Aftermath
Admiral Halsey was publically hailed as a hero, but his seniors felt he was too reckless. He was decorated, promoted, and then quietly transferred to a shore post. Admiral Spruance was also recognized for his role in the battle, and succeeded Halsey as the Navy’s senior forward commander.
The destruction of the IJN gave the US great freedom in pursuing its future campaigns. The old battleships were dispatched to the Atlantic, where in July they helped shoot ashore the massive amphibious assault on Normandy. Throughout the fall and winter of 1944 the US along with the rest of the Allies rolled forward in both the Pacific and Europe.
Germany surrendered on June 20th, 1945, as Soviet and Canadian forces reached Berlin.
By the summer of 1945, Japan was starving inside a blockade of submarines and aircraft. Only desperate attacks by the infamous Kamikazes and other suicide troops seemed able to even slow the US advance, and nothing could stop it. In August, the world’s first atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Kokura, the final act in a strategic bombing campaign that had gutted Japan’s cities. Japan formally signed an unconditional surrender on September 1st, 1945.
The Second World War was over.
USS Lexington had served in almost every major engagement of the war and countless minors ones. Her aircraft had often played a key role in those battles. The ship herself was called the “Lady Lex” “Lucky Lex” and “Lady Luck” by her crew for the numerous times she had escaped damage, and in recognition of the fact that she was the only pre-war US carrier to survive the war. She remains the most decorated ship ever to serve in the US Navy. She was decommissioned in 1947 and became a museum ship in New York. Her name lived on – the USN’s first atomic-powered aircraft carrier was named the USS Lexington, and in the 1960’s a popular TV series featured a space ship with the same name. While the series only ran for three years, spin offs, sequels, and movies made it into one of the largest TV franchises in history.
The Japanese had their own-mega franchise, which began in the 1970’s with an anime show about using a raised and rebuilt Yamato as a space ship. Sequels would eventually bring Shinano and even Musashi (after lengthy reassembly) into space as well.
The six Iowa-class battleships were retained after the war, though all were cycled through the reserve fleet in mothballs at some point. Still, there were always at least two in service up until the end of the 1980s, when they were finally replaced by the new Montana-class battleships. At least one Iowa-class participated in every conflict the US was involved in from WWII until their retirement.
Saturday, July 16, 2011
Wednesday, July 13, 2011
December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part XXI
The Death of a Navy
At 1255 Yamato opened fire at 38,000 yards, aiming for USS New Jersey (visible only from mast to mast by the Japanese). By 1300 the other six ships of the IJN line had followed suit, aiming for the USN column leaders. The first hit was scored on USS Alabama at 1258, but the IJNs gunnery was erratic due to the range and hits were few. At 1306 the USN line turned to open their broadsides, forming a single line of eight ships angling slightly towards the Japanese.
The lighter ships, meanwhile, had their own fight. Here the US was the first to open fire, the initial salvo from the USS Boston actually straddling Kumano at 1252. At 1311 the US screen ceased fire, due mainly to lack of targets – while a few of the IJN cruisers and destroyers still lived, smoke from their burning consorts completely obscured them. The Japanese had simply been smothered under high-rate, devastatingly well directed fire. USS Quincy, USS Columbia, USS Philadelphia, and USS St. Louis had been seriously damaged and six destroyers had been sunk, but the Japanese had lost four heavy cruisers, five light cruisers, and seven destroyers sunk and most of the rest crippled. USS Quincy would eventually sink while being towed back to Pearl Harbor.
While the lighter ships hammered at each other, the battle lines ponderously closed.
At 1308 USS South Dakota veered out of line, both her bridge and rudder destroyed.
At 1309 Hyuga lost all power.
At 1311 a shell from Iowa slipped though a pair of armor plates deformed by previous hits and found Musashi’s aft 18” magazine and half the ship vanished in a tremendous explosion.
At 1312 Kirishima fired her last shot; she had been pounded into floating scrap by USS North Carolina and USS Washington.
At 1313 USS Alabama, fires raging out of control, flooded her forward magazines and turned to withdraw from the line.
At 1314 Ise ceased fire as her last turret was knocked out by USS Massachusetts.
At 1315 a 5” magazine on Nagato exploded, followed seconds later by another, and her damage control center ordered all magazines flooded in a panic. Her main battery fired its last rounds and then went silent. Only Yamato and Shinano were still firing at the US, while six US battleships returned fire.
At 1317 Kirishima broke in half, her structure fatally weakened by fires, explosions, and flooding.
At 1318 a shell from USS New Jersey sprayed steel splinters across Yamato’ flag bridge, killing Admiral Yamamoto instantly.
At 1320 Yamato and Shinano turned away, their rear turrets firing parting shots.
At 1322 Spruance ordered the US battleline to turn to pursue. As they did, USS Indiana lost helm control and rammed USS North Carolina, seriously damaging both ships.
As the Japanese fled USS Gridley and USS Maury, closing from the north, fired sixteen torpedoes at the fleeing Japanese superbattleships, turned hard to open their other beam and fired sixteen more. The Japanese ships, their upper works shredded and still under fire from four US battleships, did not notice the torpedoes until the first hit. Eight fish hit Yamato, and seven hit Shinano, all on their starboard sides near the waterline. The two ships began listing almost immediately and soon capsized. Ise and Nagato were pounded under the waves by the US battleline, while Hyuga was finished off by torpedoes from USS Walker.
Throughout the afternoon, fleeing destroyers and cruisers were hunted down by follow-up strikes from the US carriers.
By sunset on the 20th, the Imperial Japanese Navy had been destroyed. Sixty-three warships had sailed to battle. Only five limped back to Truk – the battered survivors of the Carrier Force.
At 1255 Yamato opened fire at 38,000 yards, aiming for USS New Jersey (visible only from mast to mast by the Japanese). By 1300 the other six ships of the IJN line had followed suit, aiming for the USN column leaders. The first hit was scored on USS Alabama at 1258, but the IJNs gunnery was erratic due to the range and hits were few. At 1306 the USN line turned to open their broadsides, forming a single line of eight ships angling slightly towards the Japanese.
The lighter ships, meanwhile, had their own fight. Here the US was the first to open fire, the initial salvo from the USS Boston actually straddling Kumano at 1252. At 1311 the US screen ceased fire, due mainly to lack of targets – while a few of the IJN cruisers and destroyers still lived, smoke from their burning consorts completely obscured them. The Japanese had simply been smothered under high-rate, devastatingly well directed fire. USS Quincy, USS Columbia, USS Philadelphia, and USS St. Louis had been seriously damaged and six destroyers had been sunk, but the Japanese had lost four heavy cruisers, five light cruisers, and seven destroyers sunk and most of the rest crippled. USS Quincy would eventually sink while being towed back to Pearl Harbor.
