OK, let me get this straight...
I ordered a safe. Being large and heavy as safes tend to be, it is coming by truck.
But not just one truck. In fact, not even just one trucking company.
Southwestern Motor Transport Lines picked up the safe. I was kindly provided with a tracking number. Cool! They don't really provide much information, but hey.
Until they transferred the safe to Daylight Transport. SMTL provided another tracking number to use with Daylight Transport. Hmmm. Well, OK, maybe they're the ones doing the actual delivery.
Nope.
Daylight Transport will be delivering the safe to Air Van. I fully expect a third tracking number.
How many trucking companies does it take to move a single object 2,100 miles?
Wednesday, May 25, 2011
Friday, May 20, 2011
December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part IX
Midway, Part III
Yamamoto had been more than satisfied with the night action. Leaving behind his carriers, the damaged Yamashiro and Yamato, and most of his screen he had shifted to his old flagship Nagato and led the rest of his battleships forward at flank speed. No attempt was made at a carrier strike. Yamamoto had less than 70 bombers left from eight different air groups, too many of his pilots were green, and he needed what he had for ASW patrols until his screen could rejoin.
Two hours after dawn the first USN strike arrived. The Lucky Lex’s pieced-together air group was not in much better shape than the IJN’s, but the American pilots were filled with rage and determination. Disregarding their losses the SBDs broke through the IJN CAP and focused their efforts on Mutsu and Hiei. Mutsu’s fore-most turret was smashed and her upper works set on fire but she continued to steam on. Hiei staggered out of formation, her thinner armor ripped open in multiple places by 1,000 pound bombs. Half an hour later a fire reached her forward magazine, and attempts to flood it failed. The forward half of the ship blew up, and the rest sank quickly.
The B-17s arrived next. They found Yamato and Yamashiro and unloaded their bombs from 10,000 feet, unhindered by Zeros as no one had thought to put a CAP over the pair of battleships. Yamato shrugged off her damage, but Yamashiro once again caught fire. Just before 1100 Yamamoto ordered her abandoned. She was finished off by torpedoes from DD Amagiri and sank at noon.
At 1000 Admiral Halsey, realizing that a surface battle could no longer be avoided, ordered Admiral Spruance to take command of the least-damaged battleships, cruisers, and destroyers and engage the pursuing Japanese. USS Lexington and the worst-damaged ships would continue to run east.
Spruance had the USS North Carolina, USS Washington, USS New Mexico, USS Colorado, USS West Virginia, USS Pennsylvania, USS Minneapolis, USS New Orleans, USS St. Louis, USS Helena, USS Phoenix, and 11 destroyers; 6 BB, 2 CA, 3 CL, and 11 DD, almost all damaged.
Yamamoto had the Nagato, Mutsu, Ise, Hyuga, Fuso, Kongo, Kirishima, Haruna, Mogami, Suzuya, Kumano, Maya, Chokai, Haguro, Kinu, Yura, and14 destroyers; 5 BB, 3 BC, 6 CA, 2 CL, and 14 DD, most of them intact or nearly so.
Spruance knew that the odds were against him in a traditional slugging match, and his torpedo-damaged ships were slower than the IJN battleships. Spruance did, however, have a card up his sleeve.
USS Triton was one of just five USN submarines near Midway during the battle. She had run at speed on the surface all morning, then dived shortly before 1000. Aided by constant position reports from “Seagulls” off the battleships and cruisers, she achieved a good attack position and at 1045 launched six torpedoes at Nagato from less than 1,000 yards off her port bow. LtCdr Kirkpatrick had ordered all his torpedoes set for minimum depth. All six hit, but in the ongoing tragedy of the Mk 14 only four detonated. Nagato, however, rapidly took on a list and fell out of formation. Despite two IJN destroyers charging towards her, USS Triton came about and fired her stern torpedoes at Ise. Three hit, but only one detonated.
Spruance’s card had turned out to be an ace.
Yamamoto, aboard the stricken Nagato, elected not to shift his flag just minutes before the battle lines engaged and passed command to VADM Mikawa.
Spruance had placed his heavy ships in a north-south battleline, cruising ahead slow while the Japanese approached in two parallel lines; battlecrisers to the north and battleships to the south. The Japanese plan had been to have each line turn in succession northward, engage in long range fire, and use their superior speed and their battlecruisers to pull ahead of the USN line and eventually cross its T.
Mikawa, however, had barely escaped the Hiei before she exploded and most of his staff had not. When he ordered the turn north the signal was not passed to Mutsu. Ise, Hyuga, and Fuso turned shortly afterward when they saw the battlecruisers had, leaving Mutsu steaming directly towards the USN formation alone. USS North Carolina opened fire at 1058, followed at 1059 by USS Washington. USS North Carolina’s second salvo straddled Mutsu, which belatedly began to turn. By the time she had reached her intended course she was under fire from the entire US line. Two turrets were put out of commission, and a near-miss aft jammed her rudder. The other six IJN ships turned to close with the US line in an attempt to cover her, but by the time they came into range she was already a wreck.
The battle lines began to engage their opposite numbers in line. At 1120 USS Pennsylvania scored a hit on Kirishima that killed Mikawa and Captain Iwabuchi. The IJN no longer had a flag officer anywhere in the battle line. Unsure of the status of the rest of the line, the executive officer ordered a turn away from the US line in hopes of re-establishing the chain of command. When Yamamoto arrived aboard the DD Nenohi he realized his numerical advantage was gone, his fleet battered and far from home, and his carrier striking power gone.
The Japanese fleet turned towards Truk, and Spruance had no choice but to let them go.
Total Losses, Battle of Midway:
CV Junyo
BB Mutsu, Yamashiro
BC Hiei
CA Mikuma, Ashigara
CL Tama, Isuzu
9 DD
1 SS
11 Transports & Freighters
180 Aircraft
CV USS Wasp
BB USS Mississippi, USS Maryland
CA USS Quincy, USS Vincennes, USS Wichita
CL USS Juneau, USS San Juan, USS Boise
14 DD
110 Aircraft
Both sides claimed the battle as a victory. After the war, historians would point out that the battle smashed the last of the IJN’s carefully trained pre-war carrier pilots. Others would counter that after the battle the US did not have a single undamaged capital ship in the Pacific, which would result in the transfer of USS Ranger and most of the Atlantic Fleet’s remaining modern cruisers to the Pacific. It is certain that in the aftermath of the battle neither side was able to mount a large operation. The war became a waiting game.
Yamamoto had been more than satisfied with the night action. Leaving behind his carriers, the damaged Yamashiro and Yamato, and most of his screen he had shifted to his old flagship Nagato and led the rest of his battleships forward at flank speed. No attempt was made at a carrier strike. Yamamoto had less than 70 bombers left from eight different air groups, too many of his pilots were green, and he needed what he had for ASW patrols until his screen could rejoin.
Two hours after dawn the first USN strike arrived. The Lucky Lex’s pieced-together air group was not in much better shape than the IJN’s, but the American pilots were filled with rage and determination. Disregarding their losses the SBDs broke through the IJN CAP and focused their efforts on Mutsu and Hiei. Mutsu’s fore-most turret was smashed and her upper works set on fire but she continued to steam on. Hiei staggered out of formation, her thinner armor ripped open in multiple places by 1,000 pound bombs. Half an hour later a fire reached her forward magazine, and attempts to flood it failed. The forward half of the ship blew up, and the rest sank quickly.
The B-17s arrived next. They found Yamato and Yamashiro and unloaded their bombs from 10,000 feet, unhindered by Zeros as no one had thought to put a CAP over the pair of battleships. Yamato shrugged off her damage, but Yamashiro once again caught fire. Just before 1100 Yamamoto ordered her abandoned. She was finished off by torpedoes from DD Amagiri and sank at noon.
At 1000 Admiral Halsey, realizing that a surface battle could no longer be avoided, ordered Admiral Spruance to take command of the least-damaged battleships, cruisers, and destroyers and engage the pursuing Japanese. USS Lexington and the worst-damaged ships would continue to run east.
Spruance had the USS North Carolina, USS Washington, USS New Mexico, USS Colorado, USS West Virginia, USS Pennsylvania, USS Minneapolis, USS New Orleans, USS St. Louis, USS Helena, USS Phoenix, and 11 destroyers; 6 BB, 2 CA, 3 CL, and 11 DD, almost all damaged.
Yamamoto had the Nagato, Mutsu, Ise, Hyuga, Fuso, Kongo, Kirishima, Haruna, Mogami, Suzuya, Kumano, Maya, Chokai, Haguro, Kinu, Yura, and14 destroyers; 5 BB, 3 BC, 6 CA, 2 CL, and 14 DD, most of them intact or nearly so.
Spruance knew that the odds were against him in a traditional slugging match, and his torpedo-damaged ships were slower than the IJN battleships. Spruance did, however, have a card up his sleeve.
USS Triton was one of just five USN submarines near Midway during the battle. She had run at speed on the surface all morning, then dived shortly before 1000. Aided by constant position reports from “Seagulls” off the battleships and cruisers, she achieved a good attack position and at 1045 launched six torpedoes at Nagato from less than 1,000 yards off her port bow. LtCdr Kirkpatrick had ordered all his torpedoes set for minimum depth. All six hit, but in the ongoing tragedy of the Mk 14 only four detonated. Nagato, however, rapidly took on a list and fell out of formation. Despite two IJN destroyers charging towards her, USS Triton came about and fired her stern torpedoes at Ise. Three hit, but only one detonated.
Spruance’s card had turned out to be an ace.
Yamamoto, aboard the stricken Nagato, elected not to shift his flag just minutes before the battle lines engaged and passed command to VADM Mikawa.
Spruance had placed his heavy ships in a north-south battleline, cruising ahead slow while the Japanese approached in two parallel lines; battlecrisers to the north and battleships to the south. The Japanese plan had been to have each line turn in succession northward, engage in long range fire, and use their superior speed and their battlecruisers to pull ahead of the USN line and eventually cross its T.
Mikawa, however, had barely escaped the Hiei before she exploded and most of his staff had not. When he ordered the turn north the signal was not passed to Mutsu. Ise, Hyuga, and Fuso turned shortly afterward when they saw the battlecruisers had, leaving Mutsu steaming directly towards the USN formation alone. USS North Carolina opened fire at 1058, followed at 1059 by USS Washington. USS North Carolina’s second salvo straddled Mutsu, which belatedly began to turn. By the time she had reached her intended course she was under fire from the entire US line. Two turrets were put out of commission, and a near-miss aft jammed her rudder. The other six IJN ships turned to close with the US line in an attempt to cover her, but by the time they came into range she was already a wreck.
The battle lines began to engage their opposite numbers in line. At 1120 USS Pennsylvania scored a hit on Kirishima that killed Mikawa and Captain Iwabuchi. The IJN no longer had a flag officer anywhere in the battle line. Unsure of the status of the rest of the line, the executive officer ordered a turn away from the US line in hopes of re-establishing the chain of command. When Yamamoto arrived aboard the DD Nenohi he realized his numerical advantage was gone, his fleet battered and far from home, and his carrier striking power gone.
The Japanese fleet turned towards Truk, and Spruance had no choice but to let them go.
Total Losses, Battle of Midway:
CV Junyo
BB Mutsu, Yamashiro
BC Hiei
CA Mikuma, Ashigara
CL Tama, Isuzu
9 DD
1 SS
11 Transports & Freighters
180 Aircraft
CV USS Wasp
BB USS Mississippi, USS Maryland
CA USS Quincy, USS Vincennes, USS Wichita
CL USS Juneau, USS San Juan, USS Boise
14 DD
110 Aircraft
Both sides claimed the battle as a victory. After the war, historians would point out that the battle smashed the last of the IJN’s carefully trained pre-war carrier pilots. Others would counter that after the battle the US did not have a single undamaged capital ship in the Pacific, which would result in the transfer of USS Ranger and most of the Atlantic Fleet’s remaining modern cruisers to the Pacific. It is certain that in the aftermath of the battle neither side was able to mount a large operation. The war became a waiting game.
Thursday, May 19, 2011
December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part VIII
Midway, Part II
Funding for this story is provided by the IJN society for things that begin with the string “Yama” and end with the letter “o.”
Halsey was very pleased with the morning’s results. The Japanese had been battered, and with their amphibious force mangled they would surely withdraw. Halsey would pursue and pick off any cripples.
Yamamoto, however, never considered withdrawal. He was very clear on the objective of the battle, and it was not Midway. Midway had only been a means to draw the US fleet out so it could be destroyed, and the US fleet was here. Despite the morning’s losses against Midway his carriers retained considerable striking power. He ordered Ryujo, Chiyoda, and all but three destroyers of the Tranport Force’s escorts to close up with the main body, while the transports themselves and their token escort turned back for Truk.
Both sides sent out early-afternoon searches to locate their enemies. The US did this with the PBY’s from Midway, while the IJN used float planes off its various seaplane carriers, battleships, and cruisers. Both sides were conserving their carrier aircraft for the expected strikes, and both sides launched their attacks less than 20 minutes apart.
The IJN strike arrived first. A total of 141 aircraft, including 44 Zeros, met 36 Wildcats on CAP over the joint TF 16 and 17. The Zeros had only a small numerical edge, but the nature of air combat attrition and the total Japanese commitment to the campaign meant many of them were veterans of every battle all the way back to Pearl Harbor. Only a few of the American pilots matched their experience. Only ten bombers and eleven Zeros were lost to the Wildcats, which lost 19 of their own in trade.
Eighty-seven bombers got past the fighters to attack the fleet, all of them targeting the carriers and battleships.
The three battleships and four Atlanta-class cruisers alone mounted 100 5”/38 DP guns. Almost half the attackers were shot down, though some of those were able to launch their bombs or torpedoes first. USS Wasp was targeted by some of the last veteran torpedo bombers of the Pearl Harbor raid in a perfectly executed hammer-and-anvil attack. She took three torpedo hits and began to list heavily even before four bombs started fires in her hanger. USS Lexington had torpedoes pass in front of her bow, behind her stern, and along both sides but took only a single fish forward and a near-miss from a bomb aft that damaged one of her propellers; she remained able to operate aircraft, though not able to achieve full speed. Her crew began to call her the “Lucky Lex.” USS South Dakota was only targeted by seven aircraft but five of them scored bomb hits, wrecking her starboard secondary battery, her aircraft handling facilities, badly damaging “A” Turret, and holing a fuel oil tank. Several fires were started, the worst in the starboard superstructure, but with help from USS Helena they were contained and extinguished. She turned to follow USS Arizona back to Pearl. Luck and extremely effective anti-aircraft fire prevented any damage to either of the other battleships.
The worst ship hit, USS Wasp, could not control her damage. Firefighting assistance from USS Minneapolis and USS New Orleans prolonged her struggle and saved most of her crew, but the ship herself was doomed. She sank two hours after the attack began.
