Japanese convoy scattered, and many were sunk during the day by aircraft from New Georgia. Only a tenth of the convoy’s supplies reached Bougainville.
For successfully disrupting the convoy and for “exceptional bravery and decisive action under fire” Lt Kennedy was awarded the Navy Cross.
On December 16th the US decoded Japanese signals that indicated a major convoy would be running from Rabaul to Bougainville. The troops and supplies would then be ferried to New Georgia by barges. The Navy decided to intercept the convoy just short of Bougainville with MTBRons 1, 9, and 11, with 29 PT boats between them. The PTs would attack during the night of the 17th/18th, delaying the convoy so that aircraft from New Georgia could destroy them before they could unload at Bougainville.
The US plan fell apart almost from the beginning. The senior officer of the three squadrons, newly promoted CDR Taylor, had to return to base due to an engine failure on his boat. Taylor ordered a message to be relayed via blinker light to LtCDR Kelly of MTBRon 9, informing him that he was in command, but the message never reached him. Most of MTBRon 11 had been informed, however, and waited for orders from Kelly which never came. The two squadrons missed a planned course change, and it was an hour before Kelly discovered he was in command and attempted to rectify the situation.
MTBRon 1 had taken a different course from the other two squadrons, intending to catch the Japanese in a crossfire. Its 12 boats were under the command of LT John F. Kennedy and had only arrived a few weeks earlier. Taking advantage of lessons learned by the earlier PT actions the boats had been heavily refitted. The heavy torpedo tubes with the mediocre MkVIII torpedoes had been landed and replaced with MkXIII aircraft torpedoes in roll-off mounts. The weight savings had been used to heavily upgrade the gun armament – each boat carried a 37mm M4 cannon forward, single 20mm Oerlikon cannons forward and aft, and the usual pair of twin 0.50cal machineguns.
The Japanese convoy consisted of three old Minekaze class DDs, two small Wakatake class DDs, five Type A patrol boats, four Momi class fast tranports, three minesweepers, and 19 cargo ships of one to six thousand tons displacement. Kennedy’s squadron was outnumber three to one in hulls, and heavily outgunned.
MTBRon 1 made contact just after midnight. The twelve boats, unaware that they were unsupported, accelerated to flank speed and charged the Japanese force. Gunfire shattered the night, and 48 torpedoes rolled into the sea. The PTs briefly turned away, then turned back in to follow their torpedoes. The plan had been to actually pass through the Japanese formation, relying on the superior maneuverability of the PTs to avoid collision, while hopefully creating additional chaos in the Japanese formation and causing them to fire on their own ships.
Eleven torpedoes found targets, one of them hitting a 1C type freighter loaded with ammunition. The explosion lit up the entire battle, and rained burning debris onto several nearby ships. MTBRon 1 raced through the Japanese formation, already beginning to unravel, at over 40 knots. Two boats were lost, one to gunfire and one to ramming. The ten survivors realized at this point that they were alone. Kennedy quickly ordered his boats to penetrate the formation once again, and this time to fire flares while in the enemy’s midst. Kennedy hoped to provide a visual signal for the other two squadrons to home in on, and perhaps make the Japanese think that heavier forces were nearby waiting for a signal.
The second attack threw the Japanese into chaos. At least two collisions occurred, and several PTs reported Japanese ships firing on each other. Kennedy’s PT314 scored a direct hit with 37mm fire on Sawakaze’s bridge, and the destroyer veered off course and rammed a 1TS type tanker.
Three more PTs were lost, and two more suffered casualties. Kennedy himself was lightly wounded by shrapnel but remained at his post and led his seven remaining boats home.
The Japanese convoy scattered, and many were sunk during the day by aircraft from New Georgia. Only a tenth of the convoy’s supplies reached Bougainville.
For successfully disrupting the convoy and for “exceptional bravery and decisive action under fire” Lt Kennedy was awarded the Navy Cross.