While the lighter ships hammered at each other, the battle lines ponderously closed.
At 1308 USS South Dakota veered out of line, both her bridge and rudder destroyed.
At 1309 Hyuga lost all power.
At 1311 a shell from Iowa slipped though a pair of armor plates deformed by previous hits and found Musashi’s aft 18” magazine and half the ship vanished in a tremendous explosion.
At 1312 Kirishima fired her last shot; she had been pounded into floating scrap by USS North Carolina and USS Washington.
At 1313 USS Alabama, fires raging out of control, flooded her forward magazines and turned to withdraw from the line.
At 1314 Ise ceased fire as her last turret was knocked out by USS Massachusetts.
At 1315 a 5” magazine on Nagato exploded, followed seconds later by another, and her damage control center ordered all magazines flooded in a panic. Her main battery fired its last rounds and then went silent. Only Yamato and Shinano were still firing at the US, while six US battleships returned fire.
At 1317 Kirishima broke in half, her structure fatally weakened by fires, explosions, and flooding.
At 1318 a shell from USS New Jersey sprayed steel splinters across Yamato’ flag bridge, killing Admiral Yamamoto instantly.
At 1320 Yamato and Shinano turned away, their rear turrets firing parting shots.
At 1322 Spruance ordered the US battleline to turn to pursue. As they did, USS Indiana lost helm control and rammed USS North Carolina, seriously damaging both ships.
As the Japanese fled USS Gridley and USS Maury, closing from the north, fired sixteen torpedoes at the fleeing Japanese superbattleships, turned hard to open their other beam and fired sixteen more. The Japanese ships, their upper works shredded and still under fire from four US battleships, did not notice the torpedoes until the first hit. Eight fish hit Yamato, and seven hit Shinano, all on their starboard sides near the waterline. The two ships began listing almost immediately and soon capsized. Ise and Nagato were pounded under the waves by the US battleline, while Hyuga was finished off by torpedoes from USS Walker.
Throughout the afternoon, fleeing destroyers and cruisers were hunted down by follow-up strikes from the US carriers.
By sunset on the 20th, the Imperial Japanese Navy had been destroyed. Sixty-three warships had sailed to battle. Only five limped back to Truk – the battered survivors of the Carrier Force.
Food Tablets, Day 3 (Final)
Sunday morning weight: 188lbs
Monday morning weight: 186lbs
Tuesday morning weight: 183lbs
Final weight: 181 lbs
Comment: with my fourth data point showing a continued decline at an unhealthy rate, I'm stopping the experiment.
Steps Sunday: 8,789
Steps Monday: 9,652
Steps Tuesday: 7,979
Comment: half a mile of jogging yesterday; steps below average but well above my minimum goal. The average of the three days is above my baseline average.
Tablets taken: 12 (total 36 over three days)
Notes: again, minimal hunger, good energy level and alertness, no negative effects except the weight loss noted above. No odd dreams. I'll post a follow-up tomorrow about how going back onto normal food goes.
Summary: assuming no ill effects today, I'm calling this experiment a minimal success. The tablets seem to have the ability to keep energy up for a day or so without ill effects, which would be useful for 'patrol' situations or perhaps as an ultralight emergency food ration (for an EDC, perhaps). Having a bottle on hand as part of a comprehensive emergency preparedness package is probably worth it, more than one bottle per family or other small group is probably overkill. For my part, I'm going to keep a bottle on-hand.
Thanks to everyone who made suggestions or comments. I hope I've provided some useful data.
Monday morning weight: 186lbs
Tuesday morning weight: 183lbs
Final weight: 181 lbs
Comment: with my fourth data point showing a continued decline at an unhealthy rate, I'm stopping the experiment.
Steps Sunday: 8,789
Steps Monday: 9,652
Steps Tuesday: 7,979
Comment: half a mile of jogging yesterday; steps below average but well above my minimum goal. The average of the three days is above my baseline average.
Tablets taken: 12 (total 36 over three days)
Notes: again, minimal hunger, good energy level and alertness, no negative effects except the weight loss noted above. No odd dreams. I'll post a follow-up tomorrow about how going back onto normal food goes.
Summary: assuming no ill effects today, I'm calling this experiment a minimal success. The tablets seem to have the ability to keep energy up for a day or so without ill effects, which would be useful for 'patrol' situations or perhaps as an ultralight emergency food ration (for an EDC, perhaps). Having a bottle on hand as part of a comprehensive emergency preparedness package is probably worth it, more than one bottle per family or other small group is probably overkill. For my part, I'm going to keep a bottle on-hand.
Thanks to everyone who made suggestions or comments. I hope I've provided some useful data.
Tuesday, July 12, 2011
December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part XX
The Last Command
Some 400 USN aircraft, a quarter of them damaged to some degree, now attempted to locate their fleet and land in the dark. Halsey had authorized all carriers to turn on their deck lights when the strike returned, but gave no explicit authorization of any other breaches of normal light discipline. Admiral Mitscher, commanding TG 51.3, ordered his carriers to turn on not only their deck lights and running lights but also searchlights to provide a visual beacon for the returning planes. This was so successful that many aircraft from TG 51.1 and TG 51.2 wound up landing on Mitscher’s carriers. Even so, a hundred and fifty American planes were lost at sea or crash-landed. Almost all of the pilots and crews were recovered over the next several days.
Once the strike was recovered, Halsey continued west. Members of his staff protested yet again, reminding him of the disastrous night action at Midway. Halsey set half his destroyers out as a long-range radar screen, but otherwise ignored these warnings. TF 55 followed slightly behind TF 51.
Yamamoto’s Battle Force, for its part, continued east towards the Americans. It is notable that this was due not to any order on Yamamoto’s part but simply a lack of orders to change course, even as the messages detailing the destruction of the Carrier Force came in. Yamamoto knew that only a miracle would bring him within gun range of the US fleet at dawn, and that no other outcome could bring any result except destruction for his force. Still, he also knew that with his fleet carriers and their irreplaceable trained cadres of pilots and crews gone no other fleet action could be expected to yield any better result.
Yamamoto very nearly got his miracle. Halsey’s aggressive course brought his picket destroyers within 100 miles of the IJN Battle Force at dawn. Both sides sighted each other almost immediately, and across three thousand square miles of ocean a hundred ships went to flank speed.
May 20th, 1944, would be the last large-scale naval action of the war.
The Japanese drew first blood as an F1M off CVS Nisshin shot down an OS2U from USS New Jersey in one of the few floatplane vs. floatplane duels of the war. It would not be the last oddity of the day’s action.