One hundred and eighteen USN aircraft were about to land their own blows. 71 SBDs and the 12 new TBFs, escorted by 35 Wildcats, were out looking for the IJN carriers. Kido Butai, however, was covered by a rain squall and the strike was unable to locate them. Continuing on, near the extreme edge of their range, they spotted the IJN battle force and attacked.
37 Zeros were up over the formation. In sharp contrast to the strike escorts, these were the greenest pilots the IJN had ever deployed. The two squadrons of Wildcats shot down 19 for the loss of only five of their own. Only one SBD was downed by fighters.
USS Lexington’s Torpedo Squadron 2 focused their attack on the biggest ship any of them had ever seen – the Yamato. Four were killed by anti aircraft fire, but nine torpedoes closed on the battleship. Three missed and three more were duds, but three hit and detonated. Two did minimal damage, but one struck on the starboard outboard shaft, wrecking it. Scouting Squadron 2 also targeted the flagship, hitting her with five bombs. These smashed a number of her secondary and anti-aircraft guns, but the main battery and vitals of the ship took no damage from the bombs.
Bombing Squadron 2 concentrated their attacks on Junyo and hit her with three bombs. Fires on the converted liner quickly raged out of control and she was abandoned two hours later.
The two squadrons from the Wasp attacked the Fuso, scoring two hits, and the Yamashiro, scoring three. The hits on Fuso damaged her upper works but impaired her ability to steam not at all. Yamashiro was another story. One bomb blasted a hole in her deck armor, and a second hit almost the exact same spot, penetrating into her engineering spaces. One boiler room was blown apart, and the fires would put three more of her six boilers out of commission before they were put out.
Eleven SBDs were lost to anti-aircraft fire.
Yamamoto now faced his own difficult choice. His strike aircraft were almost gone, and two of hit battleships were lamed. His strike had brought word that three more battleships were on hand than previously believed, and these were the newer, more powerful ships of the US battle line. One was claimed sunk, but that left nine USN battleships to face his eleven. Yamamoto was also fully aware that four of his ships would more properly be rated as battlecruisers, and that the USN seemed to still have strike aircraft to weaken him. To seek battle would be to risk disaster. To abandon the Yamato, flagship of the Combined Fleet, and flee leaving it and Yamashiro to their fate would forever seal the IJN’s fate, however; if his fleet was not superior now, it never would be.
Yamamoto chose to gamble. First, he drew his forces together. Every cruiser except Tone and Chikuma and all but a single squadron of destroyers were detached, formed a patrol line and turned east at high speed. The remainder of the force except for the transports and one destroyer division followed them at the best speed the battered Yamashiro could manage, Yamato still leading the formation despite her wounds. If the Americans pursued they would find themselves in a night gunnery and torpedo action. If the US fleet was crippled, Yamato’s own battleline could finish them off. Even if they were only lamed, he might be able to catch and finish off several cripples cheaply.
Halsey was indeed giving chase, but not until morning. The loss of USS Wasp and the damage to USS South Dakota were regrettable, but the US had given as good as it got and there were almost certainly cripples ahead he could kill. He would not do so recklessly, however. Like Yamamoto he drew his forces together, but essentially held them in place. Tomorrow morning would be soon enough to begin the chase in earnest, and ran no risk of blundering into a night action. Tomorrow morning his thirsty destroyers would refuel, along with as much of the rest of the force as could be managed, and then his task force would follow the Japanese at high speed. USS Lexington packed aboard a full wing, making up her own losses from USS Wasp’s wing. The remaining aircraft landed on Midway, ready to fill gaps in USS Lexington’s wing as the next day’s action progressed. Several damaged aircraft that would normally have eventually been repaired were pushed over the side. Halsey only had one deck left, and he wanted it fully loaded.
OrBat, 2nd Phase:
Main Body (Yamamoto):
CV Akagi, Kaga, Shokaku, Zuikaku, Ryujo
CVL Zuiho, Shoho
Total, all carriers: 63 A6M, 25 D3A, 43 B5N
CVS Nisshin, Chitose, Chiyoda (total of 35 F1M, 7 E13A)
BB Yamato, Nagato, Mutsu, Ise, Hyuga, Fuso, Yamashiro
BC Kongo, Hiei, Kirishima, Haruna
CA Tone, Chikuma
8 DD
5 AO
Attack Force (Kondo):
CA Mogami, Mikuma, Suzuya, Kumano, Takao, Maya, Chokai, Myoko, Haguro, Ashigara
CL Nagara, Kinu, Tama, Kitakami, Oi, Isuzu, Yura, Yubari
37 DD
Auxiliary Force:
4 DD
3 Transports & Freighters
6 AO
1 AE
TF 16 (Halsey):
CV USS Lexington (41 F4F, 40 SBD, 7 TBF)
BB USS North Carolina, USS Washington, USS New Mexico, USS Mississippi, USS Idaho, USS Colorado, USS Maryland, USS West Virginia, USS Pennsylvania
CA USS Minneapolis, USS New Orleans, USS Louisville, USS Quincy, USS Vincennes, USS Wichita
CL USS Atlanta, USS Juneau, USS San Diego, USS San Juan, USS St. Louis, USS Helena, USS Phoenix, USS Boise
32 DD
TF 11
4 DD
4 AO
Midway:
33 PBY (Patrol Wing 2)
24 B-17
12 F4F (VMF-221)
21 SBD (VMSB-241)
6th Marine Defense Battalion (Reinforced)
Sunset on the 28th was at 1915 hours local. The moon rose at 2120, and the sun would rise at 0626 the next day.
Quite a few sailors would not live to see that sunrise.
The Japanese force was now at full extension; a line of destroyers running north-south for 50 miles, with pairs of cruisers at intervals behind them.
First contact was reported at 0510 by a lookout on DD Hatsukaze. Right behind her were CL Kitakami and Oi, which had each been refitted before the war to carry 40 torpedo tubes. While still 15 nautical miles from the US screen, the two cruisers volleyed their starboard-side tubes, came about, and launched their portside tubes. Within five minutes four heavy cruisers and ten destroyers added their own fish. Despite a speed of over 40 knots, it would be 22 minutes before they reached their targets. Still unspotted, the cruisers withdrew below the horizon, while those ships that could began reloading their torpedo tubes. Kitakami turned north and Oi turned south, running up and down the IJN line and alerting the ships by blinker light to the position of the US fleet. The Japanese picket line began to form into three groups, all but a few destroyers below the horizon from the US force.
A naval formation has far more empty space than ships, and at 30,000 yards even the finest torpedoes in the world could not have been expected to hit any single ship. The Japanese hadn’t even tried. Eight torpedoes ran short and roughly 70 ran wide even of the US formation, spread out to minimize the risk of collision in the dark, but nearly 120 fish ran through the US task force. Starting at 0547, 19 of them found targets.
USS San Juan took two hits and blew up almost instantly as one found her forward 5” magazine. USS Wichita took three hits and capsized in less than 20 minutes. USS Maryland took two hits and lost all power as fires raged in her engineering spaces.
USS Lexington, USS North Carolina, USS Mississippi, USS Quincy, USS Boise, USS Juneau, and six destroyers were hit by one torpedo each. Five of the destroyers sank within minutes.
The IJN closed on the formation, now maneuvering franticly and firing at shadows, from three sides. More torpedoes slipped into the water. USS O’Brien finally reported a radar contact at 0558. The US formation exploded with gunfire, obliterating the CA Mikuma with an avalanche of battleship and cruiser shells. The Japanese charged in, and a furious, twisting, half-blind melee spread across an area of almost nine hundred square miles. The Japanese fired over 400 torpedoes before sunrise.
By 0630, the rising sun illuminated the IJN survivors fleeing west, chased out of range by 14” and 16” shells, and a sea dotted with burning and sinking ships.
Sunk or destroyed, morning action on August 29th, 1942:
IJN
CA Mikuma, Ashigara
CL Tama, Isuzu
9 DD
USN
BB USS Mississippi, USS Maryland
CA USS Quincy, USS Vincennes, USS Wichita
CL USS Juneau, USS San Juan, USS Boise
14 DD
Yamamoto’s gamble had paid off. Every US battleship except the USS Pennsylvania had been hit. USS Idaho could only make eight knots. Halsey ordered the shattered, disorganized fleet to head due east.
The one bright spot was the USS Lexington. Despite having been hit by a torpedo for the second time in the battle, she could, barely, get up enough speed to operate aircraft. The first Wildcat left he deck even as DD Oboro was pounded under by the USS Washington, the last Japanese casualty of the early-morning action. Minutes later, a PBY from Midway, launched in the moonlight shortly after word arrived of the raging night action arrived, spotted the Japanese battle-line 70 miles west of the US force.
Even more sailors would not live to see the sunset.
Funding for this story is provided by the IJN society for things that begin with the string “Yama” and end with the letter “o.”
Halsey was very pleased with the morning’s results. The Japanese had been battered, and with their amphibious force mangled they would surely withdraw. Halsey would pursue and pick off any cripples.
Yamamoto, however, never considered withdrawal. He was very clear on the objective of the battle, and it was not Midway. Midway had only been a means to draw the US fleet out so it could be destroyed, and the US fleet was here. Despite the morning’s losses against Midway his carriers retained considerable striking power. He ordered Ryujo, Chiyoda, and all but three destroyers of the Tranport Force’s escorts to close up with the main body, while the transports themselves and their token escort turned back for Truk.
Both sides sent out early-afternoon searches to locate their enemies. The US did this with the PBY’s from Midway, while the IJN used float planes off its various seaplane carriers, battleships, and cruisers. Both sides were conserving their carrier aircraft for the expected strikes, and both sides launched their attacks less than 20 minutes apart.
The IJN strike arrived first. A total of 141 aircraft, including 44 Zeros, met 36 Wildcats on CAP over the joint TF 16 and 17. The Zeros had only a small numerical edge, but the nature of air combat attrition and the total Japanese commitment to the campaign meant many of them were veterans of every battle all the way back to Pearl Harbor. Only a few of the American pilots matched their experience. Only ten bombers and eleven Zeros were lost to the Wildcats, which lost 19 of their own in trade.
Eighty-seven bombers got past the fighters to attack the fleet, all of them targeting the carriers and battleships.
The three battleships and four Atlanta-class cruisers alone mounted 100 5”/38 DP guns. Almost half the attackers were shot down, though some of those were able to launch their bombs or torpedoes first. USS Wasp was targeted by some of the last veteran torpedo bombers of the Pearl Harbor raid in a perfectly executed hammer-and-anvil attack. She took three torpedo hits and began to list heavily even before four bombs started fires in her hanger. USS Lexington had torpedoes pass in front of her bow, behind her stern, and along both sides but took only a single fish forward and a near-miss from a bomb aft that damaged one of her propellers; she remained able to operate aircraft, though not able to achieve full speed. Her crew began to call her the “Lucky Lex.” USS South Dakota was only targeted by seven aircraft but five of them scored bomb hits, wrecking her starboard secondary battery, her aircraft handling facilities, badly damaging “A” Turret, and holing a fuel oil tank. Several fires were started, the worst in the starboard superstructure, but with help from USS Helena they were contained and extinguished. She turned to follow USS Arizona back to Pearl. Luck and extremely effective anti-aircraft fire prevented any damage to either of the other battleships.
The worst ship hit, USS Wasp, could not control her damage. Firefighting assistance from USS Minneapolis and USS New Orleans prolonged her struggle and saved most of her crew, but the ship herself was doomed. She sank two hours after the attack began.
One hundred and eighteen USN aircraft were about to land their own blows. 71 SBDs and the 12 new TBFs, escorted by 35 Wildcats, were out looking for the IJN carriers. Kido Butai, however, was covered by a rain squall and the strike was unable to locate them. Continuing on, near the extreme edge of their range, they spotted the IJN battle force and attacked.
37 Zeros were up over the formation. In sharp contrast to the strike escorts, these were the greenest pilots the IJN had ever deployed. The two squadrons of Wildcats shot down 19 for the loss of only five of their own. Only one SBD was downed by fighters.
USS Lexington’s Torpedo Squadron 2 focused their attack on the biggest ship any of them had ever seen – the Yamato. Four were killed by anti aircraft fire, but nine torpedoes closed on the battleship. Three missed and three more were duds, but three hit and detonated. Two did minimal damage, but one struck on the starboard outboard shaft, wrecking it. Scouting Squadron 2 also targeted the flagship, hitting her with five bombs. These smashed a number of her secondary and anti-aircraft guns, but the main battery and vitals of the ship took no damage from the bombs.
Bombing Squadron 2 concentrated their attacks on Junyo and hit her with three bombs. Fires on the converted liner quickly raged out of control and she was abandoned two hours later.
The two squadrons from the Wasp attacked the Fuso, scoring two hits, and the Yamashiro, scoring three. The hits on Fuso damaged her upper works but impaired her ability to steam not at all. Yamashiro was another story. One bomb blasted a hole in her deck armor, and a second hit almost the exact same spot, penetrating into her engineering spaces. One boiler room was blown apart, and the fires would put three more of her six boilers out of commission before they were put out.
Eleven SBDs were lost to anti-aircraft fire.
Yamamoto now faced his own difficult choice. His strike aircraft were almost gone, and two of hit battleships were lamed. His strike had brought word that three more battleships were on hand than previously believed, and these were the newer, more powerful ships of the US battle line. One was claimed sunk, but that left nine USN battleships to face his eleven. Yamamoto was also fully aware that four of his ships would more properly be rated as battlecruisers, and that the USN seemed to still have strike aircraft to weaken him. To seek battle would be to risk disaster. To abandon the Yamato, flagship of the Combined Fleet, and flee leaving it and Yamashiro to their fate would forever seal the IJN’s fate, however; if his fleet was not superior now, it never would be.
Yamamoto chose to gamble. First, he drew his forces together. Every cruiser except Tone and Chikuma and all but a single squadron of destroyers were detached, formed a patrol line and turned east at high speed. The remainder of the force except for the transports and one destroyer division followed them at the best speed the battered Yamashiro could manage, Yamato still leading the formation despite her wounds. If the Americans pursued they would find themselves in a night gunnery and torpedo action. If the US fleet was crippled, Yamato’s own battleline could finish them off. Even if they were only lamed, he might be able to catch and finish off several cripples cheaply.
Halsey was indeed giving chase, but not until morning. The loss of USS Wasp and the damage to USS South Dakota were regrettable, but the US had given as good as it got and there were almost certainly cripples ahead he could kill. He would not do so recklessly, however. Like Yamamoto he drew his forces together, but essentially held them in place. Tomorrow morning would be soon enough to begin the chase in earnest, and ran no risk of blundering into a night action. Tomorrow morning his thirsty destroyers would refuel, along with as much of the rest of the force as could be managed, and then his task force would follow the Japanese at high speed. USS Lexington packed aboard a full wing, making up her own losses from USS Wasp’s wing. The remaining aircraft landed on Midway, ready to fill gaps in USS Lexington’s wing as the next day’s action progressed. Several damaged aircraft that would normally have eventually been repaired were pushed over the side. Halsey only had one deck left, and he wanted it fully loaded.