Wednesday, June 22, 2011
December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part XV
The Solomons Campaign, Part IV
At dawn, as the Japanese turned to depart, they were surprised by nine PT’s of MTB Squadron 11 and five from MTBRon 9. Under the Squadron 11 CO LtCDR Taylor, who had gathered the various anti-barge patrols during the night, the 14 wooden boats came charging out of the rising sun at over 40 knots. The Japanese, tired from the high speed run, earlier engagement, and hours of sustained gunnery, were slow to notice the attack. Only two destroyers and one cruiser managed to open fire before the PT’s salvoed their deadly fish at close range. Fifty-three torpedoes raced through the water. Thanks to tender modifications to their firing pins and an almost unhindered firing run, the torpedoes achieved excellent results: twelve hits on eight targets, with every hit detonating. Kongo had been hit twice more, Haruna three times, Takao twice, Chokai once, and four destroyers had been hit once each. Only one destroyer sank as a direct result of the torpedo attack, but the Japanese had been hamstrung; most of their heavy ships were damaged - Haruna and Takao could barely make 10 knots and still keep ahead of the flooding. PT160 from MTBRon 9 was the only loss to the US, though two other boat’s, including Taylor’s, were damaged by near-misses. Taylor had deliberately spread his attacks in hopes of achieving this exact result: Halsey’s force was moving to cut off their escape at flank speed, and no damaged Japanese ship could hope to avoid them. LtCDR Taylor would be awarded the Navy Cross for this action.
From dawn to dusk a furious running air battle shifted and eddied around New Georgia and the waters nearby as the Japanese threw every plane available into action in a desperate effort to save their exposed capital ships. Suicidal attacks were made on the US carrier force and only slightly better odds were faced by fighters trying to break through escorting Hellcats to engage Dauntless and Avenger bombers as they methodically crushed the Bombardment Force. Almost 100 Japanese aircraft were lost in the effort in trade for a dozen US aircraft and a pair of hits on US ships; one bomb that exploded on the edge of USS Yorktown’s flight deck, smashing one of her anti-aircraft galleries but leaving her able to operate aircraft and a torpedo that struck USS San Francisco midships, causing major flooding and forcing the ship to turn for home. The losses to the Japanese were far worse. Air attacks sank Kongo, Haruna, Takao, and Maya along with three of the six remaining destroyers. Chokai, badly damaged, was finished off by gunfire from USS Iowa and USS Massachusetts the next day.
Only Kirishima, Agano, and three destroyers managed to reach Rabaul, all but Agano damaged to some extent.
Two IJN submarines were swept aside by the US fleet’s screen without loss.
Halsey was eager to capitalize on this victory, and proposed to his staff a strike on Rabaul, which he noted must have been emptied of aircraft in the day’s fighting. His staff, while agreeing with his analysis of the situation, to a man counseled caution. Follow up on the victory with the planned bombardment of New Georgia and sail for home with a solid victory. Halsey, reluctantly, ordered this course of action.
With Japanese air power in the area devastated and rotating cover from US carriers, the Marines were able to resume their advance in New Georgia. In early November reinforcements and supplies began to arrive in large numbers, while air and sea patrols increasingly isolated the Japanese. Smith was promoted to Lt. General and placed in command of the newly formed I Amphibious Corps, consisting initially of the 2nd and 3rd Marine Divisions, 1st Marine Air Wing, and various support and combat support units. By the end of November organized resistance on New Georgia had ended. The island began fulfilling its intended function, though well behind schedule: serving as a base to attack Japanese forces in the area and prevent them from conducting additional operations.
On December 3rd the first squadron of B-24 Liberators landed on New Georgia, followed over the next week by the rest of the 25th Bombardment Group (Heavy). Liberators raided Rabaul for the first time on the 10th, beginning a series of regular attacks on Japanese bases. The 17th Bombardment Group (Medium) followed with B-25 Mitchells. The 95th Bomb Squadron from this group was the first to use skip-bombing in combat on the 18th, sinking an IJN destroyer transport near Bougainville.
With operations in the Solomon Islands now running smoothly and in US favor, Nimitz turned his attention to the next major target.
Yamamoto was forced to accept the neutralizing of the Solomons, but his carrier and battleship forces were once again ready for action. The next major move by the USN would be countered in force.
At dawn, as the Japanese turned to depart, they were surprised by nine PT’s of MTB Squadron 11 and five from MTBRon 9. Under the Squadron 11 CO LtCDR Taylor, who had gathered the various anti-barge patrols during the night, the 14 wooden boats came charging out of the rising sun at over 40 knots. The Japanese, tired from the high speed run, earlier engagement, and hours of sustained gunnery, were slow to notice the attack. Only two destroyers and one cruiser managed to open fire before the PT’s salvoed their deadly fish at close range. Fifty-three torpedoes raced through the water. Thanks to tender modifications to their firing pins and an almost unhindered firing run, the torpedoes achieved excellent results: twelve hits on eight targets, with every hit detonating. Kongo had been hit twice more, Haruna three times, Takao twice, Chokai once, and four destroyers had been hit once each. Only one destroyer sank as a direct result of the torpedo attack, but the Japanese had been hamstrung; most of their heavy ships were damaged - Haruna and Takao could barely make 10 knots and still keep ahead of the flooding. PT160 from MTBRon 9 was the only loss to the US, though two other boat’s, including Taylor’s, were damaged by near-misses. Taylor had deliberately spread his attacks in hopes of achieving this exact result: Halsey’s force was moving to cut off their escape at flank speed, and no damaged Japanese ship could hope to avoid them. LtCDR Taylor would be awarded the Navy Cross for this action.