Halsey’s carriers raced east as they frantically spotted their strike aircraft, then turned west at 0900 and began to launch. Just spotting the strikes had been a challenge; the disruptions of the night landing piled on top of the previous day’s fighting had left no carrier with all its remaining planes on board, and most had aircraft from multiple ships. The USS Ticonderoga CV16 had aircraft from eight different ships including the lost Yorktown and two CVLs on board, from all three task groups.
Fighters from the dawn CAP were already engaging the Japanese as the strikes launched, and each task group was directed to attack on its own. With so little time for briefing and planning, and so little cohesiveness in the strike groups, a virtue was made of necessity and most carrier’s groups were directed to attack at will; a lamed Japanese ship at this point could easily be finished off later.
The result was a chaotic death dance played out around and above the Japanese Battle Force as it steered towards TF 51.
At dawn on the 20th the IJN Battle Force had three carriers, two seaplane carriers, seven battleships, one battlecruiser, eight heavy cruisers, one torpedo cruiser, nine light cruisers, and seventeen destroyers. Yamamoto had detached CL Kiso and three destroyers to screen his aviation ships. This group was attacked by most of the aircraft launched by TG51.3; well over half the US aircraft launched that morning. By noon six of the nine ships were sunk and the rest sinking.
Aircraft from TG51.2 spread their attacks across the rest of the IJN force. They sank cruisers Myoko, Furutaka, Naka, and Yubari along with five destroyers and damaged many other ships.
Admiral Sherman, commanding the battered TG51.1, kept the aircraft lifting from his remaining carriers under much tighter control. He wanted to kill a battleship, and Commander Dixon of the USS Lexington, his senior pilot, was determined to oblige him. Sixty-eight strike aircraft, just over half of them TBF Avengers, converged on Fuso and scored five bomb and an incredible eight torpedo hits. Fuso capsized half an hour later.
By noon the sky was empty of Japanese aircraft. The US fleet’s Hellcats began strafing the dwindling ranks of the Japanese fleet. Their Browning .50cal machineguns couldn’t sink ships, but they could rip up exposed equipment on deck and kill unprotected crewmen. A TBF from CVE Sangamon was the last aircraft to attack before the battle lines engaged, hitting Shinano with a bomb that jammed her “B” turret pointed forward.
TF55, meanwhile, had split in two, Spruance leading his six fast battleships, four light cruisers, and 27 destroyers forward. At 1130 they linked up with TG51.4 – the two Iowa-class battleships and their screen – along with half a dozen cruisers detached from the carrier groups, and steered towards the Japanese. In all Spruance had eight fast battleships, four brand-new heavy cruisers, eight light cruisers, and three dozen destroyers, none of them damaged.
Yamamoto still had six battleships, one battlecruiser, thirteen cruisers and nine destroyers, almost all of them damaged to some extent. His battle line actually had a greater displacement than the US battleships and he had more heavy cruisers, but Yamamoto must have been well aware he was heavily outmatched. His battle-line formed north-to-south, the three massive Yamato-class BBs in the lead and Kirishima in the rear with the old Nagato, Ise, and Hyuga in between, and sent his cruisers and destroyers forward in two groups north and south of his line to engage the enemy now visible on the horizon.
The USN battleships were in four columns of two sailing west; North Carolina leading Washington furthest to the south, then Alabama leading Massachusetts, South Dakota leading Indiana, and finally New Jersey leading Iowa at the northern end. The battlewagons were flanked by cruisers and destroyers to the north and south, just like the Japanese. Spruance sent his own screen forward to engage the Japanese while his battleships closed the distance, scouting planes already circling overhead to report.
OrBat, Final Phase:
Battle Force (Yamamoto)
BB Yamato, Musashi, Shinano, Nagato, Ise, Hyuga
BC Kirishima
CA Mogami, Kumano, Haguro, Aoba, Kinugasa, Kako
CLTT Oi
CL Agano, Jintsu, Yahagi, Oyodo, Yura, Noshiro
9 DD
TF55.1/TF51.4, Fast Battle Force (Spruance)
BB Iowa, New Jersey, South Dakota, Indiana, Massachusetts, Alabama, North Carolina, Washington
CA Baltimore, Boston, Houston CA70, Quincy
CL Columbia, Mobile, Wichita CL81, Miami, Philadelphia, Phoenix, St. Louis, Helena
36 DD
At 1241 Yamamoto, inspired by history on the eve of what he seems to have realized would be his last battle, ordered a message sent, explicitly via flag signal, to the rest of his force:
The Emperor expects that every man will do his duty.
Some 400 USN aircraft, a quarter of them damaged to some degree, now attempted to locate their fleet and land in the dark. Halsey had authorized all carriers to turn on their deck lights when the strike returned, but gave no explicit authorization of any other breaches of normal light discipline. Admiral Mitscher, commanding TG 51.3, ordered his carriers to turn on not only their deck lights and running lights but also searchlights to provide a visual beacon for the returning planes. This was so successful that many aircraft from TG 51.1 and TG 51.2 wound up landing on Mitscher’s carriers. Even so, a hundred and fifty American planes were lost at sea or crash-landed. Almost all of the pilots and crews were recovered over the next several days.
Once the strike was recovered, Halsey continued west. Members of his staff protested yet again, reminding him of the disastrous night action at Midway. Halsey set half his destroyers out as a long-range radar screen, but otherwise ignored these warnings. TF 55 followed slightly behind TF 51.
Yamamoto’s Battle Force, for its part, continued east towards the Americans. It is notable that this was due not to any order on Yamamoto’s part but simply a lack of orders to change course, even as the messages detailing the destruction of the Carrier Force came in. Yamamoto knew that only a miracle would bring him within gun range of the US fleet at dawn, and that no other outcome could bring any result except destruction for his force. Still, he also knew that with his fleet carriers and their irreplaceable trained cadres of pilots and crews gone no other fleet action could be expected to yield any better result.
Yamamoto very nearly got his miracle. Halsey’s aggressive course brought his picket destroyers within 100 miles of the IJN Battle Force at dawn. Both sides sighted each other almost immediately, and across three thousand square miles of ocean a hundred ships went to flank speed.
May 20th, 1944, would be the last large-scale naval action of the war.
The Japanese drew first blood as an F1M off CVS Nisshin shot down an OS2U from USS New Jersey in one of the few floatplane vs. floatplane duels of the war. It would not be the last oddity of the day’s action.
Halsey’s carriers raced east as they frantically spotted their strike aircraft, then turned west at 0900 and began to launch. Just spotting the strikes had been a challenge; the disruptions of the night landing piled on top of the previous day’s fighting had left no carrier with all its remaining planes on board, and most had aircraft from multiple ships. The USS Ticonderoga CV16 had aircraft from eight different ships including the lost Yorktown and two CVLs on board, from all three task groups.
