The Silent Service
While Japanese forces fought in the Solomon Islands, others were fighting an increasingly desperate battle to keep them supplied. The improved performance of US torpedoes, coupled with slowly improving tactics and assignment of operational zones – hunting grounds, as the sub skippers called them – were making the US submarine force one of the most deadly weapons being wielded against Japan.
By the end of 1943 over a third of the Japanese pre-war merchant fleet had been sunk, the vast majority of the losses being inflicted by submarines. During 1943 Japanese merchant ships were being sunk ten times faster than they could be built. Dozens of destroyers, numerous lighter combatants, and several major combatants had been lost as well.
In November of 1943 Yamamoto recommended that construction on all ships larger than destroyers not at least 50% complete be suspended, work being shifted to escorts and merchant ships. Condemned by some as defeatist, this recommendation was supported at least in part by others, who noted that at the present rate the Japanese destroyer force would cease to exist by the end of 1945, despite new construction.
The reasons for Japan’s plight were many. Convoys had been slow to form and even at the end of 1943 many ships sailed alone. Escorts were scarce due to low pre-war priorities, and only so many destroyers could be withdrawn from Combined Fleet for escort work. The need for light forces to fight in the Solomons had further drained the escort pool. What escorts were available were poorly trained for ASW and equipment varied dramatically. In particular depth-charge patterns were usually set fairly shallow, meaning that a US submarine that managed to evade the initial attack was typically able to break contact without damage. This stood in sharp contrast to Allied ASW, who were able to prosecute-to-kill on a regular basis.
The US ability to mass-produce good fleet boats also played a key part. While Japan seldom built more than half a dozen boats to a single design, the US built over 30 Gato-class boats in 1942 and again in 1943, along with two dozen Balao-class boats that had only slight modification from the Gato-class. This standardization was a tremendous benefit in training crews and applying tactical lessons.
The vaunted U-boats loudly threatened Britain. The Gatos silently strangled Japan.
Monday, June 27, 2011
Friday, June 24, 2011
December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part XVI
Bougainville
On December 16th the US decoded Japanese signals that indicated a major convoy would be running from Rabaul to Bougainville. The troops and supplies would then be ferried to New Georgia by barges. The Navy decided to intercept the convoy just short of Bougainville with MTBRons 1, 9, and 11, with 29 PT boats between them. The PTs would attack during the night of the 17th/18th, delaying the convoy so that aircraft from New Georgia could destroy them before they could unload at Bougainville.
The US plan fell apart almost from the beginning. The senior officer of the three squadrons, newly promoted CDR Taylor, had to return to base due to an engine failure on his boat. Taylor ordered a message to be relayed via blinker light to LtCDR Kelly of MTBRon 9, informing him that he was in command, but the message never reached him. Most of MTBRon 11 had been informed, however, and waited for orders from Kelly which never came. The two squadrons missed a planned course change, and it was an hour before Kelly discovered he was in command and attempted to rectify the situation.
MTBRon 1 had taken a different course from the other two squadrons, intending to catch the Japanese in a crossfire. Its 12 boats were under the command of LT John F. Kennedy and had only arrived a few weeks earlier. Taking advantage of lessons learned by the earlier PT actions the boats had been heavily refitted. The heavy torpedo tubes with the mediocre MkVIII torpedoes had been landed and replaced with MkXIII aircraft torpedoes in roll-off mounts. The weight savings had been used to heavily upgrade the gun armament – each boat carried a 37mm M4 cannon forward, single 20mm Oerlikon cannons forward and aft, and the usual pair of twin 0.50cal machineguns.
The Japanese convoy consisted of three old Minekaze class DDs, two small Wakatake class DDs, five Type A patrol boats, four Momi class fast tranports, three minesweepers, and 19 cargo ships of one to six thousand tons displacement. Kennedy’s squadron was outnumber three to one in hulls, and heavily outgunned.
MTBRon 1 made contact just after midnight. The twelve boats, unaware that they were unsupported, accelerated to flank speed and charged the Japanese force. Gunfire shattered the night, and 48 torpedoes rolled into the sea. The PTs briefly turned away, then turned back in to follow their torpedoes. The plan had been to actually pass through the Japanese formation, relying on the superior maneuverability of the PTs to avoid collision, while hopefully creating additional chaos in the Japanese formation and causing them to fire on their own ships.
Eleven torpedoes found targets, one of them hitting a 1C type freighter loaded with ammunition. The explosion lit up the entire battle, and rained burning debris onto several nearby ships. MTBRon 1 raced through the Japanese formation, already beginning to unravel, at over 40 knots. Two boats were lost, one to gunfire and one to ramming. The ten survivors realized at this point that they were alone. Kennedy quickly ordered his boats to penetrate the formation once again, and this time to fire flares while in the enemy’s midst. Kennedy hoped to provide a visual signal for the other two squadrons to home in on, and perhaps make the Japanese think that heavier forces were nearby waiting for a signal.
The second attack threw the Japanese into chaos. At least two collisions occurred, and several PTs reported Japanese ships firing on each other. Kennedy’s PT314 scored a direct hit with 37mm fire on Sawakaze’s bridge, and the destroyer veered off course and rammed a 1TS type tanker.
Three more PTs were lost, and two more suffered casualties. Kennedy himself was lightly wounded by shrapnel but remained at his post and led his seven remaining boats home.
The Japanese convoy scattered, and many were sunk during the day by aircraft from New Georgia. Only a tenth of the convoy’s supplies reached Bougainville.
For successfully disrupting the convoy and for “exceptional bravery and decisive action under fire” Lt Kennedy was awarded the Navy Cross.
On December 16th the US decoded Japanese signals that indicated a major convoy would be running from Rabaul to Bougainville. The troops and supplies would then be ferried to New Georgia by barges. The Navy decided to intercept the convoy just short of Bougainville with MTBRons 1, 9, and 11, with 29 PT boats between them. The PTs would attack during the night of the 17th/18th, delaying the convoy so that aircraft from New Georgia could destroy them before they could unload at Bougainville.
The US plan fell apart almost from the beginning. The senior officer of the three squadrons, newly promoted CDR Taylor, had to return to base due to an engine failure on his boat. Taylor ordered a message to be relayed via blinker light to LtCDR Kelly of MTBRon 9, informing him that he was in command, but the message never reached him. Most of MTBRon 11 had been informed, however, and waited for orders from Kelly which never came. The two squadrons missed a planned course change, and it was an hour before Kelly discovered he was in command and attempted to rectify the situation.
MTBRon 1 had taken a different course from the other two squadrons, intending to catch the Japanese in a crossfire. Its 12 boats were under the command of LT John F. Kennedy and had only arrived a few weeks earlier. Taking advantage of lessons learned by the earlier PT actions the boats had been heavily refitted. The heavy torpedo tubes with the mediocre MkVIII torpedoes had been landed and replaced with MkXIII aircraft torpedoes in roll-off mounts. The weight savings had been used to heavily upgrade the gun armament – each boat carried a 37mm M4 cannon forward, single 20mm Oerlikon cannons forward and aft, and the usual pair of twin 0.50cal machineguns.
The Japanese convoy consisted of three old Minekaze class DDs, two small Wakatake class DDs, five Type A patrol boats, four Momi class fast tranports, three minesweepers, and 19 cargo ships of one to six thousand tons displacement. Kennedy’s squadron was outnumber three to one in hulls, and heavily outgunned.