OrBat, 2nd Phase:
Main Body (Yamamoto):
CV Akagi, Kaga, Shokaku, Zuikaku, Ryujo
CVL Zuiho, Shoho
Total, all carriers: 63 A6M, 25 D3A, 43 B5N
CVS Nisshin, Chitose, Chiyoda (total of 35 F1M, 7 E13A)
BB Yamato, Nagato, Mutsu, Ise, Hyuga, Fuso, Yamashiro
BC Kongo, Hiei, Kirishima, Haruna
CA Tone, Chikuma
8 DD
5 AO
Attack Force (Kondo):
CA Mogami, Mikuma, Suzuya, Kumano, Takao, Maya, Chokai, Myoko, Haguro, Ashigara
CL Nagara, Kinu, Tama, Kitakami, Oi, Isuzu, Yura, Yubari
37 DD
Auxiliary Force:
4 DD
3 Transports & Freighters
6 AO
1 AE
TF 16 (Halsey):
CV USS Lexington (41 F4F, 40 SBD, 7 TBF)
BB USS North Carolina, USS Washington, USS New Mexico, USS Mississippi, USS Idaho, USS Colorado, USS Maryland, USS West Virginia, USS Pennsylvania
CA USS Minneapolis, USS New Orleans, USS Louisville, USS Quincy, USS Vincennes, USS Wichita
CL USS Atlanta, USS Juneau, USS San Diego, USS San Juan, USS St. Louis, USS Helena, USS Phoenix, USS Boise
32 DD
TF 11
4 DD
4 AO
Midway:
33 PBY (Patrol Wing 2)
24 B-17
12 F4F (VMF-221)
21 SBD (VMSB-241)
6th Marine Defense Battalion (Reinforced)
Sunset on the 28th was at 1915 hours local. The moon rose at 2120, and the sun would rise at 0626 the next day.
Quite a few sailors would not live to see that sunrise.
The Japanese force was now at full extension; a line of destroyers running north-south for 50 miles, with pairs of cruisers at intervals behind them.
First contact was reported at 0510 by a lookout on DD Hatsukaze. Right behind her were CL Kitakami and Oi, which had each been refitted before the war to carry 40 torpedo tubes. While still 15 nautical miles from the US screen, the two cruisers volleyed their starboard-side tubes, came about, and launched their portside tubes. Within five minutes four heavy cruisers and ten destroyers added their own fish. Despite a speed of over 40 knots, it would be 22 minutes before they reached their targets. Still unspotted, the cruisers withdrew below the horizon, while those ships that could began reloading their torpedo tubes. Kitakami turned north and Oi turned south, running up and down the IJN line and alerting the ships by blinker light to the position of the US fleet. The Japanese picket line began to form into three groups, all but a few destroyers below the horizon from the US force.
A naval formation has far more empty space than ships, and at 30,000 yards even the finest torpedoes in the world could not have been expected to hit any single ship. The Japanese hadn’t even tried. Eight torpedoes ran short and roughly 70 ran wide even of the US formation, spread out to minimize the risk of collision in the dark, but nearly 120 fish ran through the US task force. Starting at 0547, 19 of them found targets.
USS San Juan took two hits and blew up almost instantly as one found her forward 5” magazine. USS Wichita took three hits and capsized in less than 20 minutes. USS Maryland took two hits and lost all power as fires raged in her engineering spaces.
USS Lexington, USS North Carolina, USS Mississippi, USS Quincy, USS Boise, USS Juneau, and six destroyers were hit by one torpedo each. Five of the destroyers sank within minutes.
The IJN closed on the formation, now maneuvering franticly and firing at shadows, from three sides. More torpedoes slipped into the water. USS O’Brien finally reported a radar contact at 0558. The US formation exploded with gunfire, obliterating the CA Mikuma with an avalanche of battleship and cruiser shells. The Japanese charged in, and a furious, twisting, half-blind melee spread across an area of almost nine hundred square miles. The Japanese fired over 400 torpedoes before sunrise.
By 0630, the rising sun illuminated the IJN survivors fleeing west, chased out of range by 14” and 16” shells, and a sea dotted with burning and sinking ships.
Sunk or destroyed, morning action on August 29th, 1942:
IJN
CA Mikuma, Ashigara
CL Tama, Isuzu
9 DD
USN
BB USS Mississippi, USS Maryland
CA USS Quincy, USS Vincennes, USS Wichita
CL USS Juneau, USS San Juan, USS Boise
14 DD
Yamamoto’s gamble had paid off. Every US battleship except the USS Pennsylvania had been hit. USS Idaho could only make eight knots. Halsey ordered the shattered, disorganized fleet to head due east.
The one bright spot was the USS Lexington. Despite having been hit by a torpedo for the second time in the battle, she could, barely, get up enough speed to operate aircraft. The first Wildcat left he deck even as DD Oboro was pounded under by the USS Washington, the last Japanese casualty of the early-morning action. Minutes later, a PBY from Midway, launched in the moonlight shortly after word arrived of the raging night action arrived, spotted the Japanese battle-line 70 miles west of the US force.
Even more sailors would not live to see the sunset.
Wednesday, May 18, 2011
December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part VII
Midway, Part I
Nimitz was wrong. Admiral Yamamoto had been given the go ahead to attack Midway with almost every available major unit of the IJN, heavily because the operation would require no Army units. The IJA begrudged every soldier committed to the IJN’s operations, and without major IJA units operations against Ceylon or New Caledonia were impossible. It was believed that Midway, however, could by taken by SNLF troops already under the IJN’s control.
Midway was expected to be the decisive battle which would destroy the USN, and the Japanese believed they had learned from their mistakes at the Coral Sea. This time the battle-line would be deployed from the beginning, and would keep close to the carriers. If American battleships offered battle again, it would be accepted. Scouting would be increased, and carriers provided with each force to provide CAP and ASW patrols. This ambitious goal was met, but only in part: the carrier air groups on the operation were at only 70% of authorized strength, and many pilots were barely-trained novices at carrier operations. The US, in contrast, was able to supply full-strength groups for her carriers including a squadron of the new TBF torpedo bombers, although the USN groups too were short on veterans.
Signals intelligence finally revealed Midway as the target on August 25th, after the Japanese forces had sailed from Truk. US forces sailing for New Caledonia from Pearl Harbor quickly altered their courses northward, and elements of the 5th and 11th Bomb Groups with 24 B-17’s were hastily dispatched to Midway.
Japanese OrBat:
Carrier Force (Kido Butai, Nagumo):
CV Akagi, Kaga, Shokaku, Zuikaku (total of 56 A6M, 70 D3A, 76 B5N)
CVL Zuiho, Shoho (total of 24 A6M, 13 B5N)
BC Kongo, Hiei, Kirishima, Haruna
CA Tone, Chikuma
CL Isuzu, Yura
16 DD
Battle Force (Yamamoto):
CV Junyo (24 A6M, 8 B5N)
CVS Nisshin, Chitose (total of 26 F1M, 7 E13A)
BB Yamato, Nagato, Mutsu, Ise, Hyuga, Fuso, Yamashiro
CA Mogami, Mikuma, Suzuya, Kumano, Takao, Maya, Chokai
CL Nagara, Kinu, Tama, Kitakami, Oi
22 DD
Transport Force (Kondo):
CV Ryujo (20 A6M, 6 B5N)
CVS Chiyoda (12 F1M, 3 E13A)
CA Myoko, Haguro, Ashigara
CL Yubari
7 DD
14 Transports & Freighters
2 SNLF Battalions
Support Force:
4 DD
11 AO
1 AE
Advance Force:
21 SS
Allied OrBat:
TF 17 (Halsey)
CV USS Lexington (36 F4F, 36 SBD, 12 TBF), USS Wasp (36 F4F, 36 SBD)
CA USS Minneapolis, USS New Orleans, USS Louisville, USS Quincy, USS Vincennes, USS Wichita
CL USS Atlanta, USS Juneau
15 DD
TF 16 (Fletcher)
BB USS South Dakota, USS North Carolina, USS Washington
CL USS San Diego, USS San Juan, USS St. Louis, USS Helena
9 DD
TF 19 (Anderson)
BB USS New Mexico, USS Mississippi, USS Idaho, USS Colorado, USS Maryland, USS West Virginia, USS Pennsylvania, USS Arizona
CL USS Phoenix, USS Boise
12 DD
TF 7
5 SS
TF 11
4 DD
4 AO
Midway:
36 PBY (Patrol Wing 2)
24 B-17
27 F4F (VMF-221)
27 SBD (VMSB-241)
6th Marine Defense Battalion (Reinforced)
On August 27th a PBY searching from Midway spotted the approaching Japanese Battle Force and radioed a contact report. 20 minutes later it spotted the Carrier Force to the north and sent a second report. Five minutes after that it was shot down by a pair of Zeros. The Carriers were attacked later that day by B-17s from Midway, but the bombers stayed high to avoid the IJN CAP and scored no hits. That evening, I-71 spotted TF 17 southeast of Midway, sent off its own report, maneuvered as close as it could to the fast-moving force, and fired four torpedoes. One came within ten yards of the USS Lexington’s stern, but none hit. I-71 was pounced on by USS McCall and USS Maury and never heard from again. Less than an hour later, I-69 spotted and reported TF 19, and managed to put a pair of torpedoes into USS Arizona before being driven off. The damaged battlewagon turned back for Pearl in company with two destroyers.
Both sides had been detected and knew it. Halsey quickly conferred with his staff, and then ordered that the fleet advance. The choice was a difficult one, but there were several points in favor of seeking battle. Morale was extremely low after the long string of defeats the US had been handed, including the final surrender of Corregidor early that month. Midway’s position between the fleets gave the US a major scouting and striking force that the Japanese couldn’t sink. Most importantly, however, “tactical surprise,” Halsey stated “may yet be achieved.”
TF 19 was ordered to steam straight for Midway, while TF 16 and TF 17 drew together and turned slightly to the west. Halsey also sent orders to Midway: tomorrow, the aircraft there were to attempt to locate and sink the Japanese transports as their first priority. If the Japanese could be denied Midway the battle could be declared a victory and the fleet need not be risked.
Yamamoto also had decisions to make and orders to give, though his were much easier. The Carrier Force was shifted from the north of the Battle Force to the south and ordered to maximum speed. There would still be time for a preparatory strike on Midway early in the morning before the carrier forces came in range of each other in the mid-afternoon.
Midway’s PBYs launched again before sunrise, hunting for the Japanese. They found them quite easily, and more or less where they expected to find them. The Japanese, for their part, were not surprised to be located, having maintained fairly steady courses towards Midway throughout the night.
It would be one of the last things that day that went as both sides expected.
A 120-strong strike escorted by 31 Zeros arrived over Midway to find the sky apparently empty of the expected defenders.
The commander of VMF-221, Major John Smith, had set a trap. Expecting an attack, he had ensured that every aircraft on the island was aloft and away from the island. Due to a combination of luck, educated guesses, radar direction, and skill, he had managed to position his squadron and VMSB-241 above and up-sun of the IJN bombers just before they arrived over their targets. 54 Marine aircraft came diving in at high speed on bombers focused on their targets.
Surprise was total. Post-war analysis indicates that 34 Japanese aircraft were destroyed or crippled in the first pass alone. The Zeros, some of whom had removed their radios to save weight, were slow to realize there was a threat behind them. Several of the green Japanese pilots panicked, jettisoned their bombs, and broke formation. It was the worst thing they could have done. VMF-221 came about to make another pass at the main formation while VMSB-241 gleefully split into flights and elements to hunt down the cripples and loners.
By the time the Japanese aircraft withdrew, 59 had been lost in trade for 12 of the defenders. Midway’s facilities had been damaged, but its runways were still open, and well to the east its aircraft were about to deliver their own attack.
The Japanese had developed a mixed opinion of the B-17. On the one hand, it could fly high enough and was tough and well defended enough that shooting one down was extremely rare. On the other hand, flying so high made its bombs little threat to warships and not very accurate in general. The 30 B-17’s flying from Midway were a scratch team, but they managed to form a very tight box on the 28th, and each was carrying sixteen 250-lb bombs instead of the normal eight 500-lb bombs. The 480 bombs mostly missed. In fact, only 8% hit anything but the ocean. Thirty-eight bombs hit a group that only contained 27 ships, nine of which (including the destroyers, CL Yubari and CA Myoko) were able to escape the target zone before the bombs reached it. The two other heavy cruisers suffered only trivial damage from the light bombs. The transports were another story. The immediate casualties on the packed transports were bad enough, but the fires started on most of the ships were worse. Only one was sunk by the bombs outright, but ten more succumbed to fires and flooding. A third of the SNLF troops were lost, and many of the rest lost all of their equipment. Ryujo and Chiyoda also suffered light damage, but both were still capable of aircraft operations.
The battle was far from over.
Nimitz was wrong. Admiral Yamamoto had been given the go ahead to attack Midway with almost every available major unit of the IJN, heavily because the operation would require no Army units. The IJA begrudged every soldier committed to the IJN’s operations, and without major IJA units operations against Ceylon or New Caledonia were impossible. It was believed that Midway, however, could by taken by SNLF troops already under the IJN’s control.
Midway was expected to be the decisive battle which would destroy the USN, and the Japanese believed they had learned from their mistakes at the Coral Sea. This time the battle-line would be deployed from the beginning, and would keep close to the carriers. If American battleships offered battle again, it would be accepted. Scouting would be increased, and carriers provided with each force to provide CAP and ASW patrols. This ambitious goal was met, but only in part: the carrier air groups on the operation were at only 70% of authorized strength, and many pilots were barely-trained novices at carrier operations. The US, in contrast, was able to supply full-strength groups for her carriers including a squadron of the new TBF torpedo bombers, although the USN groups too were short on veterans.
Signals intelligence finally revealed Midway as the target on August 25th, after the Japanese forces had sailed from Truk. US forces sailing for New Caledonia from Pearl Harbor quickly altered their courses northward, and elements of the 5th and 11th Bomb Groups with 24 B-17’s were hastily dispatched to Midway.