Fighters from the dawn CAP were already engaging the Japanese as the strikes launched, and each task group was directed to attack on its own. With so little time for briefing and planning, and so little cohesiveness in the strike groups, a virtue was made of necessity and most carrier’s groups were directed to attack at will; a lamed Japanese ship at this point could easily be finished off later.
The result was a chaotic death dance played out around and above the Japanese Battle Force as it steered towards TF 51.
At dawn on the 20th the IJN Battle Force had three carriers, two seaplane carriers, seven battleships, one battlecruiser, eight heavy cruisers, one torpedo cruiser, nine light cruisers, and seventeen destroyers. Yamamoto had detached CL Kiso and three destroyers to screen his aviation ships. This group was attacked by most of the aircraft launched by TG51.3; well over half the US aircraft launched that morning. By noon six of the nine ships were sunk and the rest sinking.
Aircraft from TG51.2 spread their attacks across the rest of the IJN force. They sank cruisers Myoko, Furutaka, Naka, and Yubari along with five destroyers and damaged many other ships.
Admiral Sherman, commanding the battered TG51.1, kept the aircraft lifting from his remaining carriers under much tighter control. He wanted to kill a battleship, and Commander Dixon of the USS Lexington, his senior pilot, was determined to oblige him. Sixty-eight strike aircraft, just over half of them TBF Avengers, converged on Fuso and scored five bomb and an incredible eight torpedo hits. Fuso capsized half an hour later.
By noon the sky was empty of Japanese aircraft. The US fleet’s Hellcats began strafing the dwindling ranks of the Japanese fleet. Their Browning .50cal machineguns couldn’t sink ships, but they could rip up exposed equipment on deck and kill unprotected crewmen. A TBF from CVE Sangamon was the last aircraft to attack before the battle lines engaged, hitting Shinano with a bomb that jammed her “B” turret pointed forward.
TF55, meanwhile, had split in two, Spruance leading his six fast battleships, four light cruisers, and 27 destroyers forward. At 1130 they linked up with TG51.4 – the two Iowa-class battleships and their screen – along with half a dozen cruisers detached from the carrier groups, and steered towards the Japanese. In all Spruance had eight fast battleships, four brand-new heavy cruisers, eight light cruisers, and three dozen destroyers, none of them damaged.
Yamamoto still had six battleships, one battlecruiser, thirteen cruisers and nine destroyers, almost all of them damaged to some extent. His battle line actually had a greater displacement than the US battleships and he had more heavy cruisers, but Yamamoto must have been well aware he was heavily outmatched. His battle-line formed north-to-south, the three massive Yamato-class BBs in the lead and Kirishima in the rear with the old Nagato, Ise, and Hyuga in between, and sent his cruisers and destroyers forward in two groups north and south of his line to engage the enemy now visible on the horizon.
The USN battleships were in four columns of two sailing west; North Carolina leading Washington furthest to the south, then Alabama leading Massachusetts, South Dakota leading Indiana, and finally New Jersey leading Iowa at the northern end. The battlewagons were flanked by cruisers and destroyers to the north and south, just like the Japanese. Spruance sent his own screen forward to engage the Japanese while his battleships closed the distance, scouting planes already circling overhead to report.
OrBat, Final Phase:
Battle Force (Yamamoto)
BB Yamato, Musashi, Shinano, Nagato, Ise, Hyuga
BC Kirishima
CA Mogami, Kumano, Haguro, Aoba, Kinugasa, Kako
CLTT Oi
CL Agano, Jintsu, Yahagi, Oyodo, Yura, Noshiro
9 DD
TF55.1/TF51.4, Fast Battle Force (Spruance)
BB Iowa, New Jersey, South Dakota, Indiana, Massachusetts, Alabama, North Carolina, Washington
CA Baltimore, Boston, Houston CA70, Quincy
CL Columbia, Mobile, Wichita CL81, Miami, Philadelphia, Phoenix, St. Louis, Helena
36 DD
At 1241 Yamamoto, inspired by history on the eve of what he seems to have realized would be his last battle, ordered a message sent, explicitly via flag signal, to the rest of his force:
The Emperor expects that every man will do his duty.
Food Tablets, Day 2
Sunday morning weight: 188lbs
Monday morning weight: 186lbs
Tuesday morning weight: 183lbs
Comment: ok, that's not a good trend. I'm going to go for one more day to see if it levels out (note I was fairly dehydrated this morning, which might account for a pound or so). If it doesn't, I'm going to abort.
Steps Sunday: 8,789
Steps Monday: 9,652
Comment: quite a bit above average, and includes one mile of jogging.
Tablets taken: 12
Notes: as with Sunday, only minor hunger now and again. I actually felt a little more awake and alert than normal, possibly unrelated. I went to bed much later than normal for me, though I'm pretty sure that there wasn't a causal link with the food tablets.
Monday morning weight: 186lbs
Tuesday morning weight: 183lbs
Comment: ok, that's not a good trend. I'm going to go for one more day to see if it levels out (note I was fairly dehydrated this morning, which might account for a pound or so). If it doesn't, I'm going to abort.
Steps Sunday: 8,789
Steps Monday: 9,652
Comment: quite a bit above average, and includes one mile of jogging.
Tablets taken: 12
Notes: as with Sunday, only minor hunger now and again. I actually felt a little more awake and alert than normal, possibly unrelated. I went to bed much later than normal for me, though I'm pretty sure that there wasn't a causal link with the food tablets.
Monday, July 11, 2011
December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part XIX
The Marshals Campaign, Part II
Just before noon on the 19th, Admiral Ozawa’s carriers, still undetected, launched a maximum effort strike at extreme range towards the US carriers. Two hundred assorted dive and torpedo bombers escorted by one hundred and forty fighters were spotted by an SBD returning from patrol, which radioed off a frantic contact report before being picked off by a pair of Zeros. Ensign George Bush was the only survivor of his crew, but his contact report gained the fleet twenty vital minutes warning before the Japanese first appeared on radar. Hanger crews actually managed to get Hellcats fueled, armed, and launched in time to intercept the Japanese directly over the fleet – an effort that would save many lives.
The USS Enterprise had her Hellcats aloft as the CAP, and they were thus the first to make contact. Poor coordination by the Japanese allowed the twenty-two F6Fs to blow though the fighter screen and get in among the bombers. The Zeros became disorganized, some turning to pursue the Enterprise’s group while others continued on to meet the hastily launched reserve from the USS Hancock and USS Adams. By the time the Japanese bombers began their attack runs Hellcats from almost every carrier in TF51 had joined the defense, along with six from the escort carrier USS Santee in TF55. Roughly thirty Zeros and fifty bombers were gone.
