December 28th - the Day of Infamy, Part XI

The Gilberts Campaign

The objective of the first US offensive of the Pacific Theater was Tarawa. The island was a logical stepping stone either towards the Marshall Islands or the Solomon Islands; allowing either a direct route to Japan or a base to relieve the pressure on Australia. Tarawa’s isolated location seemed to make it an ideal proving ground for the doctrine and equipment being developed for the offensive across the Pacific, while still being close enough to future targets to function as a forward base.

Yamamoto had expected a US offensive, and Tarawa was one of the three targets he had judged most likely. Each of these were picketed by submarines, with most of Japan’s long-range boats ready to sail as soon as the target was revealed. Yamamoto had been urged to keep his fleet at Truk, ready to sortie against the US offensive, but while his ships were all repaired from the damage at Midway, his air groups were still badly under strength. Yamamoto hoped to keep up the attrition of the US fleet with submarines and land-based aircraft until his own fleet was once again ready. His private conversations with his staff, and especially Admiral Ozawa, who had recently replaced Nagumo as the commander of Kido Butai, indicate that he believed success was highly improbable. However, no other course of action could be expected to yield better results.

Six IJN submarines were off Tarawa when the US invasion force arrived on May 24th, 1943, and 28 more were dispatched within hours of the first spotting of the US fleet by patrol aircraft. Almost as many more would follow over the next few days.

The campaign did not begin well for the Japanese. US signals intelligence had located one of the two IJN patrol lines, and as the main body approached it was attacked on the 23rd by a squadron of destroyers supported by aircraft. I-55 and I-56 were sunk and I-59 was damaged and driven off without loss to the US force.

On the 24th the IJN’s luck was much better. I-176, I-177, and I-178 approached the US fleet. I-178 was sunk by USS Gridley as she approached and I-177 driven off by USS Conway, but I-176 managed to put two torpedoes into USS Yorktown before being sunk by USS Knight and USS Butler. One torpedo detonated on the port inboard propeller, destroying it and damaging the rudder and port outboard prop. USS Yorktown’s crew had demonstrated great skill at damage control at the Coral Sea and did so again, but the speed and handling limits imposed by her underwater damage would prevent her from operating aircraft. USS Salt Lake City took her in tow towards Pearl Harbor, later being relieved by fleet tugs USS Navajo and USS Sioux. A crewman from USS Sioux is believed to have given the carrier her infamous nickname: the Yardtown.

Over the next five days, 48 IJN submarines closed on the US forces off Tarawa. The Japanese submarines knew the US fleet’s approximate location, and several carried their own float planes for aerial reconnaissance. Despite this, 17 boats completely failed to make contact. Of the rest, 20 were sunk and five damaged in trade for hits on four US ships.

The escort carrier USS Altamaha was hit by three torpedoes on the 27th and sunk with a loss of over 500 men. USS Brooklyn’s bow was blown off by one torpedo and was hit by another aft on the 26th, but she made it halfway back to Pearl Harbor under tow before sinking in rough weather. USS Mervine was hit by a single torpedo while depth-charging a probable submarine contact on the 28th. The hit broke her back and she sank half an hour later. Transport USS George F. Elliot took a single hit on the 27th but survived.

Yamamoto was furious. Despite inflated kill claims from the submarines that returned, it was clear that little damage had been done to the US fleet. “6th Fleet,” Yamamoto wrote in a message to the Navy General Staff, “has failed to do their duty to the Emperor.” Admiral Nagano quite evidently agreed. By the end of June every single submarine commander who had returned without making contact had been relieved, along with 6th Fleet’s commander and chief of staff, and the commanders of Submarine Squadrons 1, 3, 4, and 5. Several of those relieved later committed suicide.

Tarawa’s defenders fared little better. On the 25th the island was bombarded by twelve battleships, four heavy cruisers, seven light cruisers, and scores of destroyers and lighter ships. Air attacks from the four fleet carriers, two light carriers, and eight escort carriers of the force added to the pounding. Most of the naval officers believed that this bombardment would crush the defenses, leaving the Marines nothing to do but mop up a few shell-shocked survivors. The Marines commanders, remembering the massive bombardments of the First World War, felt that stiff resistance could still be expected and planned accordingly.

Two regiments were committed to the first wave on the 26th, roughly half of them in the new LVT “Amtracks”. Despite attempts to blow gaps in the reef, only the amtracks proved able to make it across and land their troops, the rest having to wade ashore under heavy fire. The Japanese were far from crushed, but their chain of command had been disrupted and their communications badly damaged by the bombardment. The 1st Marine Division advanced slowly but steadily, and the Japanese never managed to organize a counter-attack. On the 29th, the island was declared secured. The Japanese had lost almost 4,000 men killed, with less than a hundred taken prisoner (almost all wounded) along with roughly a hundred Korean forced laborers. Eight hundred Marines had been killed and thousands wounded.

The first major US offensive had been a success, and many valuable lessons had been learned.