Japanese OrBat:
Carrier Force (Kido Butai, Nagumo):
CV Akagi, Kaga, Shokaku, Zuikaku (total of 56 A6M, 70 D3A, 76 B5N)
CVL Zuiho, Shoho (total of 24 A6M, 13 B5N)
BC Kongo, Hiei, Kirishima, Haruna
CA Tone, Chikuma
CL Isuzu, Yura
16 DD
Battle Force (Yamamoto):
CV Junyo (24 A6M, 8 B5N)
CVS Nisshin, Chitose (total of 26 F1M, 7 E13A)
BB Yamato, Nagato, Mutsu, Ise, Hyuga, Fuso, Yamashiro
CA Mogami, Mikuma, Suzuya, Kumano, Takao, Maya, Chokai
CL Nagara, Kinu, Tama, Kitakami, Oi
22 DD
Transport Force (Kondo):
CV Ryujo (20 A6M, 6 B5N)
CVS Chiyoda (12 F1M, 3 E13A)
CA Myoko, Haguro, Ashigara
CL Yubari
7 DD
14 Transports & Freighters
2 SNLF Battalions
Support Force:
4 DD
11 AO
1 AE
Advance Force:
21 SS
Allied OrBat:
TF 17 (Halsey)
CV USS Lexington (36 F4F, 36 SBD, 12 TBF), USS Wasp (36 F4F, 36 SBD)
CA USS Minneapolis, USS New Orleans, USS Louisville, USS Quincy, USS Vincennes, USS Wichita
CL USS Atlanta, USS Juneau
15 DD
TF 16 (Fletcher)
BB USS South Dakota, USS North Carolina, USS Washington
CL USS San Diego, USS San Juan, USS St. Louis, USS Helena
9 DD
TF 19 (Anderson)
BB USS New Mexico, USS Mississippi, USS Idaho, USS Colorado, USS Maryland, USS West Virginia, USS Pennsylvania, USS Arizona
CL USS Phoenix, USS Boise
12 DD
TF 7
5 SS
TF 11
4 DD
4 AO
Midway:
36 PBY (Patrol Wing 2)
24 B-17
27 F4F (VMF-221)
27 SBD (VMSB-241)
6th Marine Defense Battalion (Reinforced)
On August 27th a PBY searching from Midway spotted the approaching Japanese Battle Force and radioed a contact report. 20 minutes later it spotted the Carrier Force to the north and sent a second report. Five minutes after that it was shot down by a pair of Zeros. The Carriers were attacked later that day by B-17s from Midway, but the bombers stayed high to avoid the IJN CAP and scored no hits. That evening, I-71 spotted TF 17 southeast of Midway, sent off its own report, maneuvered as close as it could to the fast-moving force, and fired four torpedoes. One came within ten yards of the USS Lexington’s stern, but none hit. I-71 was pounced on by USS McCall and USS Maury and never heard from again. Less than an hour later, I-69 spotted and reported TF 19, and managed to put a pair of torpedoes into USS Arizona before being driven off. The damaged battlewagon turned back for Pearl in company with two destroyers.
Both sides had been detected and knew it. Halsey quickly conferred with his staff, and then ordered that the fleet advance. The choice was a difficult one, but there were several points in favor of seeking battle. Morale was extremely low after the long string of defeats the US had been handed, including the final surrender of Corregidor early that month. Midway’s position between the fleets gave the US a major scouting and striking force that the Japanese couldn’t sink. Most importantly, however, “tactical surprise,” Halsey stated “may yet be achieved.”
TF 19 was ordered to steam straight for Midway, while TF 16 and TF 17 drew together and turned slightly to the west. Halsey also sent orders to Midway: tomorrow, the aircraft there were to attempt to locate and sink the Japanese transports as their first priority. If the Japanese could be denied Midway the battle could be declared a victory and the fleet need not be risked.
Yamamoto also had decisions to make and orders to give, though his were much easier. The Carrier Force was shifted from the north of the Battle Force to the south and ordered to maximum speed. There would still be time for a preparatory strike on Midway early in the morning before the carrier forces came in range of each other in the mid-afternoon.
Midway’s PBYs launched again before sunrise, hunting for the Japanese. They found them quite easily, and more or less where they expected to find them. The Japanese, for their part, were not surprised to be located, having maintained fairly steady courses towards Midway throughout the night.
It would be one of the last things that day that went as both sides expected.
A 120-strong strike escorted by 31 Zeros arrived over Midway to find the sky apparently empty of the expected defenders.
The commander of VMF-221, Major John Smith, had set a trap. Expecting an attack, he had ensured that every aircraft on the island was aloft and away from the island. Due to a combination of luck, educated guesses, radar direction, and skill, he had managed to position his squadron and VMSB-241 above and up-sun of the IJN bombers just before they arrived over their targets. 54 Marine aircraft came diving in at high speed on bombers focused on their targets.
Surprise was total. Post-war analysis indicates that 34 Japanese aircraft were destroyed or crippled in the first pass alone. The Zeros, some of whom had removed their radios to save weight, were slow to realize there was a threat behind them. Several of the green Japanese pilots panicked, jettisoned their bombs, and broke formation. It was the worst thing they could have done. VMF-221 came about to make another pass at the main formation while VMSB-241 gleefully split into flights and elements to hunt down the cripples and loners.
By the time the Japanese aircraft withdrew, 59 had been lost in trade for 12 of the defenders. Midway’s facilities had been damaged, but its runways were still open, and well to the east its aircraft were about to deliver their own attack.
The Japanese had developed a mixed opinion of the B-17. On the one hand, it could fly high enough and was tough and well defended enough that shooting one down was extremely rare. On the other hand, flying so high made its bombs little threat to warships and not very accurate in general. The 30 B-17’s flying from Midway were a scratch team, but they managed to form a very tight box on the 28th, and each was carrying sixteen 250-lb bombs instead of the normal eight 500-lb bombs. The 480 bombs mostly missed. In fact, only 8% hit anything but the ocean. Thirty-eight bombs hit a group that only contained 27 ships, nine of which (including the destroyers, CL Yubari and CA Myoko) were able to escape the target zone before the bombs reached it. The two other heavy cruisers suffered only trivial damage from the light bombs. The transports were another story. The immediate casualties on the packed transports were bad enough, but the fires started on most of the ships were worse. Only one was sunk by the bombs outright, but ten more succumbed to fires and flooding. A third of the SNLF troops were lost, and many of the rest lost all of their equipment. Ryujo and Chiyoda also suffered light damage, but both were still capable of aircraft operations.
The battle was far from over.
Tuesday, May 17, 2011
December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part VI
Diversions and Raids
The USS Lexington was, once again, the only operational US carrier in the Pacific. Once again, the Atlantic fleet would solve the problem. USS Wasp arrived in the Pacific on June 15th, only a few days after the USS Yorktown finally limped into Pearl Harbor. USS North Carolina also arrived in June, and was welcomed with great enthusiasm due in no small part to her 27knot speed. Her sister USS Washington followed two months later, along with USS South Dakota and USS Juneau.
Neither side had been idle, however. The Japanese had occupied several islands in the Solomons, and began building airfields. The USN, primarily the USS Lexington, had conducted more pinprick raids against those and other islands. Both sides had also suffered additional losses. USS Chester, torpedoed once at Pearl Harbor and again at the Coral Sea, was sunk by torpedoes from I-26, though USS Gridley and USS Downes sank the submarine in turn. The scales were balanced a week later when USS Seawolf intercepted a force unloading troops on Guadalcanal and sank CA Nachi.
The latter incident would have far reaching consequences. The destruction of any major IJN unit was good news and received attention all the way up the chain of command, and Admiral Nimitz, almost as an afterthought, asked to review the USS Seawolf’s patrol report personally. An hour after receiving it he was angry and demanding an investigation to determine why USS Seawolf had fired 24 torpedoes for exactly three hits – all on the Nachi. Admiral Withers, confronted by an angry Nimitz, at first tried to blame LtCdr Warder for timidity, insisting that the Mk 14 torpedo was an excellent weapon. Nimitz refused to believe the first submarine skipper to bag an IJN heavy cruiser “demonstrated insufficient aggressiveness” when he fired 12 torpedoes at a single ship, interrupted by two rounds of being depth-charged by IJN destroyers. Something, Nimitz insisted, must be wrong with the torpedoes.
Nimitz, now coldly furious, sent a message to all flag officers inviting them to comment on the performance of the Mk 14. When he received a detailed list of incidents and problems from Admiral Lockwood in Australia, he decided he had found the right man for a job: a detailed investigation. Lockwood was recalled to Pearl Harbor, and immediately began a rigorous series of tests.
By the end of August Admiral Nimitz felt the fleet was strong enough to engage the IJN directly once again, with two fleet carriers, three fast battleships, four anti-aircraft light cruisers and a number of fleet oilers along with the pre-war battleships, heavy light cruisers, and lesser ships. This was fortunate, as throughout August signals intelligence indicated that the IJN was planning another major operation. The target, however, was uncertain. Indicators pointed from the Aleutians to Ceylon and many places in between.
Nimitz felt the most likely target was New Caledonia; a difficult target but a rich prize, whose French owners could be expected to be… adaptable to new overlords. The French authorities had already resisted or blocked some attempts to improve the facilities and station additional troops on the island, and the ABDA troops on the island consisted of a single reinforced regiment of infantry, a battalion of anti-aircraft artillery, a squadron of fighters, and a detachment of PBY’s – not nearly enough to hold the island against a determined assault. If the Japanese took New Caledonia communications with Australia would become extremely difficult.
The USS Lexington was, once again, the only operational US carrier in the Pacific. Once again, the Atlantic fleet would solve the problem. USS Wasp arrived in the Pacific on June 15th, only a few days after the USS Yorktown finally limped into Pearl Harbor. USS North Carolina also arrived in June, and was welcomed with great enthusiasm due in no small part to her 27knot speed. Her sister USS Washington followed two months later, along with USS South Dakota and USS Juneau.
Neither side had been idle, however. The Japanese had occupied several islands in the Solomons, and began building airfields. The USN, primarily the USS Lexington, had conducted more pinprick raids against those and other islands. Both sides had also suffered additional losses. USS Chester, torpedoed once at Pearl Harbor and again at the Coral Sea, was sunk by torpedoes from I-26, though USS Gridley and USS Downes sank the submarine in turn. The scales were balanced a week later when USS Seawolf intercepted a force unloading troops on Guadalcanal and sank CA Nachi.
The latter incident would have far reaching consequences. The destruction of any major IJN unit was good news and received attention all the way up the chain of command, and Admiral Nimitz, almost as an afterthought, asked to review the USS Seawolf’s patrol report personally. An hour after receiving it he was angry and demanding an investigation to determine why USS Seawolf had fired 24 torpedoes for exactly three hits – all on the Nachi. Admiral Withers, confronted by an angry Nimitz, at first tried to blame LtCdr Warder for timidity, insisting that the Mk 14 torpedo was an excellent weapon. Nimitz refused to believe the first submarine skipper to bag an IJN heavy cruiser “demonstrated insufficient aggressiveness” when he fired 12 torpedoes at a single ship, interrupted by two rounds of being depth-charged by IJN destroyers. Something, Nimitz insisted, must be wrong with the torpedoes.
Nimitz, now coldly furious, sent a message to all flag officers inviting them to comment on the performance of the Mk 14. When he received a detailed list of incidents and problems from Admiral Lockwood in Australia, he decided he had found the right man for a job: a detailed investigation. Lockwood was recalled to Pearl Harbor, and immediately began a rigorous series of tests.
By the end of August Admiral Nimitz felt the fleet was strong enough to engage the IJN directly once again, with two fleet carriers, three fast battleships, four anti-aircraft light cruisers and a number of fleet oilers along with the pre-war battleships, heavy light cruisers, and lesser ships. This was fortunate, as throughout August signals intelligence indicated that the IJN was planning another major operation. The target, however, was uncertain. Indicators pointed from the Aleutians to Ceylon and many places in between.
Nimitz felt the most likely target was New Caledonia; a difficult target but a rich prize, whose French owners could be expected to be… adaptable to new overlords. The French authorities had already resisted or blocked some attempts to improve the facilities and station additional troops on the island, and the ABDA troops on the island consisted of a single reinforced regiment of infantry, a battalion of anti-aircraft artillery, a squadron of fighters, and a detachment of PBY’s – not nearly enough to hold the island against a determined assault. If the Japanese took New Caledonia communications with Australia would become extremely difficult.
Monday, May 16, 2011
December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part V
Note: yes, I know I have a lot of issues with changing tense (past/present, etc.).
Coral Sea
Yamamoto had been arguing for months that it was vital to bring the remaining USN carriers to battle and destroy them. After the Doolittle raid, opposition to this objective vanished. The Japanese had been planning a second offensive campaign, aimed at Port Moresby, the Solomons, and New Caladonia. While initially this campaign was to be supported only intermittently by one or two divisions of Kido Butai’s fleet carriers at a time, now Kido Butai would operate as a unit from Truk, spending as much time at sea as possible. Yamamoto proposed instead that the USN should be lured out by an attack on Midway, but his proposal was rejected. Land-based aircraft could cover the IJN from bases throughout the region while operating in the Coral Sea, while Midway could hold only a few aircraft.
Damage and air group losses incurred in the opening months of the war, especially the Indian Ocean raid, were almost completely made good by May 6th, and accordingly the start date for the offensive was set for May 28th.
Problems, however, continued to crop up. Truk was not yet a forward base capable of supporting Kido Butai, the battle fleet, and the invasion force at the same time. As the US was expected to counter-attack, the battle fleet would remain in home waters until Port Moresby was taken.
The US, through signals intelligence, became aware of this offensive almost as soon as major planning began in Japan. When Truk was informed that the IJN battle-line would arrive after the invasion of Port Moresby, Nimitz saw the opportunity to hit back at the Japanese.
The USN, however, also lacked the logistical capability to support its entire force so far forward. All three fleet carriers would be sent to break up the invasion, along with the three New Mexico-class battleships, ten heavy cruisers (two of them from the Royal Australian Navy), and five light cruisers.
Japanese OrBat:
Kido Butai:
CV Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu, Shokaku, Zuikaku
BC Kongo, Hiei, Kirishima, Haruna
CA Tone, Chikuma
CL Abukuma, Nagara
16 DD
Invasion Force
CVL Shoho, Zuiho
CVS Chitose, Nisshin
CA Atago, Chokai, Myoko, Haguro
CL Jintsu, Sendai, Oi, Kitakami
16 DD
19 SS
Numerous transports, auxiliaries, and tenders
Land-based air
150 land-based carrier-type aircraft
Allied OrBat:
TG 17.1
1 AS
17 SS
TG 17.2 (Fletcher)
CV USS Lexington
BB USS New Mexico, USS Mississippi, USS Idaho
CA USS Minneapolis, USS New Orleans, USS Astoria, USS San Francisco
CL USS Phoenix, USS St Louis, USS Honolulu, USS Helena
14 DD
TG 17.3
1 AV
24 PBY-5
TG 17.5 (Halsey)
CV USS Yorktown, USS Hornet
CA USS Northampton, USS Chester, USS Louisville, USS Portland, HMAS Australia, HMAS Canberra
CL USS Atlanta
9 DD
TG 17.9
4 DD
4 AO
USAAF, Australia (Brett)
34 Heavy Bombers (B-17)
110 Twin-Engine Bombers (B-25, B-26, A-20)
200 Fighters (P-39, P-40)
On the morning of June 2nd, 1942, the Coral Sea contained over 100 warships from three nations in four major groups and numerous minor ones. The Japanese invasion force bound for Port Moresby had left Rabaul the previous day. Kido Butai was just to the west of Bouganville, enroute from Truk to cover the landings. The two Allied task forces were south of the Solomon Islands, with Admiral Fletcher’s TG17.2 some 30 miles to the north of Admiral Halsey’s TG17.5.