From dawn to dusk a furious running air battle shifted and eddied around New Georgia and the waters nearby as the Japanese threw every plane available into action in a desperate effort to save their exposed capital ships. Suicidal attacks were made on the US carrier force and only slightly better odds were faced by fighters trying to break through escorting Hellcats to engage Dauntless and Avenger bombers as they methodically crushed the Bombardment Force. Almost 100 Japanese aircraft were lost in the effort in trade for a dozen US aircraft and a pair of hits on US ships; one bomb that exploded on the edge of USS Yorktown’s flight deck, smashing one of her anti-aircraft galleries but leaving her able to operate aircraft and a torpedo that struck USS San Francisco midships, causing major flooding and forcing the ship to turn for home. The losses to the Japanese were far worse. Air attacks sank Kongo, Haruna, Takao, and Maya along with three of the six remaining destroyers. Chokai, badly damaged, was finished off by gunfire from USS Iowa and USS Massachusetts the next day.
Only Kirishima, Agano, and three destroyers managed to reach Rabaul, all but Agano damaged to some extent.
Two IJN submarines were swept aside by the US fleet’s screen without loss.
Halsey was eager to capitalize on this victory, and proposed to his staff a strike on Rabaul, which he noted must have been emptied of aircraft in the day’s fighting. His staff, while agreeing with his analysis of the situation, to a man counseled caution. Follow up on the victory with the planned bombardment of New Georgia and sail for home with a solid victory. Halsey, reluctantly, ordered this course of action.
With Japanese air power in the area devastated and rotating cover from US carriers, the Marines were able to resume their advance in New Georgia. In early November reinforcements and supplies began to arrive in large numbers, while air and sea patrols increasingly isolated the Japanese. Smith was promoted to Lt. General and placed in command of the newly formed I Amphibious Corps, consisting initially of the 2nd and 3rd Marine Divisions, 1st Marine Air Wing, and various support and combat support units. By the end of November organized resistance on New Georgia had ended. The island began fulfilling its intended function, though well behind schedule: serving as a base to attack Japanese forces in the area and prevent them from conducting additional operations.
On December 3rd the first squadron of B-24 Liberators landed on New Georgia, followed over the next week by the rest of the 25th Bombardment Group (Heavy). Liberators raided Rabaul for the first time on the 10th, beginning a series of regular attacks on Japanese bases. The 17th Bombardment Group (Medium) followed with B-25 Mitchells. The 95th Bomb Squadron from this group was the first to use skip-bombing in combat on the 18th, sinking an IJN destroyer transport near Bougainville.
With operations in the Solomon Islands now running smoothly and in US favor, Nimitz turned his attention to the next major target.
Yamamoto was forced to accept the neutralizing of the Solomons, but his carrier and battleship forces were once again ready for action. The next major move by the USN would be countered in force.
Tuesday, June 21, 2011
December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part XIV
The Solomons Campaign, Part III
While light forces and aircraft fought a series of duels around the clock in the shallow waters of the Solomons, the US carrier, battleship, and amphibious forces were re-fitting at Pearl Harbor. Halsey believed that Rabaul could be crushed by the fleet and advocated dispatching the fleet to conduct air strikes and shore bombardment to smash it. Turner proposed loading those units of the 3rd Marine Division that had already arrived in Hawaii and using them to reinforce New Georgia, with the carriers providing cover against the possible emergence of the Japanese fleet. Spruance proposed bringing the 1st Marine Division forward from Tarawa, either to reinforce New Georgia or to take Guadalcanal, the largest Japanese base in the SE Solomon Islands.
In addition to all these plans, King was insistent that the schedule for the planned 1944 campaigns not be jeopardized. The New Georgia campaign had been intended to provide a base for operations to counter Japanese activities in the Coral Sea and the nearby islands. If it instead tied down US forces it would be a strategic failure no matter the attrition ratio achieved.