MTBRon 1 made contact just after midnight. The twelve boats, unaware that they were unsupported, accelerated to flank speed and charged the Japanese force. Gunfire shattered the night, and 48 torpedoes rolled into the sea. The PTs briefly turned away, then turned back in to follow their torpedoes. The plan had been to actually pass through the Japanese formation, relying on the superior maneuverability of the PTs to avoid collision, while hopefully creating additional chaos in the Japanese formation and causing them to fire on their own ships.
Eleven torpedoes found targets, one of them hitting a 1C type freighter loaded with ammunition. The explosion lit up the entire battle, and rained burning debris onto several nearby ships. MTBRon 1 raced through the Japanese formation, already beginning to unravel, at over 40 knots. Two boats were lost, one to gunfire and one to ramming. The ten survivors realized at this point that they were alone. Kennedy quickly ordered his boats to penetrate the formation once again, and this time to fire flares while in the enemy’s midst. Kennedy hoped to provide a visual signal for the other two squadrons to home in on, and perhaps make the Japanese think that heavier forces were nearby waiting for a signal.
The second attack threw the Japanese into chaos. At least two collisions occurred, and several PTs reported Japanese ships firing on each other. Kennedy’s PT314 scored a direct hit with 37mm fire on Sawakaze’s bridge, and the destroyer veered off course and rammed a 1TS type tanker.
Three more PTs were lost, and two more suffered casualties. Kennedy himself was lightly wounded by shrapnel but remained at his post and led his seven remaining boats home.
The Japanese convoy scattered, and many were sunk during the day by aircraft from New Georgia. Only a tenth of the convoy’s supplies reached Bougainville.
For successfully disrupting the convoy and for “exceptional bravery and decisive action under fire” Lt Kennedy was awarded the Navy Cross.
Wednesday, June 22, 2011
December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part XV
The Solomons Campaign, Part IV
At dawn, as the Japanese turned to depart, they were surprised by nine PT’s of MTB Squadron 11 and five from MTBRon 9. Under the Squadron 11 CO LtCDR Taylor, who had gathered the various anti-barge patrols during the night, the 14 wooden boats came charging out of the rising sun at over 40 knots. The Japanese, tired from the high speed run, earlier engagement, and hours of sustained gunnery, were slow to notice the attack. Only two destroyers and one cruiser managed to open fire before the PT’s salvoed their deadly fish at close range. Fifty-three torpedoes raced through the water. Thanks to tender modifications to their firing pins and an almost unhindered firing run, the torpedoes achieved excellent results: twelve hits on eight targets, with every hit detonating. Kongo had been hit twice more, Haruna three times, Takao twice, Chokai once, and four destroyers had been hit once each. Only one destroyer sank as a direct result of the torpedo attack, but the Japanese had been hamstrung; most of their heavy ships were damaged - Haruna and Takao could barely make 10 knots and still keep ahead of the flooding. PT160 from MTBRon 9 was the only loss to the US, though two other boat’s, including Taylor’s, were damaged by near-misses. Taylor had deliberately spread his attacks in hopes of achieving this exact result: Halsey’s force was moving to cut off their escape at flank speed, and no damaged Japanese ship could hope to avoid them. LtCDR Taylor would be awarded the Navy Cross for this action.
From dawn to dusk a furious running air battle shifted and eddied around New Georgia and the waters nearby as the Japanese threw every plane available into action in a desperate effort to save their exposed capital ships. Suicidal attacks were made on the US carrier force and only slightly better odds were faced by fighters trying to break through escorting Hellcats to engage Dauntless and Avenger bombers as they methodically crushed the Bombardment Force. Almost 100 Japanese aircraft were lost in the effort in trade for a dozen US aircraft and a pair of hits on US ships; one bomb that exploded on the edge of USS Yorktown’s flight deck, smashing one of her anti-aircraft galleries but leaving her able to operate aircraft and a torpedo that struck USS San Francisco midships, causing major flooding and forcing the ship to turn for home. The losses to the Japanese were far worse. Air attacks sank Kongo, Haruna, Takao, and Maya along with three of the six remaining destroyers. Chokai, badly damaged, was finished off by gunfire from USS Iowa and USS Massachusetts the next day.
Only Kirishima, Agano, and three destroyers managed to reach Rabaul, all but Agano damaged to some extent.
Two IJN submarines were swept aside by the US fleet’s screen without loss.
Halsey was eager to capitalize on this victory, and proposed to his staff a strike on Rabaul, which he noted must have been emptied of aircraft in the day’s fighting. His staff, while agreeing with his analysis of the situation, to a man counseled caution. Follow up on the victory with the planned bombardment of New Georgia and sail for home with a solid victory. Halsey, reluctantly, ordered this course of action.
With Japanese air power in the area devastated and rotating cover from US carriers, the Marines were able to resume their advance in New Georgia. In early November reinforcements and supplies began to arrive in large numbers, while air and sea patrols increasingly isolated the Japanese. Smith was promoted to Lt. General and placed in command of the newly formed I Amphibious Corps, consisting initially of the 2nd and 3rd Marine Divisions, 1st Marine Air Wing, and various support and combat support units. By the end of November organized resistance on New Georgia had ended. The island began fulfilling its intended function, though well behind schedule: serving as a base to attack Japanese forces in the area and prevent them from conducting additional operations.
On December 3rd the first squadron of B-24 Liberators landed on New Georgia, followed over the next week by the rest of the 25th Bombardment Group (Heavy). Liberators raided Rabaul for the first time on the 10th, beginning a series of regular attacks on Japanese bases. The 17th Bombardment Group (Medium) followed with B-25 Mitchells. The 95th Bomb Squadron from this group was the first to use skip-bombing in combat on the 18th, sinking an IJN destroyer transport near Bougainville.
With operations in the Solomon Islands now running smoothly and in US favor, Nimitz turned his attention to the next major target.
Yamamoto was forced to accept the neutralizing of the Solomons, but his carrier and battleship forces were once again ready for action. The next major move by the USN would be countered in force.
At dawn, as the Japanese turned to depart, they were surprised by nine PT’s of MTB Squadron 11 and five from MTBRon 9. Under the Squadron 11 CO LtCDR Taylor, who had gathered the various anti-barge patrols during the night, the 14 wooden boats came charging out of the rising sun at over 40 knots. The Japanese, tired from the high speed run, earlier engagement, and hours of sustained gunnery, were slow to notice the attack. Only two destroyers and one cruiser managed to open fire before the PT’s salvoed their deadly fish at close range. Fifty-three torpedoes raced through the water. Thanks to tender modifications to their firing pins and an almost unhindered firing run, the torpedoes achieved excellent results: twelve hits on eight targets, with every hit detonating. Kongo had been hit twice more, Haruna three times, Takao twice, Chokai once, and four destroyers had been hit once each. Only one destroyer sank as a direct result of the torpedo attack, but the Japanese had been hamstrung; most of their heavy ships were damaged - Haruna and Takao could barely make 10 knots and still keep ahead of the flooding. PT160 from MTBRon 9 was the only loss to the US, though two other boat’s, including Taylor’s, were damaged by near-misses. Taylor had deliberately spread his attacks in hopes of achieving this exact result: Halsey’s force was moving to cut off their escape at flank speed, and no damaged Japanese ship could hope to avoid them. LtCDR Taylor would be awarded the Navy Cross for this action.