The American plan was to surprise the Japanese carriers and sink them with air strikes from the carriers and from land-based bombers. The Japanese were not expecting a major hostile naval presence, but launched an aerial search as a routine precaution and in hopes of snapping up any Allied units that happened to be nearby.
At 0803, an E13A “Jake” from CA Tone spotted Halsey’s carriers and radioed a contact report. Just 20 minutes later, an SBD “Dauntless” from the USS Lexington spotted Kido Butai. Although the Japanese were surprised, CV Akagi and Kaga had aircraft already armed and spotted for an anti-shipping strike. The other four carriers hastily began to ready their own strikes, but judging time to be of the essence Nagumo ordered what was ready to be launched.
Less than 200 miles to the East, all three American carriers began to launch. Here, again, the strike would be less than what might have been ideal; USS Lexington’s Scouting Squadron 2 was out on search, as was part of USS Yorktown’s Scouting Squadron 5. Medium bombers from Port Moresby were also taking off, however, with a mix of torpedoes and bombs.
By 1000 the Allies’ plan for a coordinated strike from multiple directions had already fallen apart. Despite being ordered to attack the IJN carriers, most of the land-based bombers engaged the invasion force when they spotted it enroute, hitting two transports and CA Myoko. Fighters from the light carriers accompanying the force shot down four of the strike aircraft at the loss of a single one of their own. The different cruising speeds of the SBD dive bombers and TBD torpedo bombers led to both naval strikes splitting into two, and in the case of Halsey’s strike three, groups. USS Hornet’s Torpedo Squadron 8 veered off course and failed to find the enemy at all.
In contrast, the 70-strong strike from CV Akagi and Kaga arrives over Halsey’s carriers as a single unit, and are met by a dozen F4F “Wildcats” of Fighting Squadron 5. They, in turn, are met by the 9 A6M “Zeros” escorting the strike. Although outnumbered, the Zeros shoot down five of the Wildcats while losing three of their own, and more importantly prevent the CAP from effectively engaging the attacking bombers; only five are lost.
34 of the attackers are torpedo-carrying B5N “Kates.” Approaching their targets low and slow, three are shot down by Wildcats and eleven are plucked out of the sky by anti-aircraft fire, but all the rest launch a textbook multi-angle torpedo attack on the two US carriers. They maneuver frantically, but three torpedoes strike home on the USS Yorktown and two on USS Hornet. A single torpedo passes astern of Hornet and hits USS Chester amidships. Above, 27 D3A “Vals” tip over into their dives. Two of those dives become death spirals as a single Wildcat shoots past, and twelve more fall to anti-aircraft fire as they run through a heavy barrage dominated by the USS Atlanta. Four bombs hit USS Yorktown, two more bracket USS Hornet at less than ten yards distance, and three planes for no apparent reason attack USS Northampton, scoring two more hits.
The Japanese strike has suffered heavily, but as they depart they can see two carriers and a heavy cruiser on fire and apparently doomed; a good trade for 31 aircraft.
The first American strike, twenty SBDs of Bombing Squadron 8 with no fighter escort, arrive over the Japanese carriers and are promptly torn apart by Zeros. Thirteen aircraft are lost and five more damaged; the survivors jettison their bombs and run for it. Bombing Squadron 5 arrives only minutes later but achieves little more: eight aircraft are lost to fighters and anti-aircraft in return for a single hit on CV Zuikaku, which however starts a serious fire among the spotted aircraft. Next on the scene is Torpedo Squadron 5, which suffers eleven aircraft destroyed but achieves nothing more than disorganizing the Japanese formation as the ships turn to avoid the incoming fish. As they make their runs, however, Fighting Squadrons 8 and 2 make a belated appearance and engage the IJN CAP, now with reduced ammunition, fuel, and altitude. Eleven Zeros are shot down in trade for only two Wildcats, but far more importantly the melee draws attention away from the real threat: Bombing Squadron 2 from the USS Lexington has just arrived. Twenty-one SBDs dive on CV Hiryu and Soryu, and put three bombs into each for the loss of five aircraft. Both carriers have just launched a strike, but the bombs explode among a second wave arming and fueling in their hanger decks. Within minutes both ships are ablaze from stem to stern, punctuated by flashes from secondary explosions. In a frustrating anti-climax, Torpedo Squadron 2 loses five aircraft for zero hits ten minutes later.
Back at Halsey’s group, the Yorktown-class carriers are gaining a reputation for toughness. The fires are out, the flooding controlled, and USS Hornet is even capable of flight operations. USS Yorktown breaks off to begin the long trip to Pearl Harbor along with the badly damaged USS Northampton and two destroyers. A refreshed CAP greets the main Japanese strike of over 100 aircraft, two of whom know their parent carriers are doomed. Both sides have blood in their eyes, but the Japanese also have superior numbers and more experience. USS Hornet takes five additional torpedoes, at least six bomb hits, and two dive-bombers crash on her deck. USS Portland catches a pair of torpedoes, and HMAS Canberra is hit by another and two bombs. Two destroyers are damaged by near-misses. Thirty-nine more Japanese aircraft are lost, and six Wildcats. Just after being hit by the sixth bomb, USS Hornet explodes and sinks in less than ten minutes, taking with her over 1,500 of her crew.
As the strikes return, the losses appear to be roughly equal. The IJN aircraft report that both American carriers and two cruisers are definitely sunk, and also claim two additional cruisers probably sunk. The Japanese have lost CV Hiryu and Soryu, and Zuikaku is damaged. A hundred aircraft have been destroyed, but scores of American planes are claimed as well and more will have been unable to reach land bases or trapped aboard the sinking carriers.
As night falls, the Japanese steam on, convinced that they have smashed a major US force for heavy but acceptable losses, and that Port Moresby will soon be theirs.
What is left of Halsey’s force is indeed retiring, but Fletcher’s is closing with the Japanese as fast as the battleships are able. The battle is not yet over.
On the morning of June 3rd the Japanese again launched a fairly relaxed, routine search pattern. Just minutes later a frantic E13A reported an American fleet only miles beyond the horizon from the Japanese carrier force, bearing NE and heading almost directly towards them. Nagumo was about to order a turn into the wind to launch a strike when an update arrived: three battleships and six cruisers.
Nagumo faced a cruel choice; he could turn into the wind to launch his strike, thus moving his carriers directly toward enemy battleships at a closing speed of 50 knots, or he could run, using his force’s superior speed to slowly open the range. He chose the latter. With only a light CAP and ASW patrol aloft Kido Butai turned SW to run.
The USS Lexington faces no difficult choices. Breaking off from the battleships with two heavy cruisers and four destroyers she begins launching aircraft. Aboard that morning are 22 operational Wildcats from all three fighter squadrons, 46 Dauntlesses from two bombing and three scouting squadrons, and nine Devastators from two torpedo squadrons; a total of 77 aircraft drawn from ten squadrons on three different carriers. Ten Wildcats are put up on CAP, the rest escort a massed strike of Dauntlesses. Determined to launch a single, coordinated strike and taking advantage of the short range to target (reported by SOC “Seagulls” launched before dawn from the cruisers), Fletcher gives strict orders to Captain Sherman: the strike aircraft are to orbit the ship until EVERY SBD is aloft, then move in a single group to strike the enemy. Although the need to bring up aircraft from the hanger after the first wave is launched will delay the strike, Fletcher believes the added weight will be decisive.
The state of confusion and communications in the Japanese fleet is seldom better illustrated than by the simple fact that it was 25 minutes after the turn SW that VADM Mikawa, commanding the IJN battlecruisers, learned that the fleet was running from three American battleships. Mikawa immediately requested permission to turn about and engage the enemy, pointing out that he has 4:3 odds in his favor.
Nagumo at first refuses. He is fully aware that the Kongo-class have only 2/3 the armor and heavy guns of the American battleships, meaning that even a straight fight between them would hardly be a clear advantage for the Japanese. Worse, he has only two heavy cruisers of his own, while six have been reported with the American force. Nagumo’s plan is far safer: open the range throughout the morning, then turn back and launch a heavy strike in the afternoon to cripple the Americans, and finish them off with his surface units before nightfall.
Mikawa repeats his request, pointing out the benefit of a joint air/surface attack. Nagumo reluctantly agrees 15 minutes after Mikawa’s initial request.
Kido Butai’s deck crews have not wasted those 40 minutes. A full-deck strike is spotted on all four carriers, ready to go if the situation should change, every pilot praying for the wind to shift, even just a few points. Their prayers seem to be granted as the ships turn about, and the launches begin.
First off are the fighters, as they need the least space. This will prove critical, as barely are the last of the reinforcements for the CAP and the strike escorts aloft when the American strike arrives. The IJN on the surface and in the air shatter, and 58 USN aircraft find themselves facing almost as many Zeros. The result is a slaughter. Eleven Zeros are lost, but not a single Wildcat survives, and three-quarters of the SBDs are lost to fighters or AA. The few survivors manage to put one bomb each into Kaga and Shokaku.
Those two bombs, however, are decisive. The hit on Kaga is among the spotted strike, starting a major fire and destroying or damaging many of her aircraft before it can be brought under control. The hit on Shokaku holes her flight deck forward, preventing her from launching aircraft. Now knowing that at least one American carrier yet lives, with his Zeros low on ammunition and fuel, hit fleet disorganized by maneuvers, and with only half his strike able to be launched, Nagumo orders his ships to turn away once again. He will regroup, lick his wounds, and cover the tranports approaching Port Moresby.
Fletcher also orders his ships to turn away. His bombers, even counting those on the crippled USS Yorktown or able to be repaired, are too few to strike with, and his fighters are almost gone. His battleships are too slow to catch the enemy, and he can not risk them without support from his carriers. Land based aircraft will have to defend Port Moresby as best as they are able. He has sunk two Japanese carriers in trade for USS Hornet; that will have to be enough for now.
Land based aircraft are not enough. CA Atago and four transports are sunk, two more cruisers, a destroyer, and three more transports are damaged, but the Japanese land enough troops to capture Port Moresby.
Coral Sea
Yamamoto had been arguing for months that it was vital to bring the remaining USN carriers to battle and destroy them. After the Doolittle raid, opposition to this objective vanished. The Japanese had been planning a second offensive campaign, aimed at Port Moresby, the Solomons, and New Caladonia. While initially this campaign was to be supported only intermittently by one or two divisions of Kido Butai’s fleet carriers at a time, now Kido Butai would operate as a unit from Truk, spending as much time at sea as possible. Yamamoto proposed instead that the USN should be lured out by an attack on Midway, but his proposal was rejected. Land-based aircraft could cover the IJN from bases throughout the region while operating in the Coral Sea, while Midway could hold only a few aircraft.
Damage and air group losses incurred in the opening months of the war, especially the Indian Ocean raid, were almost completely made good by May 6th, and accordingly the start date for the offensive was set for May 28th.
Problems, however, continued to crop up. Truk was not yet a forward base capable of supporting Kido Butai, the battle fleet, and the invasion force at the same time. As the US was expected to counter-attack, the battle fleet would remain in home waters until Port Moresby was taken.
The US, through signals intelligence, became aware of this offensive almost as soon as major planning began in Japan. When Truk was informed that the IJN battle-line would arrive after the invasion of Port Moresby, Nimitz saw the opportunity to hit back at the Japanese.
The USN, however, also lacked the logistical capability to support its entire force so far forward. All three fleet carriers would be sent to break up the invasion, along with the three New Mexico-class battleships, ten heavy cruisers (two of them from the Royal Australian Navy), and five light cruisers.
Japanese OrBat:
Kido Butai:
CV Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu, Shokaku, Zuikaku
BC Kongo, Hiei, Kirishima, Haruna
CA Tone, Chikuma
CL Abukuma, Nagara
16 DD
Invasion Force
CVL Shoho, Zuiho
CVS Chitose, Nisshin
CA Atago, Chokai, Myoko, Haguro
CL Jintsu, Sendai, Oi, Kitakami
16 DD
19 SS
Numerous transports, auxiliaries, and tenders
Land-based air
150 land-based carrier-type aircraft
Allied OrBat:
TG 17.1
1 AS
17 SS
TG 17.2 (Fletcher)
CV USS Lexington
BB USS New Mexico, USS Mississippi, USS Idaho
CA USS Minneapolis, USS New Orleans, USS Astoria, USS San Francisco
CL USS Phoenix, USS St Louis, USS Honolulu, USS Helena
14 DD
TG 17.3
1 AV
24 PBY-5
TG 17.5 (Halsey)
CV USS Yorktown, USS Hornet
CA USS Northampton, USS Chester, USS Louisville, USS Portland, HMAS Australia, HMAS Canberra
CL USS Atlanta
9 DD
TG 17.9
4 DD
4 AO
USAAF, Australia (Brett)
34 Heavy Bombers (B-17)
110 Twin-Engine Bombers (B-25, B-26, A-20)
200 Fighters (P-39, P-40)
On the morning of June 2nd, 1942, the Coral Sea contained over 100 warships from three nations in four major groups and numerous minor ones. The Japanese invasion force bound for Port Moresby had left Rabaul the previous day. Kido Butai was just to the west of Bouganville, enroute from Truk to cover the landings. The two Allied task forces were south of the Solomon Islands, with Admiral Fletcher’s TG17.2 some 30 miles to the north of Admiral Halsey’s TG17.5.
The American plan was to surprise the Japanese carriers and sink them with air strikes from the carriers and from land-based bombers. The Japanese were not expecting a major hostile naval presence, but launched an aerial search as a routine precaution and in hopes of snapping up any Allied units that happened to be nearby.
At 0803, an E13A “Jake” from CA Tone spotted Halsey’s carriers and radioed a contact report. Just 20 minutes later, an SBD “Dauntless” from the USS Lexington spotted Kido Butai. Although the Japanese were surprised, CV Akagi and Kaga had aircraft already armed and spotted for an anti-shipping strike. The other four carriers hastily began to ready their own strikes, but judging time to be of the essence Nagumo ordered what was ready to be launched.
Less than 200 miles to the East, all three American carriers began to launch. Here, again, the strike would be less than what might have been ideal; USS Lexington’s Scouting Squadron 2 was out on search, as was part of USS Yorktown’s Scouting Squadron 5. Medium bombers from Port Moresby were also taking off, however, with a mix of torpedoes and bombs.
