December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part XIII

The Solomons Campaign, Part II

On the 10th the Japanese tried another series of air strikes, this time approaching in small groups at low altitude to minimize radar warning. While warning was indeed minimal, the low altitude made the strikes very vulnerable once they were spotted. Losses to Hellcats and flak were near total, and the only damage was done by a Ki-51 which crashed into the USS Idaho, putting her aft main battery turret out of action.

The invasion itself had its own problems. The preliminary bombardment was even heavier than at Tarawa, but after a brief attempt to contest the landing the majority of the Japanese troops faded back into the jungle on the 12th. New Georgia was much larger and much more difficult terrain than Tarawa, and the 2nd Marine Division had a difficult time advancing.

On the night of the 12th, Japanese forces approached the US anchorage. A dozen Otori and Tomozuru torpedo boats had slipped from island to island. At 0400 on the 13th they raced into the US anchorage. They fired 32 torpedoes; not the deadly Type 93s, but dangerous enough, and engaged anything they saw with gunfire. US escorts sank five of the raiders with gunfire, and as the Japanese had hoped fired off numerous star shells to illuminate the area. One transport and two destroyers were hit, but the Japanese raid had accomplished its real mission.

Miles away, a strike force consisting of the cruisers Oi and Kitakami along with six destroyers had just finished a high-speed run from Rabaul. The task force’s best lookouts were watching the horizon in the direction of the US fleet. Star shells from the US escorts soon provided an aiming point, and the fleet salvoed 134 torpedoes at near-maximum range then turned back for Rabaul. Just as the Americans were settling down from the torpedo boat raid, the Type 93s arrived. Some 80 transports, landing ships, and auxiliaries along with 30 escorts were in the target area. Fifteen torpedoes hit five transports, an LST, a tanker, two cargo ships, a seaplane tender, two destroyers and a destroyer escort. Two of the transports and one cargo ship were saved, all the rest were sunk or destroyed.

The Japanese strike force had counted on land-based air cover to protect them when daylight came, but US carrier planes found them first. Kitakami and four destroyers were sunk by scores of SBDs and TBFs, and Oi and the other two destroyers were damaged.

Halsey was unwilling to risk his carriers close to New Georgia after the night of the 12th/13th. With only distant cover from the carriers, the battle-line pulled back to Tarawa to replenish ammunition, and the airbase on New Georgia itself incomplete, the Japanese were able to maintain parity in the air and near parity on the ground. The Marine advance slowed to a crawl. Japanese troops were brought in from other islands in the chain, escorted by light combatants. The US countered with its own light forces, including two squadrons of Motor Torpedo Boats, but they could not stop the reinforcements. On October 15th Halsey pulled the carrier force back to Pearl to replenish munitions, spares, and replace lost aircraft. The last surviving transports had been unloaded and withdrew with them.

General Julian Smith, commanding the 2nd Marine Division, found his forces under strength, with only minimal Navy support, and with only a single muddy field and two depleted Marine fighter squadrons for air support. It was not an enviable position. The Japanese ground forces seemed to grow stronger by the day, while his own forces could expect no major reinforcement for weeks at the least.

Smith, however, did not give in to despair. While his troops had difficulty advancing through the jungle, the Japanese had demonstrated a tendency to assault strong points without regard for losses. Smith setup a series of feint attacks, staged retreats, and deceptively quiet sectors of the front to trick the Japanese into attacking well-prepared and heavily equipped forces. The Japanese frequently believed they had encountered only a hasty defense, and accepted high losses to continue doomed attacks. Smith particularly encouraged the heavy use of all available automatic weapons; a gamble with his fragile logistic tail, but one that paid off. Cautious Japanese commanders advanced only slowly after encountering a few ambushes. The bold commanders often died leading their men. Japanese infiltration tactics proved far less successful then they had even in the Philippines: Smith seldom missed a chance to remind his rear-echelon units that every Marine was a rifleman first. Well-drilled volunteers with M1 Garand semi-automatic rifles proved a far greater challenge to the Japanese infiltrators than conscripts armed with bolt-action weapons at best.

It was in the jungles of New Georgia that the Marines “wrote the book” on jungle warfare.

It was in the jungles of New Georgia that the Japanese Army learned to fear the US Marines.