From dawn to dusk a furious running air battle shifted and eddied around New Georgia and the waters nearby as the Japanese threw every plane available into action in a desperate effort to save their exposed capital ships. Suicidal attacks were made on the US carrier force and only slightly better odds were faced by fighters trying to break through escorting Hellcats to engage Dauntless and Avenger bombers as they methodically crushed the Bombardment Force. Almost 100 Japanese aircraft were lost in the effort in trade for a dozen US aircraft and a pair of hits on US ships; one bomb that exploded on the edge of USS Yorktown’s flight deck, smashing one of her anti-aircraft galleries but leaving her able to operate aircraft and a torpedo that struck USS San Francisco midships, causing major flooding and forcing the ship to turn for home. The losses to the Japanese were far worse. Air attacks sank Kongo, Haruna, Takao, and Maya along with three of the six remaining destroyers. Chokai, badly damaged, was finished off by gunfire from USS Iowa and USS Massachusetts the next day.
Only Kirishima, Agano, and three destroyers managed to reach Rabaul, all but Agano damaged to some extent.
Two IJN submarines were swept aside by the US fleet’s screen without loss.
Halsey was eager to capitalize on this victory, and proposed to his staff a strike on Rabaul, which he noted must have been emptied of aircraft in the day’s fighting. His staff, while agreeing with his analysis of the situation, to a man counseled caution. Follow up on the victory with the planned bombardment of New Georgia and sail for home with a solid victory. Halsey, reluctantly, ordered this course of action.
With Japanese air power in the area devastated and rotating cover from US carriers, the Marines were able to resume their advance in New Georgia. In early November reinforcements and supplies began to arrive in large numbers, while air and sea patrols increasingly isolated the Japanese. Smith was promoted to Lt. General and placed in command of the newly formed I Amphibious Corps, consisting initially of the 2nd and 3rd Marine Divisions, 1st Marine Air Wing, and various support and combat support units. By the end of November organized resistance on New Georgia had ended. The island began fulfilling its intended function, though well behind schedule: serving as a base to attack Japanese forces in the area and prevent them from conducting additional operations.
On December 3rd the first squadron of B-24 Liberators landed on New Georgia, followed over the next week by the rest of the 25th Bombardment Group (Heavy). Liberators raided Rabaul for the first time on the 10th, beginning a series of regular attacks on Japanese bases. The 17th Bombardment Group (Medium) followed with B-25 Mitchells. The 95th Bomb Squadron from this group was the first to use skip-bombing in combat on the 18th, sinking an IJN destroyer transport near Bougainville.
With operations in the Solomon Islands now running smoothly and in US favor, Nimitz turned his attention to the next major target.
Yamamoto was forced to accept the neutralizing of the Solomons, but his carrier and battleship forces were once again ready for action. The next major move by the USN would be countered in force.
Tuesday, June 21, 2011
December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part XIV
The Solomons Campaign, Part III
While light forces and aircraft fought a series of duels around the clock in the shallow waters of the Solomons, the US carrier, battleship, and amphibious forces were re-fitting at Pearl Harbor. Halsey believed that Rabaul could be crushed by the fleet and advocated dispatching the fleet to conduct air strikes and shore bombardment to smash it. Turner proposed loading those units of the 3rd Marine Division that had already arrived in Hawaii and using them to reinforce New Georgia, with the carriers providing cover against the possible emergence of the Japanese fleet. Spruance proposed bringing the 1st Marine Division forward from Tarawa, either to reinforce New Georgia or to take Guadalcanal, the largest Japanese base in the SE Solomon Islands.
In addition to all these plans, King was insistent that the schedule for the planned 1944 campaigns not be jeopardized. The New Georgia campaign had been intended to provide a base for operations to counter Japanese activities in the Coral Sea and the nearby islands. If it instead tied down US forces it would be a strategic failure no matter the attrition ratio achieved.
Meanwhile, Yamamoto was modifying his own plans. The fragile hold the US had on New Georgia might be broken if the main US airfield and the limited port facilities could be destroyed. On October 21st, the three remaining Kongo-class battlecruisers accompanied by three Takao-class heavy cruisers, light cruiser Agano, and seven destroyers left Truk for Rabaul. There they would refuel, then make a high-speed dash to New Georgia.
Nimitz worked out a compromise. The USN would conduct limited operations and raids with a third of the fast carrier force at a time, rotating forces to provide continuous coverage. Rabaul and Truk were judged too heavily defended (post-war analysis would reveal that this was not the case, but Intelligence opinions at the time were nearly unanimous) for what was in essence a strongly reinforced carrier division, but bases in the Solomons would be attacked in hopes of relieving the pressure on New Georgia. Just hours before the Japanese Bombardment Force sailed from Truk, TF 51 sailed from Pearl Harbor with USS Lexington, USS Yorktown, USS Enterprise CVL23, USS Iowa, USS Indiana, USS Massachusetts, USS New Orleans, USS San Francisco, USS San Diego, USS Phoenix, USS Helena, USS Cleveland, USS Santa Fe, and 24 destroyers under Admiral Halsey.
On October 27th, the US task force launched a pair of carrier strikes at Bougainville, destroying a number of Japanese aircraft for little loss to themselves. The Japanese correctly guessed that the strike represented only a part of the US fleet, and ordered the Bombardment Force to leave Rabaul on schedule that afternoon.
Halsey, however, was not content with a single carrier strike. The Hellcat and the strength of US AA fire between them seemed fully capable of handling the limited land-based air threats to the task force. Halsey had been provided with solid intelligence that the IJN fleet carriers were in home waters, an edge the Japanese were completely unaware of. Secure in his local superiority, Halsey closed with New Georgia, intending to use his battleships to pound known Japanese positions the next afternoon day. This would boost the Marine’s morale and hopefully have a material benefit as well.
A patrol of three PT boats from MTB Squadron 9 keeping watch for Japanese barge traffic spotted the IJN Bombardment Force shortly before midnight on the 27th. They attacked, inflicting only a single torpedo hit on Kongo for the loss of two boats, but were able to make a surprisingly accurate assessment of the Japanese force and warn New Georgia.
Well before dawn on the 28th the Japanese Bombardment force began hurling shells into the Marine positions on New Georgia. To the 2nd Marine Division it would simply be called The Night thereafter, and for those who survived it little more needed to be said. For two hours three battlecruisers, three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and eight destroyers pounded the US positions, shooting from the map but well aware of US concentrations from observations by land units during the previous weeks. Losses were heavily, especially among the 105mm howitzer batteries and what remained of the air base. General Smith’s headquarters were hit by an 8” shell, wounding the general and killing a number of his staff. Smith, however, had already broadcast the MTB report, which Halsey’s force had picked up.
While light forces and aircraft fought a series of duels around the clock in the shallow waters of the Solomons, the US carrier, battleship, and amphibious forces were re-fitting at Pearl Harbor. Halsey believed that Rabaul could be crushed by the fleet and advocated dispatching the fleet to conduct air strikes and shore bombardment to smash it. Turner proposed loading those units of the 3rd Marine Division that had already arrived in Hawaii and using them to reinforce New Georgia, with the carriers providing cover against the possible emergence of the Japanese fleet. Spruance proposed bringing the 1st Marine Division forward from Tarawa, either to reinforce New Georgia or to take Guadalcanal, the largest Japanese base in the SE Solomon Islands.
In addition to all these plans, King was insistent that the schedule for the planned 1944 campaigns not be jeopardized. The New Georgia campaign had been intended to provide a base for operations to counter Japanese activities in the Coral Sea and the nearby islands. If it instead tied down US forces it would be a strategic failure no matter the attrition ratio achieved.
Meanwhile, Yamamoto was modifying his own plans. The fragile hold the US had on New Georgia might be broken if the main US airfield and the limited port facilities could be destroyed. On October 21st, the three remaining Kongo-class battlecruisers accompanied by three Takao-class heavy cruisers, light cruiser Agano, and seven destroyers left Truk for Rabaul. There they would refuel, then make a high-speed dash to New Georgia.