TF 51 was operating in four slightly separated task groups; TG51.1 took the brunt of the attack while roughly twenty IJN bombers attacked TG51.4 (USS Iowa, New Jersey, and their screen).
TG51.1 had fleet carriers Lexington, Yorktown, and Saratoga (II), light carriers Wasp, Ranger, and Intrepid, heavy cruisers Salt Lake City, Pensacola, Baltimore, and Boston, light cruisers Atlanta, Denver, and Mobile, and nine destroyers. One hundred and thirty aircraft attacked 22 ships, concentrating on the carriers. Scores were downed by AA fire, and others to Hellcats that followed them down, but over half of the attackers were able to release their bombs and torpedoes, scoring fourteen hits.
USS Yorktown was hit by six bombs, two torpedoes, and one Val that crashed into her flight deck. There was probably no better trained and certainly no more experienced crew in the world at managing battle damage than hers, but the explosions and fires simply overwhelmed them. Yorktown, ablaze from stem to stern and beam to beam, was ordered abandoned at 1645 and sank twenty minutes later, taking over 1,200 of her crew with her.
Two bombs hit the Saratoga, wrecking her forward flight deck and elevator. Wasp was hit by a single bomb amidships that holed her flight deck and burst in her hanger, starting a fire that took over an hour to bring under control. Intrepid was hit by a torpedo aft that destroyed one engine room. Pensacola was hit by two bombs, which smashed her “B” turret and started a serious fire aft. Ranger took a near miss that opened a seam and killed one crewman. Lexington was soaked by a pair of near-misses but took no damage and reported no casualties – the only one of the six carriers in the group to emerge unscathed.
One hundred and ninety-three IJN aircraft failed to return to their carriers. Twenty-one Hellcats were shot down, mostly from among those hastily launched individually or in pairs as the Japanese approached.
Even before USS Yorktown sank, SBDs from TG51.2 were aloft, searching for the Japanese. TF 51 had detached its damaged ships along with a destroyer squadron for protection and was charging west. Halsey had blood in his eye, and was determined to hit back.
The position of the Japanese fleet, when finally located, posed a problem. By the time the US strike could finish being prepared, launch, fly to the target, attack, and fly back it would be dark. Night landings by massed, and in many cases damaged, aircraft would be sure to result in additional casualties. Further, most of the USN pilots had already flown one mission earlier in the day against Kwajalein. Pilot fatigue would be a danger on top of the hazards of combat and flying at night.
Halsey, however, overruled his staff’s concerns. 183 dive bombers, 97 TBFs, and 204 Hellcats reached the Japanese Carrier Force an hour and a half before dusk. Sixty Zeroes were aloft, and despite being outnumbered over 3:1 by the US fighters managed to shoot down eleven bombers. Japanese AA fire, nowhere near as heavy or capable as its US equivalent, downed some thirty more aircraft before they could release their ordnance. The Americans ignored the IJN light cruisers and destroyers, scoring 49 bomb and torpedo hits on the nine carriers (including the two seaplane carriers) and two heavy cruisers.
Half the hits were scored on the five IJN fleet carriers, causing severe fires and flooding that would sink or destroy all of them. CV Shokaku was the last to go, her flight deck beginning to dip under water just as the sun set on the Japanese fleet. Light carriers Zuiho and Shoho along with seaplane carrier Chitose joined them, Shoho being totally destroyed in a massive explosion just seconds after being hit by a pair of 1,000lb bombs amidships. Heavy cruiser Tone was wrecked and set afire by bomb strikes, although she would survive the night and be scuttled shortly after dawn. CVS Chiyoda was hit by a pair of torpedoes that ruined her main power plant, however the ship’s odd design allowed her to limp away on her secondary diesel plant. She was joined by CA Chikuma, three of her main battery turrets out of action and her seaplane handling facilities wrecked but her propulsion system almost miraculously intact. Admiral Ozawa, barely able to stand unsupported due to his wounds but still erect on Sendai’s bridge, ordered the two cripples, his new flag ship, and two destroyers to turn back for Truk. The other three light cruisers and seven destroyers were ordered to join the Battle Force.
Kido Butai was dead, but Combined Fleet yet lived.
Just before noon on the 19th, Admiral Ozawa’s carriers, still undetected, launched a maximum effort strike at extreme range towards the US carriers. Two hundred assorted dive and torpedo bombers escorted by one hundred and forty fighters were spotted by an SBD returning from patrol, which radioed off a frantic contact report before being picked off by a pair of Zeros. Ensign George Bush was the only survivor of his crew, but his contact report gained the fleet twenty vital minutes warning before the Japanese first appeared on radar. Hanger crews actually managed to get Hellcats fueled, armed, and launched in time to intercept the Japanese directly over the fleet – an effort that would save many lives.
The USS Enterprise had her Hellcats aloft as the CAP, and they were thus the first to make contact. Poor coordination by the Japanese allowed the twenty-two F6Fs to blow though the fighter screen and get in among the bombers. The Zeros became disorganized, some turning to pursue the Enterprise’s group while others continued on to meet the hastily launched reserve from the USS Hancock and USS Adams. By the time the Japanese bombers began their attack runs Hellcats from almost every carrier in TF51 had joined the defense, along with six from the escort carrier USS Santee in TF55. Roughly thirty Zeros and fifty bombers were gone.
TF 51 was operating in four slightly separated task groups; TG51.1 took the brunt of the attack while roughly twenty IJN bombers attacked TG51.4 (USS Iowa, New Jersey, and their screen).
TG51.1 had fleet carriers Lexington, Yorktown, and Saratoga (II), light carriers Wasp, Ranger, and Intrepid, heavy cruisers Salt Lake City, Pensacola, Baltimore, and Boston, light cruisers Atlanta, Denver, and Mobile, and nine destroyers. One hundred and thirty aircraft attacked 22 ships, concentrating on the carriers. Scores were downed by AA fire, and others to Hellcats that followed them down, but over half of the attackers were able to release their bombs and torpedoes, scoring fourteen hits.
USS Yorktown was hit by six bombs, two torpedoes, and one Val that crashed into her flight deck. There was probably no better trained and certainly no more experienced crew in the world at managing battle damage than hers, but the explosions and fires simply overwhelmed them. Yorktown, ablaze from stem to stern and beam to beam, was ordered abandoned at 1645 and sank twenty minutes later, taking over 1,200 of her crew with her.