By 1000 the Allies’ plan for a coordinated strike from multiple directions had already fallen apart. Despite being ordered to attack the IJN carriers, most of the land-based bombers engaged the invasion force when they spotted it enroute, hitting two transports and CA Myoko. Fighters from the light carriers accompanying the force shot down four of the strike aircraft at the loss of a single one of their own. The different cruising speeds of the SBD dive bombers and TBD torpedo bombers led to both naval strikes splitting into two, and in the case of Halsey’s strike three, groups. USS Hornet’s Torpedo Squadron 8 veered off course and failed to find the enemy at all.
In contrast, the 70-strong strike from CV Akagi and Kaga arrives over Halsey’s carriers as a single unit, and are met by a dozen F4F “Wildcats” of Fighting Squadron 5. They, in turn, are met by the 9 A6M “Zeros” escorting the strike. Although outnumbered, the Zeros shoot down five of the Wildcats while losing three of their own, and more importantly prevent the CAP from effectively engaging the attacking bombers; only five are lost.
34 of the attackers are torpedo-carrying B5N “Kates.” Approaching their targets low and slow, three are shot down by Wildcats and eleven are plucked out of the sky by anti-aircraft fire, but all the rest launch a textbook multi-angle torpedo attack on the two US carriers. They maneuver frantically, but three torpedoes strike home on the USS Yorktown and two on USS Hornet. A single torpedo passes astern of Hornet and hits USS Chester amidships. Above, 27 D3A “Vals” tip over into their dives. Two of those dives become death spirals as a single Wildcat shoots past, and twelve more fall to anti-aircraft fire as they run through a heavy barrage dominated by the USS Atlanta. Four bombs hit USS Yorktown, two more bracket USS Hornet at less than ten yards distance, and three planes for no apparent reason attack USS Northampton, scoring two more hits.
The Japanese strike has suffered heavily, but as they depart they can see two carriers and a heavy cruiser on fire and apparently doomed; a good trade for 31 aircraft.
The first American strike, twenty SBDs of Bombing Squadron 8 with no fighter escort, arrive over the Japanese carriers and are promptly torn apart by Zeros. Thirteen aircraft are lost and five more damaged; the survivors jettison their bombs and run for it. Bombing Squadron 5 arrives only minutes later but achieves little more: eight aircraft are lost to fighters and anti-aircraft in return for a single hit on CV Zuikaku, which however starts a serious fire among the spotted aircraft. Next on the scene is Torpedo Squadron 5, which suffers eleven aircraft destroyed but achieves nothing more than disorganizing the Japanese formation as the ships turn to avoid the incoming fish. As they make their runs, however, Fighting Squadrons 8 and 2 make a belated appearance and engage the IJN CAP, now with reduced ammunition, fuel, and altitude. Eleven Zeros are shot down in trade for only two Wildcats, but far more importantly the melee draws attention away from the real threat: Bombing Squadron 2 from the USS Lexington has just arrived. Twenty-one SBDs dive on CV Hiryu and Soryu, and put three bombs into each for the loss of five aircraft. Both carriers have just launched a strike, but the bombs explode among a second wave arming and fueling in their hanger decks. Within minutes both ships are ablaze from stem to stern, punctuated by flashes from secondary explosions. In a frustrating anti-climax, Torpedo Squadron 2 loses five aircraft for zero hits ten minutes later.
Back at Halsey’s group, the Yorktown-class carriers are gaining a reputation for toughness. The fires are out, the flooding controlled, and USS Hornet is even capable of flight operations. USS Yorktown breaks off to begin the long trip to Pearl Harbor along with the badly damaged USS Northampton and two destroyers. A refreshed CAP greets the main Japanese strike of over 100 aircraft, two of whom know their parent carriers are doomed. Both sides have blood in their eyes, but the Japanese also have superior numbers and more experience. USS Hornet takes five additional torpedoes, at least six bomb hits, and two dive-bombers crash on her deck. USS Portland catches a pair of torpedoes, and HMAS Canberra is hit by another and two bombs. Two destroyers are damaged by near-misses. Thirty-nine more Japanese aircraft are lost, and six Wildcats. Just after being hit by the sixth bomb, USS Hornet explodes and sinks in less than ten minutes, taking with her over 1,500 of her crew.
As the strikes return, the losses appear to be roughly equal. The IJN aircraft report that both American carriers and two cruisers are definitely sunk, and also claim two additional cruisers probably sunk. The Japanese have lost CV Hiryu and Soryu, and Zuikaku is damaged. A hundred aircraft have been destroyed, but scores of American planes are claimed as well and more will have been unable to reach land bases or trapped aboard the sinking carriers.
As night falls, the Japanese steam on, convinced that they have smashed a major US force for heavy but acceptable losses, and that Port Moresby will soon be theirs.
What is left of Halsey’s force is indeed retiring, but Fletcher’s is closing with the Japanese as fast as the battleships are able. The battle is not yet over.
On the morning of June 3rd the Japanese again launched a fairly relaxed, routine search pattern. Just minutes later a frantic E13A reported an American fleet only miles beyond the horizon from the Japanese carrier force, bearing NE and heading almost directly towards them. Nagumo was about to order a turn into the wind to launch a strike when an update arrived: three battleships and six cruisers.
Nagumo faced a cruel choice; he could turn into the wind to launch his strike, thus moving his carriers directly toward enemy battleships at a closing speed of 50 knots, or he could run, using his force’s superior speed to slowly open the range. He chose the latter. With only a light CAP and ASW patrol aloft Kido Butai turned SW to run.
The USS Lexington faces no difficult choices. Breaking off from the battleships with two heavy cruisers and four destroyers she begins launching aircraft. Aboard that morning are 22 operational Wildcats from all three fighter squadrons, 46 Dauntlesses from two bombing and three scouting squadrons, and nine Devastators from two torpedo squadrons; a total of 77 aircraft drawn from ten squadrons on three different carriers. Ten Wildcats are put up on CAP, the rest escort a massed strike of Dauntlesses. Determined to launch a single, coordinated strike and taking advantage of the short range to target (reported by SOC “Seagulls” launched before dawn from the cruisers), Fletcher gives strict orders to Captain Sherman: the strike aircraft are to orbit the ship until EVERY SBD is aloft, then move in a single group to strike the enemy. Although the need to bring up aircraft from the hanger after the first wave is launched will delay the strike, Fletcher believes the added weight will be decisive.
The state of confusion and communications in the Japanese fleet is seldom better illustrated than by the simple fact that it was 25 minutes after the turn SW that VADM Mikawa, commanding the IJN battlecruisers, learned that the fleet was running from three American battleships. Mikawa immediately requested permission to turn about and engage the enemy, pointing out that he has 4:3 odds in his favor.
Nagumo at first refuses. He is fully aware that the Kongo-class have only 2/3 the armor and heavy guns of the American battleships, meaning that even a straight fight between them would hardly be a clear advantage for the Japanese. Worse, he has only two heavy cruisers of his own, while six have been reported with the American force. Nagumo’s plan is far safer: open the range throughout the morning, then turn back and launch a heavy strike in the afternoon to cripple the Americans, and finish them off with his surface units before nightfall.
Mikawa repeats his request, pointing out the benefit of a joint air/surface attack. Nagumo reluctantly agrees 15 minutes after Mikawa’s initial request.
Kido Butai’s deck crews have not wasted those 40 minutes. A full-deck strike is spotted on all four carriers, ready to go if the situation should change, every pilot praying for the wind to shift, even just a few points. Their prayers seem to be granted as the ships turn about, and the launches begin.
First off are the fighters, as they need the least space. This will prove critical, as barely are the last of the reinforcements for the CAP and the strike escorts aloft when the American strike arrives. The IJN on the surface and in the air shatter, and 58 USN aircraft find themselves facing almost as many Zeros. The result is a slaughter. Eleven Zeros are lost, but not a single Wildcat survives, and three-quarters of the SBDs are lost to fighters or AA. The few survivors manage to put one bomb each into Kaga and Shokaku.
Those two bombs, however, are decisive. The hit on Kaga is among the spotted strike, starting a major fire and destroying or damaging many of her aircraft before it can be brought under control. The hit on Shokaku holes her flight deck forward, preventing her from launching aircraft. Now knowing that at least one American carrier yet lives, with his Zeros low on ammunition and fuel, hit fleet disorganized by maneuvers, and with only half his strike able to be launched, Nagumo orders his ships to turn away once again. He will regroup, lick his wounds, and cover the tranports approaching Port Moresby.
Fletcher also orders his ships to turn away. His bombers, even counting those on the crippled USS Yorktown or able to be repaired, are too few to strike with, and his fighters are almost gone. His battleships are too slow to catch the enemy, and he can not risk them without support from his carriers. Land based aircraft will have to defend Port Moresby as best as they are able. He has sunk two Japanese carriers in trade for USS Hornet; that will have to be enough for now.
Land based aircraft are not enough. CA Atago and four transports are sunk, two more cruisers, a destroyer, and three more transports are damaged, but the Japanese land enough troops to capture Port Moresby.
Friday, May 6, 2011
December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part IV
Doolittle
The US was not idle after Pearl Harbor. On January 5th, Admiral Nimitz replaced Admiral Kimmel as commander, US Pacific Fleet. USS Yorktown arrived in the Pacific on January 9th, the first reinforcement from the Atlantic Fleet.
In the first three months of 1942, USS Lexington conducted a series of probing raids against Japanese bases. The “Lady Lex” was always accompanied by a strong screen of cruisers and destroyers, and wherever possible PBY’s probed around her routes. USS Yorktown joined in this activity in late January, and received similar treatment. Admiral Nimitz was determined to preserve his carriers until there was a chance to engage the IJN on favorable terms.
On March 12th the Pacific Fleet received its first major reinforcement. USS Hornet, USS New Mexico, USS Mississippi, USS Idaho, USS Vincennes, and USS Nashville cleared the Panama Canal accompanied by nine destroyers. The three battleships had been hastily refitted with 5”/38 and 40mm Bofors guns and directors in place of their 5”/51, 5”/25, and 1.1” mounts due to increased concerns about air attack and the limited carrier-borne air cover expected to be available.
USS Hornet had a special mission. On April 1st, her deck was loaded with 16 B-25 bombers, and accompanied by USS Yorktown, six heavy cruisers, a light cruiser, nine destroyers, and three fleet oilers she sailed to within 480nm of Japan before launching her special cargo on the evening of April 18th. During the night, the 16 bombers became the first air raid on Japanese soil. Though virtually no damage of military significance was done by the raid (only 16 tons of bombs were dropped), the morale impacts to both the Japanese and the Allies were massive. Twelve of the aircraft reached Nationalist China, where the aircraft and crews continued to fly missions for over a year. In reprisal for Chinese assistance to the raid, which had dropped one bomb just 100 yards from the Imperial Palace, the Japanese Army went on a rampage in which it is estimated that 250,000 Chinese were killed. Of the five raiders captured by the Japanese (after their bomber crashed in China) two were executed, and two of the remaining three died in captivity before the end of the war.
Despite the brilliant success of the raid, the Japanese still retained the strategic initiative. It was an advantage they would continue to exploit.
The US was not idle after Pearl Harbor. On January 5th, Admiral Nimitz replaced Admiral Kimmel as commander, US Pacific Fleet. USS Yorktown arrived in the Pacific on January 9th, the first reinforcement from the Atlantic Fleet.
In the first three months of 1942, USS Lexington conducted a series of probing raids against Japanese bases. The “Lady Lex” was always accompanied by a strong screen of cruisers and destroyers, and wherever possible PBY’s probed around her routes. USS Yorktown joined in this activity in late January, and received similar treatment. Admiral Nimitz was determined to preserve his carriers until there was a chance to engage the IJN on favorable terms.
On March 12th the Pacific Fleet received its first major reinforcement. USS Hornet, USS New Mexico, USS Mississippi, USS Idaho, USS Vincennes, and USS Nashville cleared the Panama Canal accompanied by nine destroyers. The three battleships had been hastily refitted with 5”/38 and 40mm Bofors guns and directors in place of their 5”/51, 5”/25, and 1.1” mounts due to increased concerns about air attack and the limited carrier-borne air cover expected to be available.
USS Hornet had a special mission. On April 1st, her deck was loaded with 16 B-25 bombers, and accompanied by USS Yorktown, six heavy cruisers, a light cruiser, nine destroyers, and three fleet oilers she sailed to within 480nm of Japan before launching her special cargo on the evening of April 18th. During the night, the 16 bombers became the first air raid on Japanese soil. Though virtually no damage of military significance was done by the raid (only 16 tons of bombs were dropped), the morale impacts to both the Japanese and the Allies were massive. Twelve of the aircraft reached Nationalist China, where the aircraft and crews continued to fly missions for over a year. In reprisal for Chinese assistance to the raid, which had dropped one bomb just 100 yards from the Imperial Palace, the Japanese Army went on a rampage in which it is estimated that 250,000 Chinese were killed. Of the five raiders captured by the Japanese (after their bomber crashed in China) two were executed, and two of the remaining three died in captivity before the end of the war.
Despite the brilliant success of the raid, the Japanese still retained the strategic initiative. It was an advantage they would continue to exploit.
Thursday, May 5, 2011
December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part III
Malaya
On December 29th Hong Kong and Malaya were invaded. Hong Kong fell quickly.
On the morning of January 3rd, 1942, a mixed force of Japanese land-based bombers located and sank the battlecruiser HMS Repulse and the carrier HMS Indomitable, despite desperate efforts from the latter’s air wing. The 9 Sea Hurricanes and 12 Fulmars did manage to destroy 23 Japanese aircraft and damaged a dozen more, but the loss of their carrier sealed their fate. A second wave later in the day sank the battleship HMS Prince of Wales and the destroyer HMS Vampire. Japanese losses were 32 aircraft destroyed and 21 damaged.
In Malaya, as in the Philippines, the attacking Japanese were outnumbered. However, the Commonwealth forces (notably the 8th Australian Division), while riddled with problems, were still far more organized then the American and Philippine forces. Gen. Yamashita also had far worse logistical problems. These factors, along with unfavorable weather, caused the Japanese offensive to run out of steam just short of Singapore in late February. Now aware of the force disparity against them, the Japanese began to shift troops from the Philippines to reduce Singapore. Gen. Wainwright’s offensive in the Philippines then caused troops to be shifted back, and the Malaya front became a stalemate.
The ABDA (American British Dutch Australian) command had been struggling to keep a supply line open to Singapore almost since the war began, and to interfere with Japanese operations in the area. They had been barely successful at the former and a failure at the latter while suffering heavy losses. The arrival in the area of Kido Butai, fresh from a string of victories, spelled the final defeat of this force in the Battle of the Java Sea on March 26th. Now cut off and subjected to a series of carrier airstrikes, Singapore joined Corregidor as “the Alamos of the Pacific.” The Alamo, of course, fell, and so did Singapore on April 30th. Kido Butai followed up on this victory by raiding into the Indian Ocean, making a whirlwind series of attacks. In ten days, the British lost the light carrier HMS Hermes, the cruiser HMS Cornwall, two destroyers, and a number of merchant ships and aircraft. Japanese losses were only a handful of aircraft.