Nimitz worked out a compromise. The USN would conduct limited operations and raids with a third of the fast carrier force at a time, rotating forces to provide continuous coverage. Rabaul and Truk were judged too heavily defended (post-war analysis would reveal that this was not the case, but Intelligence opinions at the time were nearly unanimous) for what was in essence a strongly reinforced carrier division, but bases in the Solomons would be attacked in hopes of relieving the pressure on New Georgia. Just hours before the Japanese Bombardment Force sailed from Truk, TF 51 sailed from Pearl Harbor with USS Lexington, USS Yorktown, USS Enterprise CVL23, USS Iowa, USS Indiana, USS Massachusetts, USS New Orleans, USS San Francisco, USS San Diego, USS Phoenix, USS Helena, USS Cleveland, USS Santa Fe, and 24 destroyers under Admiral Halsey.
On October 27th, the US task force launched a pair of carrier strikes at Bougainville, destroying a number of Japanese aircraft for little loss to themselves. The Japanese correctly guessed that the strike represented only a part of the US fleet, and ordered the Bombardment Force to leave Rabaul on schedule that afternoon.
Halsey, however, was not content with a single carrier strike. The Hellcat and the strength of US AA fire between them seemed fully capable of handling the limited land-based air threats to the task force. Halsey had been provided with solid intelligence that the IJN fleet carriers were in home waters, an edge the Japanese were completely unaware of. Secure in his local superiority, Halsey closed with New Georgia, intending to use his battleships to pound known Japanese positions the next afternoon day. This would boost the Marine’s morale and hopefully have a material benefit as well.
A patrol of three PT boats from MTB Squadron 9 keeping watch for Japanese barge traffic spotted the IJN Bombardment Force shortly before midnight on the 27th. They attacked, inflicting only a single torpedo hit on Kongo for the loss of two boats, but were able to make a surprisingly accurate assessment of the Japanese force and warn New Georgia.
Well before dawn on the 28th the Japanese Bombardment force began hurling shells into the Marine positions on New Georgia. To the 2nd Marine Division it would simply be called The Night thereafter, and for those who survived it little more needed to be said. For two hours three battlecruisers, three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and eight destroyers pounded the US positions, shooting from the map but well aware of US concentrations from observations by land units during the previous weeks. Losses were heavily, especially among the 105mm howitzer batteries and what remained of the air base. General Smith’s headquarters were hit by an 8” shell, wounding the general and killing a number of his staff. Smith, however, had already broadcast the MTB report, which Halsey’s force had picked up.
Wednesday, June 15, 2011
Outrageous!
This is just sick:
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=137198108
http://www.npr.org/2011/06/15/137205543/atf-scandal-heats-up-in-congressional-hearing
The BATF sold over 1,800 weapons to illegal buyers, knowing many of them were headed for Mexican drug cartels, and DIDN'T ARREST THE BUYERS. To put icing on the cake, they stopped tracking the weapons well before they reached the Mexican border.
This past weekend, I had to fill out three forms, present two forms of government-issued ID, and wait while my SSI was run through a government database in order to buy two firearms. I should have bought from an undercover ATF agent and saved myself a lot of paperwork! Its not like there would have been a downside - they wouldn't arrest me or track me or anything like that.
Seriously, even a semi-auto rifle goes for over $1,000, easy. That means the BATF sold over TWO MILLION DOLLARS worth of weapons ILLEGALLY. For NOTHING. Wait, that's not fair. They did it to put weapons in the hands of PROBABLE CRIMINALS.
Support Gun Control! So the Government can sell weapons to criminals while denying them to law-abiding citizens.
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=137198108
http://www.npr.org/2011/06/15/137205543/atf-scandal-heats-up-in-congressional-hearing
The BATF sold over 1,800 weapons to illegal buyers, knowing many of them were headed for Mexican drug cartels, and DIDN'T ARREST THE BUYERS. To put icing on the cake, they stopped tracking the weapons well before they reached the Mexican border.
This past weekend, I had to fill out three forms, present two forms of government-issued ID, and wait while my SSI was run through a government database in order to buy two firearms. I should have bought from an undercover ATF agent and saved myself a lot of paperwork! Its not like there would have been a downside - they wouldn't arrest me or track me or anything like that.
Seriously, even a semi-auto rifle goes for over $1,000, easy. That means the BATF sold over TWO MILLION DOLLARS worth of weapons ILLEGALLY. For NOTHING. Wait, that's not fair. They did it to put weapons in the hands of PROBABLE CRIMINALS.
Support Gun Control! So the Government can sell weapons to criminals while denying them to law-abiding citizens.
December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part XIII
The Solomons Campaign, Part II
On the 10th the Japanese tried another series of air strikes, this time approaching in small groups at low altitude to minimize radar warning. While warning was indeed minimal, the low altitude made the strikes very vulnerable once they were spotted. Losses to Hellcats and flak were near total, and the only damage was done by a Ki-51 which crashed into the USS Idaho, putting her aft main battery turret out of action.
The invasion itself had its own problems. The preliminary bombardment was even heavier than at Tarawa, but after a brief attempt to contest the landing the majority of the Japanese troops faded back into the jungle on the 12th. New Georgia was much larger and much more difficult terrain than Tarawa, and the 2nd Marine Division had a difficult time advancing.
On the night of the 12th, Japanese forces approached the US anchorage. A dozen Otori and Tomozuru torpedo boats had slipped from island to island. At 0400 on the 13th they raced into the US anchorage. They fired 32 torpedoes; not the deadly Type 93s, but dangerous enough, and engaged anything they saw with gunfire. US escorts sank five of the raiders with gunfire, and as the Japanese had hoped fired off numerous star shells to illuminate the area. One transport and two destroyers were hit, but the Japanese raid had accomplished its real mission.
Miles away, a strike force consisting of the cruisers Oi and Kitakami along with six destroyers had just finished a high-speed run from Rabaul. The task force’s best lookouts were watching the horizon in the direction of the US fleet. Star shells from the US escorts soon provided an aiming point, and the fleet salvoed 134 torpedoes at near-maximum range then turned back for Rabaul. Just as the Americans were settling down from the torpedo boat raid, the Type 93s arrived. Some 80 transports, landing ships, and auxiliaries along with 30 escorts were in the target area. Fifteen torpedoes hit five transports, an LST, a tanker, two cargo ships, a seaplane tender, two destroyers and a destroyer escort. Two of the transports and one cargo ship were saved, all the rest were sunk or destroyed.
The Japanese strike force had counted on land-based air cover to protect them when daylight came, but US carrier planes found them first. Kitakami and four destroyers were sunk by scores of SBDs and TBFs, and Oi and the other two destroyers were damaged.
Halsey was unwilling to risk his carriers close to New Georgia after the night of the 12th/13th. With only distant cover from the carriers, the battle-line pulled back to Tarawa to replenish ammunition, and the airbase on New Georgia itself incomplete, the Japanese were able to maintain parity in the air and near parity on the ground. The Marine advance slowed to a crawl. Japanese troops were brought in from other islands in the chain, escorted by light combatants. The US countered with its own light forces, including two squadrons of Motor Torpedo Boats, but they could not stop the reinforcements. On October 15th Halsey pulled the carrier force back to Pearl to replenish munitions, spares, and replace lost aircraft. The last surviving transports had been unloaded and withdrew with them.