Two bombs hit the Saratoga, wrecking her forward flight deck and elevator. Wasp was hit by a single bomb amidships that holed her flight deck and burst in her hanger, starting a fire that took over an hour to bring under control. Intrepid was hit by a torpedo aft that destroyed one engine room. Pensacola was hit by two bombs, which smashed her “B” turret and started a serious fire aft. Ranger took a near miss that opened a seam and killed one crewman. Lexington was soaked by a pair of near-misses but took no damage and reported no casualties – the only one of the six carriers in the group to emerge unscathed.
One hundred and ninety-three IJN aircraft failed to return to their carriers. Twenty-one Hellcats were shot down, mostly from among those hastily launched individually or in pairs as the Japanese approached.
Even before USS Yorktown sank, SBDs from TG51.2 were aloft, searching for the Japanese. TF 51 had detached its damaged ships along with a destroyer squadron for protection and was charging west. Halsey had blood in his eye, and was determined to hit back.
The position of the Japanese fleet, when finally located, posed a problem. By the time the US strike could finish being prepared, launch, fly to the target, attack, and fly back it would be dark. Night landings by massed, and in many cases damaged, aircraft would be sure to result in additional casualties. Further, most of the USN pilots had already flown one mission earlier in the day against Kwajalein. Pilot fatigue would be a danger on top of the hazards of combat and flying at night.
Halsey, however, overruled his staff’s concerns. 183 dive bombers, 97 TBFs, and 204 Hellcats reached the Japanese Carrier Force an hour and a half before dusk. Sixty Zeroes were aloft, and despite being outnumbered over 3:1 by the US fighters managed to shoot down eleven bombers. Japanese AA fire, nowhere near as heavy or capable as its US equivalent, downed some thirty more aircraft before they could release their ordnance. The Americans ignored the IJN light cruisers and destroyers, scoring 49 bomb and torpedo hits on the nine carriers (including the two seaplane carriers) and two heavy cruisers.
Half the hits were scored on the five IJN fleet carriers, causing severe fires and flooding that would sink or destroy all of them. CV Shokaku was the last to go, her flight deck beginning to dip under water just as the sun set on the Japanese fleet. Light carriers Zuiho and Shoho along with seaplane carrier Chitose joined them, Shoho being totally destroyed in a massive explosion just seconds after being hit by a pair of 1,000lb bombs amidships. Heavy cruiser Tone was wrecked and set afire by bomb strikes, although she would survive the night and be scuttled shortly after dawn. CVS Chiyoda was hit by a pair of torpedoes that ruined her main power plant, however the ship’s odd design allowed her to limp away on her secondary diesel plant. She was joined by CA Chikuma, three of her main battery turrets out of action and her seaplane handling facilities wrecked but her propulsion system almost miraculously intact. Admiral Ozawa, barely able to stand unsupported due to his wounds but still erect on Sendai’s bridge, ordered the two cripples, his new flag ship, and two destroyers to turn back for Truk. The other three light cruisers and seven destroyers were ordered to join the Battle Force.
Kido Butai was dead, but Combined Fleet yet lived.
Food Tablets, Day 1
Sunday morning weight: 188lbs
Monday morning weight: 186lbs
Comment: within normal variation so far.
Steps Sunday: 8,789
Comment: actually a little above my average, though pretty much all walking or mowing the lawn.
Tablets taken: 12
Notes: I felt a little hungry now and then, but it never exceeded the normal "hmm, I should think about eating soon" level.
Monday morning weight: 186lbs
Comment: within normal variation so far.
Steps Sunday: 8,789
Comment: actually a little above my average, though pretty much all walking or mowing the lawn.
Tablets taken: 12
Notes: I felt a little hungry now and then, but it never exceeded the normal "hmm, I should think about eating soon" level.
Thursday, July 7, 2011
December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part XVIII
The Marshalls Campaign, Part I
Nimitz had long and carefully planned for the US offensive launched towards Kwajalein in May of 1944. Most of his staff had suggested a more cautious approach, hitting several of the outer islands first. Nimitz overruled them, sure that was what the Japanese would expect and determined to “hit ‘em where they ain’t.”
The Japanese fleet was divided. Yamamoto was at Truk with the battle line, but Ozawa and Kido Butai were enroute from Japan with their newly worked-up air groups and the newly commissioned fleet carrier Taiho, the latter still with workmen aboard fixing the minor problems of her hurried working-up cruise. The IJN had rushed almost every pilot in the training pipeline into service and scraped up a mix of old and new aircraft for them to fly, but Ozawa’s decks were nearly full. However, both Yamamoto and Ozawa were keenly aware that those pilots, planes, and carriers were all Japan would be able to field for a year or more. Between the two forces, Yamamoto had with him every carrier except a few escort carriers, every battleship and battlecruiser, every heavy cruiser, and most of the remaining light cruisers and modern destroyers left in the IJN. Yamamoto was fully aware of this, but far from confident, writing in a private letter: “I have every confidence that Combined Fleet will do all in its power to defeat the enemy, and every hope that I will do all in my power as their commander, but I fear that only Divine intervention can bring us victory.”
Yamamoto sortied from Truk even as the USN launched its first air strikes against Kwajalein. His plan was to draw the US attention with his force, then have Ozawa surprise them from the northwest.
OrBat
IJN
Battle Force (Yamamoto)
CV Ryujo, Ryuho, Hiyo (80 A6M, 30 D3A, 20 B5N)
CVS Mizhuo, Nisshin (32 F1M, 8 E13A)
BB Yamato, Musashi, Shinano, Nagato, Ise, Hyuga, Fuso
BC Kirishima
CA Mogami, Kumano, Myoko, Haguro, Aoba, Kinugasa, Furutaka, Kako
CLTT Oi
CL Agano, Naka, Kiso, Jintsu, Yahagi, Oyodo
11 DD
Carrier Force (Ozawa)
CV Akagi, Kaga, Shokaku, Zuikaku, Taiho (150 A6M, 60 D4Y, 40 D3A, 50 B6N, 50 B5N)
CVL Zuiho, Shoho (30 A6M, 20 B5N)
CVS Chitose, Chiyoda (32 F1M, 8 E13A)
CA Tone, Chikuma
CL Sendai, Yubari, Yura, Noshiro
9 DD
USN
TF 51, Carrier Force (Halsey)
CV Lexington, Yorktown, Saratoga CV9, Ticonderoga CV16, Bataan CV10, Bunker Hill, Concord CV11, Princeton CV18, Belleau Wood CV12 (324 F6F, 216 SBD, 108 SB2C 162 TBF)
CVL Independence, Enterprise CVL23, Hornet CVL24, Wasp CVL25, Ranger CVL26, Intrepid CVL28, Franklin CVL27, Hancock CVL29, Adams CVL30 (216 F6F, 81 TBF)
BB Iowa, New Jersey
CA Salt Lake City, Pensacola, Louisville, Chicago, Indianapolis, New Orleans, Minneapolis, San Francisco, Baltimore, Boston, Houston CA70, Quincy
CLAA Atlanta, San Diego, Oakland, Reno
CL Cleveland, Columbia, Denver, Santa Fe, Birmingham, Mobile, Wichita CL81, Miami
63 DD
TF 55, Battle Force (Spruance)
CVE Sangamon, Suwanee, Chenango, Santee (72 F6F, 48 TBF)
BB South Dakota, Indiana, Massachusetts, Alabama, North Carolina, Washington, New Mexico, Idaho, Colorado, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Arizona
CL Philadelphia, Nashville, Phoenix, Honolulu, St. Louis, Helena
45 DD
TF 53, Amphibious Force (Turner)
Did not participate in the naval battle
IJN USN
8 CV* 9 CV
2 CVL 9 CVL
4 CVS 4 CVE**
7 BB 14 BB
1 BC
10 CA 12 CA
1 CLTT 4 CLAA
10 CL 14 CL**
20 DD 108 DD**
610 A/C*** 1,227 A/C***
*Using the term somewhat loosely; for example Ryuho could carry a group a third the size of a US fleet carrier, and Hiyo could only make 25kts.
