December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part XIV

The Solomons Campaign, Part III

While light forces and aircraft fought a series of duels around the clock in the shallow waters of the Solomons, the US carrier, battleship, and amphibious forces were re-fitting at Pearl Harbor. Halsey believed that Rabaul could be crushed by the fleet and advocated dispatching the fleet to conduct air strikes and shore bombardment to smash it. Turner proposed loading those units of the 3rd Marine Division that had already arrived in Hawaii and using them to reinforce New Georgia, with the carriers providing cover against the possible emergence of the Japanese fleet. Spruance proposed bringing the 1st Marine Division forward from Tarawa, either to reinforce New Georgia or to take Guadalcanal, the largest Japanese base in the SE Solomon Islands.

In addition to all these plans, King was insistent that the schedule for the planned 1944 campaigns not be jeopardized. The New Georgia campaign had been intended to provide a base for operations to counter Japanese activities in the Coral Sea and the nearby islands. If it instead tied down US forces it would be a strategic failure no matter the attrition ratio achieved.

Meanwhile, Yamamoto was modifying his own plans. The fragile hold the US had on New Georgia might be broken if the main US airfield and the limited port facilities could be destroyed. On October 21st, the three remaining Kongo-class battlecruisers accompanied by three Takao-class heavy cruisers, light cruiser Agano, and seven destroyers left Truk for Rabaul. There they would refuel, then make a high-speed dash to New Georgia.

Nimitz worked out a compromise. The USN would conduct limited operations and raids with a third of the fast carrier force at a time, rotating forces to provide continuous coverage. Rabaul and Truk were judged too heavily defended (post-war analysis would reveal that this was not the case, but Intelligence opinions at the time were nearly unanimous) for what was in essence a strongly reinforced carrier division, but bases in the Solomons would be attacked in hopes of relieving the pressure on New Georgia. Just hours before the Japanese Bombardment Force sailed from Truk, TF 51 sailed from Pearl Harbor with USS Lexington, USS Yorktown, USS Enterprise CVL23, USS Iowa, USS Indiana, USS Massachusetts, USS New Orleans, USS San Francisco, USS San Diego, USS Phoenix, USS Helena, USS Cleveland, USS Santa Fe, and 24 destroyers under Admiral Halsey.

On October 27th, the US task force launched a pair of carrier strikes at Bougainville, destroying a number of Japanese aircraft for little loss to themselves. The Japanese correctly guessed that the strike represented only a part of the US fleet, and ordered the Bombardment Force to leave Rabaul on schedule that afternoon.

Halsey, however, was not content with a single carrier strike. The Hellcat and the strength of US AA fire between them seemed fully capable of handling the limited land-based air threats to the task force. Halsey had been provided with solid intelligence that the IJN fleet carriers were in home waters, an edge the Japanese were completely unaware of. Secure in his local superiority, Halsey closed with New Georgia, intending to use his battleships to pound known Japanese positions the next afternoon day. This would boost the Marine’s morale and hopefully have a material benefit as well.

A patrol of three PT boats from MTB Squadron 9 keeping watch for Japanese barge traffic spotted the IJN Bombardment Force shortly before midnight on the 27th. They attacked, inflicting only a single torpedo hit on Kongo for the loss of two boats, but were able to make a surprisingly accurate assessment of the Japanese force and warn New Georgia.

Well before dawn on the 28th the Japanese Bombardment force began hurling shells into the Marine positions on New Georgia. To the 2nd Marine Division it would simply be called The Night thereafter, and for those who survived it little more needed to be said. For two hours three battlecruisers, three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and eight destroyers pounded the US positions, shooting from the map but well aware of US concentrations from observations by land units during the previous weeks. Losses were heavily, especially among the 105mm howitzer batteries and what remained of the air base. General Smith’s headquarters were hit by an 8” shell, wounding the general and killing a number of his staff. Smith, however, had already broadcast the MTB report, which Halsey’s force had picked up.