General Julian Smith, commanding the 2nd Marine Division, found his forces under strength, with only minimal Navy support, and with only a single muddy field and two depleted Marine fighter squadrons for air support. It was not an enviable position. The Japanese ground forces seemed to grow stronger by the day, while his own forces could expect no major reinforcement for weeks at the least.
Smith, however, did not give in to despair. While his troops had difficulty advancing through the jungle, the Japanese had demonstrated a tendency to assault strong points without regard for losses. Smith setup a series of feint attacks, staged retreats, and deceptively quiet sectors of the front to trick the Japanese into attacking well-prepared and heavily equipped forces. The Japanese frequently believed they had encountered only a hasty defense, and accepted high losses to continue doomed attacks. Smith particularly encouraged the heavy use of all available automatic weapons; a gamble with his fragile logistic tail, but one that paid off. Cautious Japanese commanders advanced only slowly after encountering a few ambushes. The bold commanders often died leading their men. Japanese infiltration tactics proved far less successful then they had even in the Philippines: Smith seldom missed a chance to remind his rear-echelon units that every Marine was a rifleman first. Well-drilled volunteers with M1 Garand semi-automatic rifles proved a far greater challenge to the Japanese infiltrators than conscripts armed with bolt-action weapons at best.
It was in the jungles of New Georgia that the Marines “wrote the book” on jungle warfare.
It was in the jungles of New Georgia that the Japanese Army learned to fear the US Marines.
On the 10th the Japanese tried another series of air strikes, this time approaching in small groups at low altitude to minimize radar warning. While warning was indeed minimal, the low altitude made the strikes very vulnerable once they were spotted. Losses to Hellcats and flak were near total, and the only damage was done by a Ki-51 which crashed into the USS Idaho, putting her aft main battery turret out of action.
The invasion itself had its own problems. The preliminary bombardment was even heavier than at Tarawa, but after a brief attempt to contest the landing the majority of the Japanese troops faded back into the jungle on the 12th. New Georgia was much larger and much more difficult terrain than Tarawa, and the 2nd Marine Division had a difficult time advancing.
On the night of the 12th, Japanese forces approached the US anchorage. A dozen Otori and Tomozuru torpedo boats had slipped from island to island. At 0400 on the 13th they raced into the US anchorage. They fired 32 torpedoes; not the deadly Type 93s, but dangerous enough, and engaged anything they saw with gunfire. US escorts sank five of the raiders with gunfire, and as the Japanese had hoped fired off numerous star shells to illuminate the area. One transport and two destroyers were hit, but the Japanese raid had accomplished its real mission.
Miles away, a strike force consisting of the cruisers Oi and Kitakami along with six destroyers had just finished a high-speed run from Rabaul. The task force’s best lookouts were watching the horizon in the direction of the US fleet. Star shells from the US escorts soon provided an aiming point, and the fleet salvoed 134 torpedoes at near-maximum range then turned back for Rabaul. Just as the Americans were settling down from the torpedo boat raid, the Type 93s arrived. Some 80 transports, landing ships, and auxiliaries along with 30 escorts were in the target area. Fifteen torpedoes hit five transports, an LST, a tanker, two cargo ships, a seaplane tender, two destroyers and a destroyer escort. Two of the transports and one cargo ship were saved, all the rest were sunk or destroyed.
The Japanese strike force had counted on land-based air cover to protect them when daylight came, but US carrier planes found them first. Kitakami and four destroyers were sunk by scores of SBDs and TBFs, and Oi and the other two destroyers were damaged.
Halsey was unwilling to risk his carriers close to New Georgia after the night of the 12th/13th. With only distant cover from the carriers, the battle-line pulled back to Tarawa to replenish ammunition, and the airbase on New Georgia itself incomplete, the Japanese were able to maintain parity in the air and near parity on the ground. The Marine advance slowed to a crawl. Japanese troops were brought in from other islands in the chain, escorted by light combatants. The US countered with its own light forces, including two squadrons of Motor Torpedo Boats, but they could not stop the reinforcements. On October 15th Halsey pulled the carrier force back to Pearl to replenish munitions, spares, and replace lost aircraft. The last surviving transports had been unloaded and withdrew with them.
General Julian Smith, commanding the 2nd Marine Division, found his forces under strength, with only minimal Navy support, and with only a single muddy field and two depleted Marine fighter squadrons for air support. It was not an enviable position. The Japanese ground forces seemed to grow stronger by the day, while his own forces could expect no major reinforcement for weeks at the least.
Smith, however, did not give in to despair. While his troops had difficulty advancing through the jungle, the Japanese had demonstrated a tendency to assault strong points without regard for losses. Smith setup a series of feint attacks, staged retreats, and deceptively quiet sectors of the front to trick the Japanese into attacking well-prepared and heavily equipped forces. The Japanese frequently believed they had encountered only a hasty defense, and accepted high losses to continue doomed attacks. Smith particularly encouraged the heavy use of all available automatic weapons; a gamble with his fragile logistic tail, but one that paid off. Cautious Japanese commanders advanced only slowly after encountering a few ambushes. The bold commanders often died leading their men. Japanese infiltration tactics proved far less successful then they had even in the Philippines: Smith seldom missed a chance to remind his rear-echelon units that every Marine was a rifleman first. Well-drilled volunteers with M1 Garand semi-automatic rifles proved a far greater challenge to the Japanese infiltrators than conscripts armed with bolt-action weapons at best.
It was in the jungles of New Georgia that the Marines “wrote the book” on jungle warfare.
It was in the jungles of New Georgia that the Japanese Army learned to fear the US Marines.
Monday, June 13, 2011
December 28th - the Day of Infamy, Part XII
The Solomons Campaign, Part I
After Tarawa, there were some officers and many civilians who wanted to charge ahead. Admirals King and Nimitz, however, realized that the US would do better to proceed cautiously until they had built up an overwhelmingly superior force of ships and aircraft. Accordingly, only one more major offensive was planned for 1943. It would occur in October, and the target would be to seize a base in the Solomon Islands: New Georgia.
The US was not idle in the meantime. US Navy Construction Battalions and US Army Engineers built airfields on Tarawa, and by June heavy bombers began using them to attack targets in the Marshall Islands. US submarines continued to bleed the Japanese merchant marine, and in July USS Darter sank the escort carrier Unyo while she was ferrying aircraft to Truk.
In August the Japanese seized Attu and Kiska in the Aleutians and attempted to land a battalion of SNLF troops on New Caledonia in support of a pro-Axis coup. While the landing on New Caledonia was successful, the island quickly declared for the Free French. By the time a mixed force of US and Australian troops arrived a week later the Japanese had withdrawn with heavy casualties.
With New Caledonia now firmly in friendly hands Nimitz proposed calling off the Solomons offensive, but King directed that the attack should proceed.
The one benefit for the Japanese from the New Caledonia attack was that Yamamoto was convinced the US would follow up their success there with an offensive in the Solomons, and accordingly concentrated all available land-based aircraft, submarines, and some light surface units in the area. Once again, the goal was attrition.
The US invasion force was spotted on October 8th as it approached the Solomon Islands. Hours later, it was visited by 94 G4M “Betty” medium bombers from Rabaul. An escort of 30 Ki-43 “Oscar” fighters was sent from Guadalcanal, which arrived ten minutes before the bombers. The US fleet, however, had a surprise waiting: the fleet and light carriers were now carrying the F6F “Hellcat”. 56 of the new fighters were airborne by the time the Oscars met the CAP, with more launching. Despite the odds against them the Oscars refused to break off until the Bettys had dropped their loads. The fighters paid a heavy price: only four survived, and only seven Hellcats were lost.