**Not counting units in the Amphibious Force, which did not participate in the naval battle.
***Not counting floatplanes on surface combatants.
Note: I’ve decided to apply author’s prerogative and make USN carrier naming conventions what they should have been in my sole opinion. Yes, I realize this isn’t all that likely, but all alternate-name ships will appear with hull numbers so you can mentally replace them with OTL’s names if you wish.
Yamamoto’s plan was based on hope, but Halsey’s was based on something much more dangerous: false confidence. US intelligence had carefully analyzed Japanese carrier flight operations and losses to date and was highly confident that the Japanese would be unable to supply their seven known carriers with full air groups until at least July. The Japanese were assumed to know the strength of the US carrier force in at least rough terms. Putting these two pieces of information together, the Japanese were expected to hold their remaining fleet in reserve until they could fight under heavy air cover.
Halsey, accordingly, held much of his air strength in reserve and launched extensive searches until his initial attacks revealed only minimal Japanese air power was deployed in the Marshals. Thereafter, he used his air power to pound every target in the chain, hoping to ensure that the Japanese would be unable to bring forces from other islands to contest Kwajalein.
The US force was also, for the first time in a major operation, unsupported by a submarine picket line. While these had varied in strength, at least a few boats had always been present and were expected to provide warning of any large fleet approach. While Halsey was aware the picket line did not exist (due to their value in commerce raiding), it is generally accepted that he was subconsciously expecting there was a backup to his limited air searches that did not in fact exist.
Halsey’s sole preparations for an enemy fleet presence thus consisted of operating his carriers west of Kwajalein and ordering his battle line to keep armor-piercing shells aboard and be ready to move at high speed on an hour’s notice.
On May 19th, an E13A from Chitose located the US fleet and radioed a contact report. It was shot down, but mis-identified as a flying boat by the fighter that made the kill. Such a contact did not imply the presence of enemy ships, and Halsey was not even informed.
Nimitz had long and carefully planned for the US offensive launched towards Kwajalein in May of 1944. Most of his staff had suggested a more cautious approach, hitting several of the outer islands first. Nimitz overruled them, sure that was what the Japanese would expect and determined to “hit ‘em where they ain’t.”
The Japanese fleet was divided. Yamamoto was at Truk with the battle line, but Ozawa and Kido Butai were enroute from Japan with their newly worked-up air groups and the newly commissioned fleet carrier Taiho, the latter still with workmen aboard fixing the minor problems of her hurried working-up cruise. The IJN had rushed almost every pilot in the training pipeline into service and scraped up a mix of old and new aircraft for them to fly, but Ozawa’s decks were nearly full. However, both Yamamoto and Ozawa were keenly aware that those pilots, planes, and carriers were all Japan would be able to field for a year or more. Between the two forces, Yamamoto had with him every carrier except a few escort carriers, every battleship and battlecruiser, every heavy cruiser, and most of the remaining light cruisers and modern destroyers left in the IJN. Yamamoto was fully aware of this, but far from confident, writing in a private letter: “I have every confidence that Combined Fleet will do all in its power to defeat the enemy, and every hope that I will do all in my power as their commander, but I fear that only Divine intervention can bring us victory.”
Yamamoto sortied from Truk even as the USN launched its first air strikes against Kwajalein. His plan was to draw the US attention with his force, then have Ozawa surprise them from the northwest.
OrBat
IJN
Battle Force (Yamamoto)
CV Ryujo, Ryuho, Hiyo (80 A6M, 30 D3A, 20 B5N)
CVS Mizhuo, Nisshin (32 F1M, 8 E13A)
BB Yamato, Musashi, Shinano, Nagato, Ise, Hyuga, Fuso
BC Kirishima
CA Mogami, Kumano, Myoko, Haguro, Aoba, Kinugasa, Furutaka, Kako
CLTT Oi
CL Agano, Naka, Kiso, Jintsu, Yahagi, Oyodo
11 DD
Carrier Force (Ozawa)
CV Akagi, Kaga, Shokaku, Zuikaku, Taiho (150 A6M, 60 D4Y, 40 D3A, 50 B6N, 50 B5N)
CVL Zuiho, Shoho (30 A6M, 20 B5N)
CVS Chitose, Chiyoda (32 F1M, 8 E13A)
CA Tone, Chikuma
CL Sendai, Yubari, Yura, Noshiro
9 DD
USN
TF 51, Carrier Force (Halsey)
CV Lexington, Yorktown, Saratoga CV9, Ticonderoga CV16, Bataan CV10, Bunker Hill, Concord CV11, Princeton CV18, Belleau Wood CV12 (324 F6F, 216 SBD, 108 SB2C 162 TBF)
CVL Independence, Enterprise CVL23, Hornet CVL24, Wasp CVL25, Ranger CVL26, Intrepid CVL28, Franklin CVL27, Hancock CVL29, Adams CVL30 (216 F6F, 81 TBF)
BB Iowa, New Jersey
CA Salt Lake City, Pensacola, Louisville, Chicago, Indianapolis, New Orleans, Minneapolis, San Francisco, Baltimore, Boston, Houston CA70, Quincy
CLAA Atlanta, San Diego, Oakland, Reno
CL Cleveland, Columbia, Denver, Santa Fe, Birmingham, Mobile, Wichita CL81, Miami
63 DD
TF 55, Battle Force (Spruance)
CVE Sangamon, Suwanee, Chenango, Santee (72 F6F, 48 TBF)
BB South Dakota, Indiana, Massachusetts, Alabama, North Carolina, Washington, New Mexico, Idaho, Colorado, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Arizona
CL Philadelphia, Nashville, Phoenix, Honolulu, St. Louis, Helena
45 DD
TF 53, Amphibious Force (Turner)
Did not participate in the naval battle
IJN USN
8 CV* 9 CV
2 CVL 9 CVL
4 CVS 4 CVE**
7 BB 14 BB
1 BC
10 CA 12 CA
1 CLTT 4 CLAA
10 CL 14 CL**
20 DD 108 DD**
610 A/C*** 1,227 A/C***
*Using the term somewhat loosely; for example Ryuho could carry a group a third the size of a US fleet carrier, and Hiyo could only make 25kts.