Meanwhile, Yamamoto was modifying his own plans. The fragile hold the US had on New Georgia might be broken if the main US airfield and the limited port facilities could be destroyed. On October 21st, the three remaining Kongo-class battlecruisers accompanied by three Takao-class heavy cruisers, light cruiser Agano, and seven destroyers left Truk for Rabaul. There they would refuel, then make a high-speed dash to New Georgia.
Nimitz worked out a compromise. The USN would conduct limited operations and raids with a third of the fast carrier force at a time, rotating forces to provide continuous coverage. Rabaul and Truk were judged too heavily defended (post-war analysis would reveal that this was not the case, but Intelligence opinions at the time were nearly unanimous) for what was in essence a strongly reinforced carrier division, but bases in the Solomons would be attacked in hopes of relieving the pressure on New Georgia. Just hours before the Japanese Bombardment Force sailed from Truk, TF 51 sailed from Pearl Harbor with USS Lexington, USS Yorktown, USS Enterprise CVL23, USS Iowa, USS Indiana, USS Massachusetts, USS New Orleans, USS San Francisco, USS San Diego, USS Phoenix, USS Helena, USS Cleveland, USS Santa Fe, and 24 destroyers under Admiral Halsey.
On October 27th, the US task force launched a pair of carrier strikes at Bougainville, destroying a number of Japanese aircraft for little loss to themselves. The Japanese correctly guessed that the strike represented only a part of the US fleet, and ordered the Bombardment Force to leave Rabaul on schedule that afternoon.
Halsey, however, was not content with a single carrier strike. The Hellcat and the strength of US AA fire between them seemed fully capable of handling the limited land-based air threats to the task force. Halsey had been provided with solid intelligence that the IJN fleet carriers were in home waters, an edge the Japanese were completely unaware of. Secure in his local superiority, Halsey closed with New Georgia, intending to use his battleships to pound known Japanese positions the next afternoon day. This would boost the Marine’s morale and hopefully have a material benefit as well.
A patrol of three PT boats from MTB Squadron 9 keeping watch for Japanese barge traffic spotted the IJN Bombardment Force shortly before midnight on the 27th. They attacked, inflicting only a single torpedo hit on Kongo for the loss of two boats, but were able to make a surprisingly accurate assessment of the Japanese force and warn New Georgia.
Well before dawn on the 28th the Japanese Bombardment force began hurling shells into the Marine positions on New Georgia. To the 2nd Marine Division it would simply be called The Night thereafter, and for those who survived it little more needed to be said. For two hours three battlecruisers, three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and eight destroyers pounded the US positions, shooting from the map but well aware of US concentrations from observations by land units during the previous weeks. Losses were heavily, especially among the 105mm howitzer batteries and what remained of the air base. General Smith’s headquarters were hit by an 8” shell, wounding the general and killing a number of his staff. Smith, however, had already broadcast the MTB report, which Halsey’s force had picked up.
While light forces and aircraft fought a series of duels around the clock in the shallow waters of the Solomons, the US carrier, battleship, and amphibious forces were re-fitting at Pearl Harbor. Halsey believed that Rabaul could be crushed by the fleet and advocated dispatching the fleet to conduct air strikes and shore bombardment to smash it. Turner proposed loading those units of the 3rd Marine Division that had already arrived in Hawaii and using them to reinforce New Georgia, with the carriers providing cover against the possible emergence of the Japanese fleet. Spruance proposed bringing the 1st Marine Division forward from Tarawa, either to reinforce New Georgia or to take Guadalcanal, the largest Japanese base in the SE Solomon Islands.
In addition to all these plans, King was insistent that the schedule for the planned 1944 campaigns not be jeopardized. The New Georgia campaign had been intended to provide a base for operations to counter Japanese activities in the Coral Sea and the nearby islands. If it instead tied down US forces it would be a strategic failure no matter the attrition ratio achieved.
Meanwhile, Yamamoto was modifying his own plans. The fragile hold the US had on New Georgia might be broken if the main US airfield and the limited port facilities could be destroyed. On October 21st, the three remaining Kongo-class battlecruisers accompanied by three Takao-class heavy cruisers, light cruiser Agano, and seven destroyers left Truk for Rabaul. There they would refuel, then make a high-speed dash to New Georgia.