The Japanese bombers were carrying a mix of torpedoes and bombs. It would be the last time the Japanese attempted to employ two-engine bombers as torpedo planes against a major US formation. US flak, by now well-supplied with proximity fuses, downed every single torpedo bomber – all but six of them before they released their torpedoes. Not one hit. The conventional bombers did little better; US fighters and flak broke up their formation, and there were too few bombs to saturate the target area. Still, they achieved three bomb hits, one each on USS Bataan CV10, USS Indianapolis CA35, and USS Montpelier CL57. Only USS Montpelier’s damage was severe enough to warrant retiring from the action. The surviving Japanese bombers were pursued by Hellcats. Only 15 of them made it home, though three more Hellcats were lost.
On the 9th twelve IJN submarines engaged the US force. Radio messages allowed them to coordinate their attack, but also alerted the US to their presence. The purge of the IJN submarine force had achieved one desired result: aggression. It had achieved this, however, at the expense of a certain amount of prudence and skill. Ten of the twelve IJN subs were lost, and the other two damaged. They hit six ships. USS Ticonderoga CV16 was hit square on the bow as she combed a spread of six torpedoes. Although flooding was relatively minor, her ability to operate aircraft was nearly eliminated. USS Indiana took two hits, which slowed her enough that she was transferred from the Carrier Force to the Bombardment Force for the rest of the action. The escort carrier USS Copahee was surprised at close range and hit by four torpedoes. Fires reached her bomb magazine thirteen minutes later and she exploded and sank with a loss of all but 102 of her crew, also damaging destroyers USS Forest and USS Fitch which had closed to render assistance. Destroyers USS Laub and USS Ellyson were sunk, the latter after a six-hour struggle to keep her afloat. The worst loss however was the USS General John Pope, which was carrying some 5,000 troops. She took at least three hits shortly after 1800 and sank with the loss of over 2,000 men. The ship had been in commission only three months and six days, and had been carrying several engineering units as well as other support troops. The casualties were a major blow to plans to quickly set up airfields and harbor facilities on New Georgia.
After Tarawa, there were some officers and many civilians who wanted to charge ahead. Admirals King and Nimitz, however, realized that the US would do better to proceed cautiously until they had built up an overwhelmingly superior force of ships and aircraft. Accordingly, only one more major offensive was planned for 1943. It would occur in October, and the target would be to seize a base in the Solomon Islands: New Georgia.
The US was not idle in the meantime. US Navy Construction Battalions and US Army Engineers built airfields on Tarawa, and by June heavy bombers began using them to attack targets in the Marshall Islands. US submarines continued to bleed the Japanese merchant marine, and in July USS Darter sank the escort carrier Unyo while she was ferrying aircraft to Truk.
In August the Japanese seized Attu and Kiska in the Aleutians and attempted to land a battalion of SNLF troops on New Caledonia in support of a pro-Axis coup. While the landing on New Caledonia was successful, the island quickly declared for the Free French. By the time a mixed force of US and Australian troops arrived a week later the Japanese had withdrawn with heavy casualties.
With New Caledonia now firmly in friendly hands Nimitz proposed calling off the Solomons offensive, but King directed that the attack should proceed.
The one benefit for the Japanese from the New Caledonia attack was that Yamamoto was convinced the US would follow up their success there with an offensive in the Solomons, and accordingly concentrated all available land-based aircraft, submarines, and some light surface units in the area. Once again, the goal was attrition.
The US invasion force was spotted on October 8th as it approached the Solomon Islands. Hours later, it was visited by 94 G4M “Betty” medium bombers from Rabaul. An escort of 30 Ki-43 “Oscar” fighters was sent from Guadalcanal, which arrived ten minutes before the bombers. The US fleet, however, had a surprise waiting: the fleet and light carriers were now carrying the F6F “Hellcat”. 56 of the new fighters were airborne by the time the Oscars met the CAP, with more launching. Despite the odds against them the Oscars refused to break off until the Bettys had dropped their loads. The fighters paid a heavy price: only four survived, and only seven Hellcats were lost.
The Japanese bombers were carrying a mix of torpedoes and bombs. It would be the last time the Japanese attempted to employ two-engine bombers as torpedo planes against a major US formation. US flak, by now well-supplied with proximity fuses, downed every single torpedo bomber – all but six of them before they released their torpedoes. Not one hit. The conventional bombers did little better; US fighters and flak broke up their formation, and there were too few bombs to saturate the target area. Still, they achieved three bomb hits, one each on USS Bataan CV10, USS Indianapolis CA35, and USS Montpelier CL57. Only USS Montpelier’s damage was severe enough to warrant retiring from the action. The surviving Japanese bombers were pursued by Hellcats. Only 15 of them made it home, though three more Hellcats were lost.
On the 9th twelve IJN submarines engaged the US force. Radio messages allowed them to coordinate their attack, but also alerted the US to their presence. The purge of the IJN submarine force had achieved one desired result: aggression. It had achieved this, however, at the expense of a certain amount of prudence and skill. Ten of the twelve IJN subs were lost, and the other two damaged. They hit six ships. USS Ticonderoga CV16 was hit square on the bow as she combed a spread of six torpedoes. Although flooding was relatively minor, her ability to operate aircraft was nearly eliminated. USS Indiana took two hits, which slowed her enough that she was transferred from the Carrier Force to the Bombardment Force for the rest of the action. The escort carrier USS Copahee was surprised at close range and hit by four torpedoes. Fires reached her bomb magazine thirteen minutes later and she exploded and sank with a loss of all but 102 of her crew, also damaging destroyers USS Forest and USS Fitch which had closed to render assistance. Destroyers USS Laub and USS Ellyson were sunk, the latter after a six-hour struggle to keep her afloat. The worst loss however was the USS General John Pope, which was carrying some 5,000 troops. She took at least three hits shortly after 1800 and sank with the loss of over 2,000 men. The ship had been in commission only three months and six days, and had been carrying several engineering units as well as other support troops. The casualties were a major blow to plans to quickly set up airfields and harbor facilities on New Georgia.
Tuesday, June 7, 2011
December 28th - the Day of Infamy, Part XI
The Gilberts Campaign
The objective of the first US offensive of the Pacific Theater was Tarawa. The island was a logical stepping stone either towards the Marshall Islands or the Solomon Islands; allowing either a direct route to Japan or a base to relieve the pressure on Australia. Tarawa’s isolated location seemed to make it an ideal proving ground for the doctrine and equipment being developed for the offensive across the Pacific, while still being close enough to future targets to function as a forward base.
Yamamoto had expected a US offensive, and Tarawa was one of the three targets he had judged most likely. Each of these were picketed by submarines, with most of Japan’s long-range boats ready to sail as soon as the target was revealed. Yamamoto had been urged to keep his fleet at Truk, ready to sortie against the US offensive, but while his ships were all repaired from the damage at Midway, his air groups were still badly under strength. Yamamoto hoped to keep up the attrition of the US fleet with submarines and land-based aircraft until his own fleet was once again ready. His private conversations with his staff, and especially Admiral Ozawa, who had recently replaced Nagumo as the commander of Kido Butai, indicate that he believed success was highly improbable. However, no other course of action could be expected to yield better results.
Six IJN submarines were off Tarawa when the US invasion force arrived on May 24th, 1943, and 28 more were dispatched within hours of the first spotting of the US fleet by patrol aircraft. Almost as many more would follow over the next few days.
The campaign did not begin well for the Japanese. US signals intelligence had located one of the two IJN patrol lines, and as the main body approached it was attacked on the 23rd by a squadron of destroyers supported by aircraft. I-55 and I-56 were sunk and I-59 was damaged and driven off without loss to the US force.