**Not counting units in the Amphibious Force, which did not participate in the naval battle.
***Not counting floatplanes on surface combatants.
Note: I’ve decided to apply author’s prerogative and make USN carrier naming conventions what they should have been in my sole opinion. Yes, I realize this isn’t all that likely, but all alternate-name ships will appear with hull numbers so you can mentally replace them with OTL’s names if you wish.
Yamamoto’s plan was based on hope, but Halsey’s was based on something much more dangerous: false confidence. US intelligence had carefully analyzed Japanese carrier flight operations and losses to date and was highly confident that the Japanese would be unable to supply their seven known carriers with full air groups until at least July. The Japanese were assumed to know the strength of the US carrier force in at least rough terms. Putting these two pieces of information together, the Japanese were expected to hold their remaining fleet in reserve until they could fight under heavy air cover.
Halsey, accordingly, held much of his air strength in reserve and launched extensive searches until his initial attacks revealed only minimal Japanese air power was deployed in the Marshals. Thereafter, he used his air power to pound every target in the chain, hoping to ensure that the Japanese would be unable to bring forces from other islands to contest Kwajalein.
The US force was also, for the first time in a major operation, unsupported by a submarine picket line. While these had varied in strength, at least a few boats had always been present and were expected to provide warning of any large fleet approach. While Halsey was aware the picket line did not exist (due to their value in commerce raiding), it is generally accepted that he was subconsciously expecting there was a backup to his limited air searches that did not in fact exist.
Halsey’s sole preparations for an enemy fleet presence thus consisted of operating his carriers west of Kwajalein and ordering his battle line to keep armor-piercing shells aboard and be ready to move at high speed on an hour’s notice.
On May 19th, an E13A from Chitose located the US fleet and radioed a contact report. It was shot down, but mis-identified as a flying boat by the fighter that made the kill. Such a contact did not imply the presence of enemy ships, and Halsey was not even informed.
Wednesday, July 6, 2011
Experiment, D-4
I am going to conduct an experiment. I am going to try to eat nothing except food tablets ( http://www.survivaltabs.com/ ) for a week, starting July 10th. If you have suggestions on how to conduct this experiment better, please comment here before the 10th.
Why? I’m trying to determine if these things actually work, and if so how well. If they do, they’re an ideal ‘patrol’, survival, or hiking ration (lightweight, long shelf life, no preparation, cheap). However, their claims make me skeptical that they will, in fact, work. Hence, the experiment. :-)
Process:
I will take by mouth each day only water, prescription medication, and the tablets. No juice, alcohol, or anything else that has calories.
I will put one tablet in my mouth each hour and let it dissolve (manufacturer directed method). I will drink water as I routinely do (several quarts per day).
Each morning I will record my weight.
I will wear a pedometer, and record my total steps each day. This is intended to be a rough measure of my activity level. I’ve been wearing the pedometer for three weeks to give me a baseline to work from. My minimum level is 7,500 steps per day (yes, I work a desk job).
Variations and limitations:
I will start by taking the recommended 12 tablets per day. Should this seem to be insufficient, I will increase this up to 24 tablets per day. I will record how many tablets I actually consume each day.
If I experience a rapid weight loss or any adverse medical condition (dizziness, nausea, etc.) I will abort the experiment.
Results:
This experiment will be considered a partial success if I can go for at least three days on not more than 24 tablets per day with no ill effects and no real reduction in my activity level. The food tablets would still work as a patrol or hiking ration, or a supplemental survival ration. I would keep a few bottles in stock for these purposes.
This experiment will be considered a complete success if I can go for the full week on not more than 12 tablets per day with no ill effects and no real reduction in my activity level. The food tablets would be exactly what they’re advertized as: a survival ration, and a good one. I’d keep a reasonable number of bottles in stock along with my other emergency food stocks. At ~$30 for a 15 day supply with a ten-year shelf life they’re much cheaper to stock than most foods.
Reporting:
I’ll do my best to post status updates here daily (tablets eaten, steps taken, weight, and any comments).
Why? I’m trying to determine if these things actually work, and if so how well. If they do, they’re an ideal ‘patrol’, survival, or hiking ration (lightweight, long shelf life, no preparation, cheap). However, their claims make me skeptical that they will, in fact, work. Hence, the experiment. :-)
Process:
I will take by mouth each day only water, prescription medication, and the tablets. No juice, alcohol, or anything else that has calories.
I will put one tablet in my mouth each hour and let it dissolve (manufacturer directed method). I will drink water as I routinely do (several quarts per day).
Each morning I will record my weight.
I will wear a pedometer, and record my total steps each day. This is intended to be a rough measure of my activity level. I’ve been wearing the pedometer for three weeks to give me a baseline to work from. My minimum level is 7,500 steps per day (yes, I work a desk job).
Variations and limitations:
I will start by taking the recommended 12 tablets per day. Should this seem to be insufficient, I will increase this up to 24 tablets per day. I will record how many tablets I actually consume each day.
If I experience a rapid weight loss or any adverse medical condition (dizziness, nausea, etc.) I will abort the experiment.
Results:
This experiment will be considered a partial success if I can go for at least three days on not more than 24 tablets per day with no ill effects and no real reduction in my activity level. The food tablets would still work as a patrol or hiking ration, or a supplemental survival ration. I would keep a few bottles in stock for these purposes.
This experiment will be considered a complete success if I can go for the full week on not more than 12 tablets per day with no ill effects and no real reduction in my activity level. The food tablets would be exactly what they’re advertized as: a survival ration, and a good one. I’d keep a reasonable number of bottles in stock along with my other emergency food stocks. At ~$30 for a 15 day supply with a ten-year shelf life they’re much cheaper to stock than most foods.
Reporting:
I’ll do my best to post status updates here daily (tablets eaten, steps taken, weight, and any comments).
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