Kido Butai had ravaged the world’s two largest navies, sinking or crippling almost everything they encountered and losing not a single ship themselves in the process. The dominance of the aircraft carrier had been established. But the raids had a cost: the IJN’s elite carrier pilots had lost many of their number. By the time Kido Butai returned to Japan only a third of the aircraft it had sailed for Pearl Harbor with were still operational. A determined effort would repair many of these and replace others, but the experienced aircrews were a larger problem, one that would never be fully solved.
Dutch East Indies
The oil and mineral wealth of the Dutch East Indies made them one of the most important objectives of the initial Japanese offensive. The first landings on Borneo occurred on January 7th. The ABDA command attempted to coordinate the defense, but fared no better than they did at sea. On April 6th, the last allied troops in the Dutch East Indies surrendered. Some of the Japanese veterans of this campaign would participate in the final assault on Singapore three and a half weeks later.
While organized fighting would continue in the Philippines until the surrender of Corregidor on August 8th, and guerrilla warfare would continue for years, the opening phase of the war is generally considered to have ended with the fall of Singapore on April 30th. The Japanese had sunk or destroyed three fleet carriers, four battleships, a battlecruiser, a light carrier, three heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, a score of destroyers, hundreds smaller vessels and merchant ships, almost 1,000 aircraft, and killed or captured tens of thousands of allied troops. In exchange they had lost no warship larger than a destroyer (and only two dozen warships of any size), less than a hundred merchant ships and transports, a few hundred aircraft, and a few thousand men. They had met every objective of their pre-war plans, some of them ahead of schedule, with lower than expected losses. The few temporary reverses were blamed on local commanders in a surge of what later historians would characterize as ‘victory disease’; the superiority of the Japanese race had been clearly demonstrated for all the world to see.
On December 29th Hong Kong and Malaya were invaded. Hong Kong fell quickly.
On the morning of January 3rd, 1942, a mixed force of Japanese land-based bombers located and sank the battlecruiser HMS Repulse and the carrier HMS Indomitable, despite desperate efforts from the latter’s air wing. The 9 Sea Hurricanes and 12 Fulmars did manage to destroy 23 Japanese aircraft and damaged a dozen more, but the loss of their carrier sealed their fate. A second wave later in the day sank the battleship HMS Prince of Wales and the destroyer HMS Vampire. Japanese losses were 32 aircraft destroyed and 21 damaged.
In Malaya, as in the Philippines, the attacking Japanese were outnumbered. However, the Commonwealth forces (notably the 8th Australian Division), while riddled with problems, were still far more organized then the American and Philippine forces. Gen. Yamashita also had far worse logistical problems. These factors, along with unfavorable weather, caused the Japanese offensive to run out of steam just short of Singapore in late February. Now aware of the force disparity against them, the Japanese began to shift troops from the Philippines to reduce Singapore. Gen. Wainwright’s offensive in the Philippines then caused troops to be shifted back, and the Malaya front became a stalemate.
The ABDA (American British Dutch Australian) command had been struggling to keep a supply line open to Singapore almost since the war began, and to interfere with Japanese operations in the area. They had been barely successful at the former and a failure at the latter while suffering heavy losses. The arrival in the area of Kido Butai, fresh from a string of victories, spelled the final defeat of this force in the Battle of the Java Sea on March 26th. Now cut off and subjected to a series of carrier airstrikes, Singapore joined Corregidor as “the Alamos of the Pacific.” The Alamo, of course, fell, and so did Singapore on April 30th. Kido Butai followed up on this victory by raiding into the Indian Ocean, making a whirlwind series of attacks. In ten days, the British lost the light carrier HMS Hermes, the cruiser HMS Cornwall, two destroyers, and a number of merchant ships and aircraft. Japanese losses were only a handful of aircraft.
Kido Butai had ravaged the world’s two largest navies, sinking or crippling almost everything they encountered and losing not a single ship themselves in the process. The dominance of the aircraft carrier had been established. But the raids had a cost: the IJN’s elite carrier pilots had lost many of their number. By the time Kido Butai returned to Japan only a third of the aircraft it had sailed for Pearl Harbor with were still operational. A determined effort would repair many of these and replace others, but the experienced aircrews were a larger problem, one that would never be fully solved.
Dutch East Indies
The oil and mineral wealth of the Dutch East Indies made them one of the most important objectives of the initial Japanese offensive. The first landings on Borneo occurred on January 7th. The ABDA command attempted to coordinate the defense, but fared no better than they did at sea. On April 6th, the last allied troops in the Dutch East Indies surrendered. Some of the Japanese veterans of this campaign would participate in the final assault on Singapore three and a half weeks later.
While organized fighting would continue in the Philippines until the surrender of Corregidor on August 8th, and guerrilla warfare would continue for years, the opening phase of the war is generally considered to have ended with the fall of Singapore on April 30th. The Japanese had sunk or destroyed three fleet carriers, four battleships, a battlecruiser, a light carrier, three heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, a score of destroyers, hundreds smaller vessels and merchant ships, almost 1,000 aircraft, and killed or captured tens of thousands of allied troops. In exchange they had lost no warship larger than a destroyer (and only two dozen warships of any size), less than a hundred merchant ships and transports, a few hundred aircraft, and a few thousand men. They had met every objective of their pre-war plans, some of them ahead of schedule, with lower than expected losses. The few temporary reverses were blamed on local commanders in a surge of what later historians would characterize as ‘victory disease’; the superiority of the Japanese race had been clearly demonstrated for all the world to see.
Wednesday, May 4, 2011
December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part II
“When this war is over, the Japanese language will be spoken only in Hell.” Adm. Halsey, surveying the wreckage of USS Enterprise from Ford Island, December 28th, 1941.
“The USS Lexington just became the most important ship in the world.” Capt. Sherman, upon receiving word of the losses at Pearl Harbor.
The IJN aircraft flying away from Pearl Harbor left behind them a shattered Pacific Fleet and an atmosphere of panic tempered only by rage. Admiral Kimmel had woken up in the morning in command of twelve capital ships. By the time the sun set, only one was fully operational: the USS Lexington. Four would never fight again, and five would be in yard hands for months, or in one case years.
Only hours after the Pearl Harbor raid, 36 G3M bombers approached Wake. Here, the new radar was manned by equally green but far more aggressive personnel, and the island’s entire force of aircraft - 12 F4F Wildcats of VMF 211 – scrambled aloft to meet them. The Marine pilots managed to shoot down eight of the “Nells” and damaged several others, but the Japanese pressed the attack and did moderate damage to the base facilities.
Three days later the Japanese invasion force arrived. Major Devereux ordered his gunners to hold their fire until the enemy ships closed into effective range. His patience was rewarded by the destruction of DD Hayate and heavy damage to CL Yubari. Minutes later, bombs from VMF 211 destroyed DD Kisaragi. The Japanese invasion force withdrew. Two weeks of air attacks followed, including carrier aircraft from CV Hiryu and Soryu returning from the Pearl Harbor raid. VMF 211’s kills continued to mount until they met A6M’s from Hiryu and Soryu. The Marine squadron was destroyed in nine furious minutes of combat, though they took three Zeros with them.
Several senior officers, notably Adm. Halsey, proposed a relief expedition be sent to Wake covered by a task force built around the USS Lexington. Before this expedition could be sent, on January 5th Admiral Nimitz replaced Admiral Kimmel as commander, Pacific Fleet, and quickly vetoed any suggestion to risk the Pacific Fleet’s only operational capital ship so far from any possible support.
On January 15th the Japanese launched their second amphibious assault. The Marine defenders once again destroyed several ships and inflicted heavy losses on the landing force, but three days later the defenders were out of ammunition and water. Over 300 of the island’s defenders had been killed. Japanese ground losses alone were over 1,000. The defense of Wake, while ultimately a defeat, would claim the first IJN warship sunk and the first Japanese defeat of the war.
“We shall return.” Gen. Wainwright, just before boarding PT 34 to leave the Philippines.
While a small island north of Luzon had been occupied on the 28th, the invasion of the Philippines is generally recorded as beginning on the 30th, with the first landing on Luzon. Officially, Gen. MacArthur’s plans called for a forward defense, taking advantage of the nearly 400 aircraft available to him including what was perceived as his ace: over 70 B-17’s of the 7th and 19th Bombardment Groups (Heavy). Also available were the 27th Bombardment Group (Light) of A-24 dive-bombers, which would wind up being equally useful, and over 100 P-40’s. Ground forces were also substantial, with 12 divisions, several independent infantry regiments, the 1st Provisional Tank Group, and an assortment of independent artillery units. On paper, The US Armed Forces, Far East, and the Philippine Army appeared capable of holding indefinitely against the few divisions the Japanese could spare.
The reality on the ground, however, was quite different. Many of the Philippine Army units had only been allowed to fire their rifles for the first time less than two weeks before the outbreak of war, so short had been stocks of ammunition. Drill had been all but non-existent and language barriers were many.
Worst of all, however, was the commander himself. While no proof has survived to the present day, it now seems clear that MacArthur was, at least, aware that President Quezon hoped to keep the Philippines neutral and was willing to aid in that endeavor. To repeated requests from Gen. Brereton to allow the FEAF to attack Formosa, MacArthur made no response. As a result, many of the FEAF aircraft were on the ground or circling their fields when the Japanese air attacks arrived on the first day of the war. Almost half of the vaunted B-17’s and numerous other aircraft were destroyed in under an hour, without dropping a single bomb.
MacArthur’s plan of forward defense fared little better. Although reports from the front consistently praise the fighting spirit and determination of the Philippine and US troops, especially the Philippine Scouts, command failures existed at every level. Co-ordination was poor to non-existent and complicated when it occurred by multiple language barriers. Japanese forces, by contrast, were able to execute a number of complex flanking and encircling attacks, chopping the defenders into bits and forcing them to retreat. By late February, it was clear that the Philippines were doomed.
One of MacArthur’s last acts (in early March, 1942) was to accept half a million dollars from Quezon’s government, just before Quezon and his family were evacuated from the Philippines at MacArthur’s orders. Two days later MacArthur, along with Chief of Staff Gen. Sutherland, were killed in a Japanese air attack. Command passed to Gen. Wainwright.
Gen. Wainwright proved to be a quite different commander from MacArthur. While MacArthur never visited the front lines, earning him the nickname “Dugout Doug”, Wainwright “appeared to be everywhere – at the front, at his headquarters, in conference with the Navy, or right behind you if you weren’t doing your job,” as one staff officer related. While MacArthur had retreated under pressure, Wainwright counter-attacked at every perceived opportunity. He ordered aggressive use be made of the remnants of the FEAF, particularly the A-24’s in a close-air support role. The Japanese, who had begun to withdraw forces as the campaign appeared to wind down, were caught by surprise and were forced to pull forces from everywhere they could just to hold their lines.
Although some criticized his attacks as reckless, Wainwright had a deeper plan. MacArthur’s uncoordinated retreat had involved few preparations for a siege at Corregidor, but called for such a siege in any case. Wainwright, by throwing the Japanese off balance, hoped to create a window of opportunity. In the process, he became a hero: the Lion of the Philippines.
Roosevelt decided that a hero was necessary, and accordingly ordered Wainwright to remove himself and his staff from the Philippines in late April, when the Japanese again began to push the defenders back. Wainwright fought against this order almost as hard as he fought the Japanese; he ordered his signals section to lose messages and report others garbled, and appealed to everyone in his chain of command, as well as senior naval officers, to be allowed to remain with his troops.
The end, however, was not in doubt. Bataan fell on July 3rd, and Wainwright received an order direct from Roosevelt, specifying the exact times and means by which he would be transported to Australia. Just before boarding PT 34 for the first leg of his journey, Wainwright addressed a group of US and Philippine army officers and men with just three words: “We shall return.”
On August 8th, the troops on Corregidor surrendered, and the last organized defense ended. Guerrilla warfare would continue, involving almost a third of the US personnel in the Philippines and hundreds of thousands of natives, until the islands were liberated.
“The USS Lexington just became the most important ship in the world.” Capt. Sherman, upon receiving word of the losses at Pearl Harbor.
The IJN aircraft flying away from Pearl Harbor left behind them a shattered Pacific Fleet and an atmosphere of panic tempered only by rage. Admiral Kimmel had woken up in the morning in command of twelve capital ships. By the time the sun set, only one was fully operational: the USS Lexington. Four would never fight again, and five would be in yard hands for months, or in one case years.
Only hours after the Pearl Harbor raid, 36 G3M bombers approached Wake. Here, the new radar was manned by equally green but far more aggressive personnel, and the island’s entire force of aircraft - 12 F4F Wildcats of VMF 211 – scrambled aloft to meet them. The Marine pilots managed to shoot down eight of the “Nells” and damaged several others, but the Japanese pressed the attack and did moderate damage to the base facilities.
Three days later the Japanese invasion force arrived. Major Devereux ordered his gunners to hold their fire until the enemy ships closed into effective range. His patience was rewarded by the destruction of DD Hayate and heavy damage to CL Yubari. Minutes later, bombs from VMF 211 destroyed DD Kisaragi. The Japanese invasion force withdrew. Two weeks of air attacks followed, including carrier aircraft from CV Hiryu and Soryu returning from the Pearl Harbor raid. VMF 211’s kills continued to mount until they met A6M’s from Hiryu and Soryu. The Marine squadron was destroyed in nine furious minutes of combat, though they took three Zeros with them.
Several senior officers, notably Adm. Halsey, proposed a relief expedition be sent to Wake covered by a task force built around the USS Lexington. Before this expedition could be sent, on January 5th Admiral Nimitz replaced Admiral Kimmel as commander, Pacific Fleet, and quickly vetoed any suggestion to risk the Pacific Fleet’s only operational capital ship so far from any possible support.
On January 15th the Japanese launched their second amphibious assault. The Marine defenders once again destroyed several ships and inflicted heavy losses on the landing force, but three days later the defenders were out of ammunition and water. Over 300 of the island’s defenders had been killed. Japanese ground losses alone were over 1,000. The defense of Wake, while ultimately a defeat, would claim the first IJN warship sunk and the first Japanese defeat of the war.
“We shall return.” Gen. Wainwright, just before boarding PT 34 to leave the Philippines.