On the 24th the IJN’s luck was much better. I-176, I-177, and I-178 approached the US fleet. I-178 was sunk by USS Gridley as she approached and I-177 driven off by USS Conway, but I-176 managed to put two torpedoes into USS Yorktown before being sunk by USS Knight and USS Butler. One torpedo detonated on the port inboard propeller, destroying it and damaging the rudder and port outboard prop. USS Yorktown’s crew had demonstrated great skill at damage control at the Coral Sea and did so again, but the speed and handling limits imposed by her underwater damage would prevent her from operating aircraft. USS Salt Lake City took her in tow towards Pearl Harbor, later being relieved by fleet tugs USS Navajo and USS Sioux. A crewman from USS Sioux is believed to have given the carrier her infamous nickname: the Yardtown.
Over the next five days, 48 IJN submarines closed on the US forces off Tarawa. The Japanese submarines knew the US fleet’s approximate location, and several carried their own float planes for aerial reconnaissance. Despite this, 17 boats completely failed to make contact. Of the rest, 20 were sunk and five damaged in trade for hits on four US ships.
The escort carrier USS Altamaha was hit by three torpedoes on the 27th and sunk with a loss of over 500 men. USS Brooklyn’s bow was blown off by one torpedo and was hit by another aft on the 26th, but she made it halfway back to Pearl Harbor under tow before sinking in rough weather. USS Mervine was hit by a single torpedo while depth-charging a probable submarine contact on the 28th. The hit broke her back and she sank half an hour later. Transport USS George F. Elliot took a single hit on the 27th but survived.
Yamamoto was furious. Despite inflated kill claims from the submarines that returned, it was clear that little damage had been done to the US fleet. “6th Fleet,” Yamamoto wrote in a message to the Navy General Staff, “has failed to do their duty to the Emperor.” Admiral Nagano quite evidently agreed. By the end of June every single submarine commander who had returned without making contact had been relieved, along with 6th Fleet’s commander and chief of staff, and the commanders of Submarine Squadrons 1, 3, 4, and 5. Several of those relieved later committed suicide.
Tarawa’s defenders fared little better. On the 25th the island was bombarded by twelve battleships, four heavy cruisers, seven light cruisers, and scores of destroyers and lighter ships. Air attacks from the four fleet carriers, two light carriers, and eight escort carriers of the force added to the pounding. Most of the naval officers believed that this bombardment would crush the defenses, leaving the Marines nothing to do but mop up a few shell-shocked survivors. The Marines commanders, remembering the massive bombardments of the First World War, felt that stiff resistance could still be expected and planned accordingly.
Two regiments were committed to the first wave on the 26th, roughly half of them in the new LVT “Amtracks”. Despite attempts to blow gaps in the reef, only the amtracks proved able to make it across and land their troops, the rest having to wade ashore under heavy fire. The Japanese were far from crushed, but their chain of command had been disrupted and their communications badly damaged by the bombardment. The 1st Marine Division advanced slowly but steadily, and the Japanese never managed to organize a counter-attack. On the 29th, the island was declared secured. The Japanese had lost almost 4,000 men killed, with less than a hundred taken prisoner (almost all wounded) along with roughly a hundred Korean forced laborers. Eight hundred Marines had been killed and thousands wounded.
The first major US offensive had been a success, and many valuable lessons had been learned.
The objective of the first US offensive of the Pacific Theater was Tarawa. The island was a logical stepping stone either towards the Marshall Islands or the Solomon Islands; allowing either a direct route to Japan or a base to relieve the pressure on Australia. Tarawa’s isolated location seemed to make it an ideal proving ground for the doctrine and equipment being developed for the offensive across the Pacific, while still being close enough to future targets to function as a forward base.
Yamamoto had expected a US offensive, and Tarawa was one of the three targets he had judged most likely. Each of these were picketed by submarines, with most of Japan’s long-range boats ready to sail as soon as the target was revealed. Yamamoto had been urged to keep his fleet at Truk, ready to sortie against the US offensive, but while his ships were all repaired from the damage at Midway, his air groups were still badly under strength. Yamamoto hoped to keep up the attrition of the US fleet with submarines and land-based aircraft until his own fleet was once again ready. His private conversations with his staff, and especially Admiral Ozawa, who had recently replaced Nagumo as the commander of Kido Butai, indicate that he believed success was highly improbable. However, no other course of action could be expected to yield better results.
Six IJN submarines were off Tarawa when the US invasion force arrived on May 24th, 1943, and 28 more were dispatched within hours of the first spotting of the US fleet by patrol aircraft. Almost as many more would follow over the next few days.
The campaign did not begin well for the Japanese. US signals intelligence had located one of the two IJN patrol lines, and as the main body approached it was attacked on the 23rd by a squadron of destroyers supported by aircraft. I-55 and I-56 were sunk and I-59 was damaged and driven off without loss to the US force.
On the 24th the IJN’s luck was much better. I-176, I-177, and I-178 approached the US fleet. I-178 was sunk by USS Gridley as she approached and I-177 driven off by USS Conway, but I-176 managed to put two torpedoes into USS Yorktown before being sunk by USS Knight and USS Butler. One torpedo detonated on the port inboard propeller, destroying it and damaging the rudder and port outboard prop. USS Yorktown’s crew had demonstrated great skill at damage control at the Coral Sea and did so again, but the speed and handling limits imposed by her underwater damage would prevent her from operating aircraft. USS Salt Lake City took her in tow towards Pearl Harbor, later being relieved by fleet tugs USS Navajo and USS Sioux. A crewman from USS Sioux is believed to have given the carrier her infamous nickname: the Yardtown.
Over the next five days, 48 IJN submarines closed on the US forces off Tarawa. The Japanese submarines knew the US fleet’s approximate location, and several carried their own float planes for aerial reconnaissance. Despite this, 17 boats completely failed to make contact. Of the rest, 20 were sunk and five damaged in trade for hits on four US ships.
The escort carrier USS Altamaha was hit by three torpedoes on the 27th and sunk with a loss of over 500 men. USS Brooklyn’s bow was blown off by one torpedo and was hit by another aft on the 26th, but she made it halfway back to Pearl Harbor under tow before sinking in rough weather. USS Mervine was hit by a single torpedo while depth-charging a probable submarine contact on the 28th. The hit broke her back and she sank half an hour later. Transport USS George F. Elliot took a single hit on the 27th but survived.
Yamamoto was furious. Despite inflated kill claims from the submarines that returned, it was clear that little damage had been done to the US fleet. “6th Fleet,” Yamamoto wrote in a message to the Navy General Staff, “has failed to do their duty to the Emperor.” Admiral Nagano quite evidently agreed. By the end of June every single submarine commander who had returned without making contact had been relieved, along with 6th Fleet’s commander and chief of staff, and the commanders of Submarine Squadrons 1, 3, 4, and 5. Several of those relieved later committed suicide.
Tarawa’s defenders fared little better. On the 25th the island was bombarded by twelve battleships, four heavy cruisers, seven light cruisers, and scores of destroyers and lighter ships. Air attacks from the four fleet carriers, two light carriers, and eight escort carriers of the force added to the pounding. Most of the naval officers believed that this bombardment would crush the defenses, leaving the Marines nothing to do but mop up a few shell-shocked survivors. The Marines commanders, remembering the massive bombardments of the First World War, felt that stiff resistance could still be expected and planned accordingly.