Nimitz worked out a compromise. The USN would conduct limited operations and raids with a third of the fast carrier force at a time, rotating forces to provide continuous coverage. Rabaul and Truk were judged too heavily defended (post-war analysis would reveal that this was not the case, but Intelligence opinions at the time were nearly unanimous) for what was in essence a strongly reinforced carrier division, but bases in the Solomons would be attacked in hopes of relieving the pressure on New Georgia. Just hours before the Japanese Bombardment Force sailed from Truk, TF 51 sailed from Pearl Harbor with USS Lexington, USS Yorktown, USS Enterprise CVL23, USS Iowa, USS Indiana, USS Massachusetts, USS New Orleans, USS San Francisco, USS San Diego, USS Phoenix, USS Helena, USS Cleveland, USS Santa Fe, and 24 destroyers under Admiral Halsey.
On October 27th, the US task force launched a pair of carrier strikes at Bougainville, destroying a number of Japanese aircraft for little loss to themselves. The Japanese correctly guessed that the strike represented only a part of the US fleet, and ordered the Bombardment Force to leave Rabaul on schedule that afternoon.
Halsey, however, was not content with a single carrier strike. The Hellcat and the strength of US AA fire between them seemed fully capable of handling the limited land-based air threats to the task force. Halsey had been provided with solid intelligence that the IJN fleet carriers were in home waters, an edge the Japanese were completely unaware of. Secure in his local superiority, Halsey closed with New Georgia, intending to use his battleships to pound known Japanese positions the next afternoon day. This would boost the Marine’s morale and hopefully have a material benefit as well.
A patrol of three PT boats from MTB Squadron 9 keeping watch for Japanese barge traffic spotted the IJN Bombardment Force shortly before midnight on the 27th. They attacked, inflicting only a single torpedo hit on Kongo for the loss of two boats, but were able to make a surprisingly accurate assessment of the Japanese force and warn New Georgia.
Well before dawn on the 28th the Japanese Bombardment force began hurling shells into the Marine positions on New Georgia. To the 2nd Marine Division it would simply be called The Night thereafter, and for those who survived it little more needed to be said. For two hours three battlecruisers, three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and eight destroyers pounded the US positions, shooting from the map but well aware of US concentrations from observations by land units during the previous weeks. Losses were heavily, especially among the 105mm howitzer batteries and what remained of the air base. General Smith’s headquarters were hit by an 8” shell, wounding the general and killing a number of his staff. Smith, however, had already broadcast the MTB report, which Halsey’s force had picked up.
Wednesday, June 15, 2011
Outrageous!
This is just sick:
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=137198108
http://www.npr.org/2011/06/15/137205543/atf-scandal-heats-up-in-congressional-hearing
The BATF sold over 1,800 weapons to illegal buyers, knowing many of them were headed for Mexican drug cartels, and DIDN'T ARREST THE BUYERS. To put icing on the cake, they stopped tracking the weapons well before they reached the Mexican border.
This past weekend, I had to fill out three forms, present two forms of government-issued ID, and wait while my SSI was run through a government database in order to buy two firearms. I should have bought from an undercover ATF agent and saved myself a lot of paperwork! Its not like there would have been a downside - they wouldn't arrest me or track me or anything like that.
Seriously, even a semi-auto rifle goes for over $1,000, easy. That means the BATF sold over TWO MILLION DOLLARS worth of weapons ILLEGALLY. For NOTHING. Wait, that's not fair. They did it to put weapons in the hands of PROBABLE CRIMINALS.
Support Gun Control! So the Government can sell weapons to criminals while denying them to law-abiding citizens.
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=137198108
http://www.npr.org/2011/06/15/137205543/atf-scandal-heats-up-in-congressional-hearing
The BATF sold over 1,800 weapons to illegal buyers, knowing many of them were headed for Mexican drug cartels, and DIDN'T ARREST THE BUYERS. To put icing on the cake, they stopped tracking the weapons well before they reached the Mexican border.
This past weekend, I had to fill out three forms, present two forms of government-issued ID, and wait while my SSI was run through a government database in order to buy two firearms. I should have bought from an undercover ATF agent and saved myself a lot of paperwork! Its not like there would have been a downside - they wouldn't arrest me or track me or anything like that.
Seriously, even a semi-auto rifle goes for over $1,000, easy. That means the BATF sold over TWO MILLION DOLLARS worth of weapons ILLEGALLY. For NOTHING. Wait, that's not fair. They did it to put weapons in the hands of PROBABLE CRIMINALS.
Support Gun Control! So the Government can sell weapons to criminals while denying them to law-abiding citizens.
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