Two regiments were committed to the first wave on the 26th, roughly half of them in the new LVT “Amtracks”. Despite attempts to blow gaps in the reef, only the amtracks proved able to make it across and land their troops, the rest having to wade ashore under heavy fire. The Japanese were far from crushed, but their chain of command had been disrupted and their communications badly damaged by the bombardment. The 1st Marine Division advanced slowly but steadily, and the Japanese never managed to organize a counter-attack. On the 29th, the island was declared secured. The Japanese had lost almost 4,000 men killed, with less than a hundred taken prisoner (almost all wounded) along with roughly a hundred Korean forced laborers. Eight hundred Marines had been killed and thousands wounded.
The first major US offensive had been a success, and many valuable lessons had been learned.
Monday, June 6, 2011
December 28th - the Day of Infamy, Part X
Pacific: adj., peaceful, calm…
The lack of large operations did not mean the Pacific was living up to its name. The vital but often forgotten campaigns to protect and destroy commerce and supply lines continued. In November, RADM Lockwood issued a report concluding that there was not one, but at least three problems with the Mk 14 torpedo and its components. It ran too deep, the magnetic fuse did not function reliably, and the contact fuse was too fragile to function in a square impact – the ideal shot otherwise. As temporary workarounds, the magnetic fuse was disabled, torpedoes were to be set to run shallow, and depots and tenders throughout the Pacific fleet made field modifications to the contact fuses. By the end of December, US submarine kills began to increase rapidly, and BuOrd finally concluded that there might be problems. Even with strong backing from ADM Nimitz, it would be almost a year before the Pacific Fleet’s temporary fixes were given official approval by BuOrd and adopted by other commands.
The Japanese were also taking a toll on Allied shipping traffic. From bases in the Solomon Islands aircraft and surface raiders drove the convoys from the US to Australia and New Zealand ever further south and east. The French authorities on New Caledonia became less and less cooperative with the Allies, further complicating the problems in that area.
The China/Burma/India theater was becoming a stalemate. An attempted counter attack by the British towards Burma in October made little progress, and was finally thrown back with heavy losses in the spring of 1943. China had no land or sea connection to the Allies, and the air route over the Himalayas could only have supplied a fraction of its needs even if the Allies had been able to supply a large number of aircraft. The Chinese army was increasingly unable to meet the IJA in the field, but the IJA increasingly controlled only the territory they were standing on.
The USS Ranger arrived in the Pacific in late September, after a heated debate in Washington D.C. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral King had strongly advocated that she remain in the Atlantic for limited operations, while one or more Royal Navy carriers filled the gap in the Pacific. Anglo-American relations, however, were at a low point due to arguments about the coming campaign in the Atlantic theater.
The US favored invading France to establish a foothold for future operations, while the UK favored a peripheral campaign in the Mediterranean, optimally a landing in North Africa. The US finally conceded that the Allies were not yet strong enough to face Germany on the mainland, and accepted the invasion of Algeria. The Royal Navy insisted they would need every ship available for the invasion, slated for November, in case the Italian Navy sortied. The US countered by proposing that the invasion be delayed until early 1943, by which time USS Lexington and USS Yorktown would be repaired and able to cover the Pacific, or invade Morocco, which would reduce the threat from the Italians. Largely at the insistence of the Soviets for an earlier counterblow and General Montgomery for an offensive geographically closer to his own, these options too were rejected. The US tried to pry loose a Royal Navy carrier by highlighting the commitment of the three old battleships of BatDiv5 to the operation, but even this proved insufficient.
USS Ranger was made the centerpiece of a series of three raids in October, November, and December, each involving carrier strikes and shore bombardments; the first against the Solomons, the second against the Marshalls, and the third against New Britain.
USS Tuscaloosa and USS Concord were lost in a night action during the Solomons raid. USS Ranger herself was lost to a pair of torpedoes from I-21 as she was slowly steaming home from the New Britain raid in late December. Fortunately the USS Lexington and USS Yorktown had finished their repairs in early December and were already working up their new air groups. Nimitz, however, suspended the carrier raids; they had proven far too costly for too little result.
The major elements of the US Pacific Fleet spent the early months of 1943 training, conduction exercises between Hawaii and the West Coast, and waiting for either the next move by the IJN or the increasing number of new ships joining the fleet to permit their own major offensive to begin.
The lack of large operations did not mean the Pacific was living up to its name. The vital but often forgotten campaigns to protect and destroy commerce and supply lines continued. In November, RADM Lockwood issued a report concluding that there was not one, but at least three problems with the Mk 14 torpedo and its components. It ran too deep, the magnetic fuse did not function reliably, and the contact fuse was too fragile to function in a square impact – the ideal shot otherwise. As temporary workarounds, the magnetic fuse was disabled, torpedoes were to be set to run shallow, and depots and tenders throughout the Pacific fleet made field modifications to the contact fuses. By the end of December, US submarine kills began to increase rapidly, and BuOrd finally concluded that there might be problems. Even with strong backing from ADM Nimitz, it would be almost a year before the Pacific Fleet’s temporary fixes were given official approval by BuOrd and adopted by other commands.
The Japanese were also taking a toll on Allied shipping traffic. From bases in the Solomon Islands aircraft and surface raiders drove the convoys from the US to Australia and New Zealand ever further south and east. The French authorities on New Caledonia became less and less cooperative with the Allies, further complicating the problems in that area.
The China/Burma/India theater was becoming a stalemate. An attempted counter attack by the British towards Burma in October made little progress, and was finally thrown back with heavy losses in the spring of 1943. China had no land or sea connection to the Allies, and the air route over the Himalayas could only have supplied a fraction of its needs even if the Allies had been able to supply a large number of aircraft. The Chinese army was increasingly unable to meet the IJA in the field, but the IJA increasingly controlled only the territory they were standing on.
The USS Ranger arrived in the Pacific in late September, after a heated debate in Washington D.C. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral King had strongly advocated that she remain in the Atlantic for limited operations, while one or more Royal Navy carriers filled the gap in the Pacific. Anglo-American relations, however, were at a low point due to arguments about the coming campaign in the Atlantic theater.
The US favored invading France to establish a foothold for future operations, while the UK favored a peripheral campaign in the Mediterranean, optimally a landing in North Africa. The US finally conceded that the Allies were not yet strong enough to face Germany on the mainland, and accepted the invasion of Algeria. The Royal Navy insisted they would need every ship available for the invasion, slated for November, in case the Italian Navy sortied. The US countered by proposing that the invasion be delayed until early 1943, by which time USS Lexington and USS Yorktown would be repaired and able to cover the Pacific, or invade Morocco, which would reduce the threat from the Italians. Largely at the insistence of the Soviets for an earlier counterblow and General Montgomery for an offensive geographically closer to his own, these options too were rejected. The US tried to pry loose a Royal Navy carrier by highlighting the commitment of the three old battleships of BatDiv5 to the operation, but even this proved insufficient.
USS Ranger was made the centerpiece of a series of three raids in October, November, and December, each involving carrier strikes and shore bombardments; the first against the Solomons, the second against the Marshalls, and the third against New Britain.
USS Tuscaloosa and USS Concord were lost in a night action during the Solomons raid. USS Ranger herself was lost to a pair of torpedoes from I-21 as she was slowly steaming home from the New Britain raid in late December. Fortunately the USS Lexington and USS Yorktown had finished their repairs in early December and were already working up their new air groups. Nimitz, however, suspended the carrier raids; they had proven far too costly for too little result.
The major elements of the US Pacific Fleet spent the early months of 1943 training, conduction exercises between Hawaii and the West Coast, and waiting for either the next move by the IJN or the increasing number of new ships joining the fleet to permit their own major offensive to begin.
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