While a small island north of Luzon had been occupied on the 28th, the invasion of the Philippines is generally recorded as beginning on the 30th, with the first landing on Luzon. Officially, Gen. MacArthur’s plans called for a forward defense, taking advantage of the nearly 400 aircraft available to him including what was perceived as his ace: over 70 B-17’s of the 7th and 19th Bombardment Groups (Heavy). Also available were the 27th Bombardment Group (Light) of A-24 dive-bombers, which would wind up being equally useful, and over 100 P-40’s. Ground forces were also substantial, with 12 divisions, several independent infantry regiments, the 1st Provisional Tank Group, and an assortment of independent artillery units. On paper, The US Armed Forces, Far East, and the Philippine Army appeared capable of holding indefinitely against the few divisions the Japanese could spare.
The reality on the ground, however, was quite different. Many of the Philippine Army units had only been allowed to fire their rifles for the first time less than two weeks before the outbreak of war, so short had been stocks of ammunition. Drill had been all but non-existent and language barriers were many.
Worst of all, however, was the commander himself. While no proof has survived to the present day, it now seems clear that MacArthur was, at least, aware that President Quezon hoped to keep the Philippines neutral and was willing to aid in that endeavor. To repeated requests from Gen. Brereton to allow the FEAF to attack Formosa, MacArthur made no response. As a result, many of the FEAF aircraft were on the ground or circling their fields when the Japanese air attacks arrived on the first day of the war. Almost half of the vaunted B-17’s and numerous other aircraft were destroyed in under an hour, without dropping a single bomb.
MacArthur’s plan of forward defense fared little better. Although reports from the front consistently praise the fighting spirit and determination of the Philippine and US troops, especially the Philippine Scouts, command failures existed at every level. Co-ordination was poor to non-existent and complicated when it occurred by multiple language barriers. Japanese forces, by contrast, were able to execute a number of complex flanking and encircling attacks, chopping the defenders into bits and forcing them to retreat. By late February, it was clear that the Philippines were doomed.
One of MacArthur’s last acts (in early March, 1942) was to accept half a million dollars from Quezon’s government, just before Quezon and his family were evacuated from the Philippines at MacArthur’s orders. Two days later MacArthur, along with Chief of Staff Gen. Sutherland, were killed in a Japanese air attack. Command passed to Gen. Wainwright.
Gen. Wainwright proved to be a quite different commander from MacArthur. While MacArthur never visited the front lines, earning him the nickname “Dugout Doug”, Wainwright “appeared to be everywhere – at the front, at his headquarters, in conference with the Navy, or right behind you if you weren’t doing your job,” as one staff officer related. While MacArthur had retreated under pressure, Wainwright counter-attacked at every perceived opportunity. He ordered aggressive use be made of the remnants of the FEAF, particularly the A-24’s in a close-air support role. The Japanese, who had begun to withdraw forces as the campaign appeared to wind down, were caught by surprise and were forced to pull forces from everywhere they could just to hold their lines.
Although some criticized his attacks as reckless, Wainwright had a deeper plan. MacArthur’s uncoordinated retreat had involved few preparations for a siege at Corregidor, but called for such a siege in any case. Wainwright, by throwing the Japanese off balance, hoped to create a window of opportunity. In the process, he became a hero: the Lion of the Philippines.
Roosevelt decided that a hero was necessary, and accordingly ordered Wainwright to remove himself and his staff from the Philippines in late April, when the Japanese again began to push the defenders back. Wainwright fought against this order almost as hard as he fought the Japanese; he ordered his signals section to lose messages and report others garbled, and appealed to everyone in his chain of command, as well as senior naval officers, to be allowed to remain with his troops.
The end, however, was not in doubt. Bataan fell on July 3rd, and Wainwright received an order direct from Roosevelt, specifying the exact times and means by which he would be transported to Australia. Just before boarding PT 34 for the first leg of his journey, Wainwright addressed a group of US and Philippine army officers and men with just three words: “We shall return.”
On August 8th, the troops on Corregidor surrendered, and the last organized defense ended. Guerrilla warfare would continue, involving almost a third of the US personnel in the Philippines and hundreds of thousands of natives, until the islands were liberated.
Monday, May 2, 2011
December 28th – the Day of Infamy, Part I
On a lighter note (yes, I think a globe-spanning war is lighter than what I just posted. What does that say about me?) this is a piece of fiction I wrote up for an alternate history board I participate in. Thought I'd post it here as well.
November 5th, 1941, aboard CV Akagi, at sea off Yokosuka, Japan.
Admiral Nagumo cursed as the line connecting his flagship to the tanker parted. The first such mishap had drawn no reaction from him at all – accidents happen at sea, especially when practicing new techniques. Two men injured, one seriously, and a cable lost was a small price to pay for learning the ability to refuel ships at sea.
The second time a cable had parted had drawn a frown, quickly suppressed. The frown had returned briefly when word was brought to him that this time there had been a fatality.
That had been three hours, four broken cables, eighteen injuries, five fatalities, and one near-collision ago.
“Enough!” Nagumo snapped. “Signal ‘discontinue evolution’ and make preparations for returning to Yokosuka.”
“Hai.”
November 10th, 1941, aboard BB Nagato, Iwakuni, Japan.
Admiral Yamamoto managed to restrain his curse. “Two weeks?”
“If we are to count on underway refueling for the upcoming operations, yes,” Nagumo replied calmly. “The additional time would be of great benefit in other ways. Zuikaku has been in commission for less than two months, and Shokaku barely three. Their air groups are inexperienced.”
“It is less than a month to the target date. Your force is to sail in sixteen days, and you want two extra weeks? Impossible.”
“Perhaps, then, the operation should be cancelled,” Nagumo replied, still with his maddening calm.
“The operation is vital. It can not be cancelled.”
“Then in order to have Kido Butai ready, I shall require two additional weeks of training.”
“You were able to transfer fuel from the tanker to Akagi, and to the destroyers, were you not?” Yamamoto countered.
“Barely more than half the time, in moderate seas, with our most experienced tanker crew and one of our best carriers. The destroyers fared even worse.”
This time, Yamamoto only barely managed to restrain his curse. “I shall speak to Nagano. Many operations would have to be delayed. Oil is running short. You are to continue to make all possible preparations to depart on schedule.”
November 12th, 1941, Imperial General HQ, Tokyo, Japan.
“THREE weeks?!”
“If we are not to strike on the 8th, then that would be the ideal time. Task Force 1 is scheduled to sail on the 12th, and then Task Force 2 on the 17th. They will not both be in port again until the 27th. The 28th, Hawaii time, allows time for any delays and is a Sunday, just like the original target date of the 7th, Hawaii time,” the Intelligence officer replied.
“More than just the Oahu raid is involved in this operation! More than just the Navy is involved! Malaya, the Philippines, everything will have to change,” General Sugiyama protested.
“Yamamoto is most insistent…” Shimada began.
“Enough.” Tojo’s single word silenced the room. “Our meetings with The Emperor continue. A decision of this magnitude can not be made without him. Whatever the plans may say, the final date is not set until it is set by him.”
December 19th, 1941, aboard BB Nagato, Hashirajima, Japan.
“So, it is to be war,” Yamamoto said quietly.
“The Emperor has so ordered. War with the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands will begin on December 29th.”
“So be it. Signal to Kido Butai: Climb Mount Niitaka, 1229.”
*
On the morning of December 28th, 1941, over two-thirds of the US Pacific Fleet was in port in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The ships present included two aircraft carriers, eight battleships, four heavy cruisers, seven light cruisers, and over thirty destroyers.
Cryptanalysts in Washington D.C. had decoded a message to the Japanese embassy, and a war warning was sent to all commands. Due to poor radio conditions, the message did not reach Pearl Harbor until ten minutes after the attack began.
Pearl Harbor’s only warning was from the Army radar teams, which picked up the 1st attack wave as it approached the island almost an hour before the attack. However the operators initially believed the blip, the largest any of them had ever seen, to be a malfunction, and failed to pass word to the brand-new fighter direction center for 6 vital minutes. The senior officer there, apparently also believing this must be a mistake of some sort, ordered a single flight of fighters to be sent up to check out the blip, and did not send out a general alert. He was later court-martialed and discharged. A quartet of P-40B’s from the 73rd Interceptor Squadron were the first to make contact with the enemy just minutes before the 1st wave arrived over their targets.
Fuchida, who had prepared for the possibility that complete surprise would not be achieved, fired two smoke signals to order his dive-bombers and fighters to attack first in order to draw fire from the torpedo bombers. The torpedo bombers failed to see one of the signals, and thus believed surprise had been achieved. All of the 1st wave aircraft thus attacked at once. The torpedo bombers did the most damage, hitting both carriers, four battleships, a heavy cruiser, and the target ship USS Utah with a total of 20 torpedoes from 40 aircraft. USS Saratoga, USS Enterprise, USS Oklahoma, and USS Utah were capsized, and USS Nevada was sunk, though heroic damage control efforts allowed her to settle on an even keel.
The most spectacular damage was later determined to have been caused by a single bomb, actually a modified 16” shell, which penetrated the deck armor of USS California and caused an explosion in her forward magazine. Over 1,000 men were killed and the ship began to sink rapidly.
The second wave of IJN aircraft encountered much increased resistance from anti-aircraft fire and the few aircraft which managed to get off the ground, but were able to bomb the capsized hulls of USS Saratoga, USS Enterprise, and USS Utah, ensuring that these ships could not be salvaged later. Two bombs from the second wave struck USS Craven (DD382), which exploded and sank in less than 5 minutes with the loss of 170 of her crew.
Of nearly 600 aircraft present, 135 were destroyed and 144 were damaged. Particularly high losses were taken by the Navy Patrol Wings; every single aircraft on the ground at the start of the attack was destroyed or damaged.
Japanese losses were 37 aircraft destroyed, with 61 aircrew killed.
Capital ships & cruisers present:
USS Saratoga CV3 – sunk by 4 torpedoes, unsalvageable
USS Enterprise CV6 – sunk by 3 torpedoes, unsalvageable
USS Nevada BB36 – sunk by 3 torpedoes
USS Oklahoma BB37 – sunk by 4 torpedoes, unsalvageable
USS Pennsylvania BB38 – lightly damaged
USS Arizona BB39 – damaged by torpedo and bombs
USS Tennessee BB43 – damaged by 2 torpedoes and bombs
USS California BB44 – sunk by bomb, unsalvageable
USS Maryland BB46 – damaged by bombs
USS West Virginia BB48 – lightly damaged
USS Northampton CA26
USS Chester CA27 – damaged by torpedo
USS Louisville CA28 – lightly damaged
USS Portland CA33
USS Raleigh CL7
USS Detroit CL8
USS Phoenix CL46
USS Boise CL47 – lightly damaged
USS Honolulu CL48
USS St. Louis CL49
USS Helena CL50
Other ships damaged or destroyed:
USS Tucker DD374 – damaged by bombs
USS Craven DD382 – sunk by bombs, unsalvageable
USS Blue DD387 – damaged by bombs
USS Whitney AD4 – lightly damaged
USS Utah AG16 – sunk by 2 torpedoes, unsalvageable
A few notes are in order. First, the international date line makes dates somewhat complicated. For TTL, the Japanese will, as they historically did, refer to Tokyo time unless explicitly stated otherwise. The US will generally refer to local time.
The PoD is the IJN deciding to conduct underway replenishment exercises prior to the fleet sailing for the Pearl Harbor operation. These do not go well (casualties occurred during the OTL raid), and as shown above the end result is that the raid will take place on 12/28, not 12/7. According to CINCPAC File No. A4-3/FF12/(13), Serial 01254, US Pacific Fleet, August 13th, 1941, Task Forces 1 and 2 (with all the battleships plus USS Saratoga CV3 and USS Enterprise CV6) were scheduled to be in port that day. USS Saratoga would have returned from the refit on the Pacific Coast that kept her out of Pearl IOTL, and USS Enterprise will be back from her delivery run. As far as I can tell, the quarterly employment schedule’s contents were known to the Japanese, though further details (like USS Saratoga’s refit) were not. IOTL USS Enterprise’s ferry mission departed on November 28th, per the schedule, partly in order not to arouse suspicion.
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/410813apac.html
This timeline will mostly be in “textbook” form; but I felt the introduction should be a little more personal.
Questions, comments, suggestions, and constructive criticism are welcome.
November 5th, 1941, aboard CV Akagi, at sea off Yokosuka, Japan.
Admiral Nagumo cursed as the line connecting his flagship to the tanker parted. The first such mishap had drawn no reaction from him at all – accidents happen at sea, especially when practicing new techniques. Two men injured, one seriously, and a cable lost was a small price to pay for learning the ability to refuel ships at sea.
The second time a cable had parted had drawn a frown, quickly suppressed. The frown had returned briefly when word was brought to him that this time there had been a fatality.
That had been three hours, four broken cables, eighteen injuries, five fatalities, and one near-collision ago.
“Enough!” Nagumo snapped. “Signal ‘discontinue evolution’ and make preparations for returning to Yokosuka.”
“Hai.”
November 10th, 1941, aboard BB Nagato, Iwakuni, Japan.
Admiral Yamamoto managed to restrain his curse. “Two weeks?”
“If we are to count on underway refueling for the upcoming operations, yes,” Nagumo replied calmly. “The additional time would be of great benefit in other ways. Zuikaku has been in commission for less than two months, and Shokaku barely three. Their air groups are inexperienced.”
“It is less than a month to the target date. Your force is to sail in sixteen days, and you want two extra weeks? Impossible.”
“Perhaps, then, the operation should be cancelled,” Nagumo replied, still with his maddening calm.
“The operation is vital. It can not be cancelled.”
“Then in order to have Kido Butai ready, I shall require two additional weeks of training.”
“You were able to transfer fuel from the tanker to Akagi, and to the destroyers, were you not?” Yamamoto countered.
“Barely more than half the time, in moderate seas, with our most experienced tanker crew and one of our best carriers. The destroyers fared even worse.”
This time, Yamamoto only barely managed to restrain his curse. “I shall speak to Nagano. Many operations would have to be delayed. Oil is running short. You are to continue to make all possible preparations to depart on schedule.”
November 12th, 1941, Imperial General HQ, Tokyo, Japan.
“THREE weeks?!”
“If we are not to strike on the 8th, then that would be the ideal time. Task Force 1 is scheduled to sail on the 12th, and then Task Force 2 on the 17th. They will not both be in port again until the 27th. The 28th, Hawaii time, allows time for any delays and is a Sunday, just like the original target date of the 7th, Hawaii time,” the Intelligence officer replied.
“More than just the Oahu raid is involved in this operation! More than just the Navy is involved! Malaya, the Philippines, everything will have to change,” General Sugiyama protested.
“Yamamoto is most insistent…” Shimada began.
“Enough.” Tojo’s single word silenced the room. “Our meetings with The Emperor continue. A decision of this magnitude can not be made without him. Whatever the plans may say, the final date is not set until it is set by him.”
December 19th, 1941, aboard BB Nagato, Hashirajima, Japan.
“So, it is to be war,” Yamamoto said quietly.
“The Emperor has so ordered. War with the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands will begin on December 29th.”
“So be it. Signal to Kido Butai: Climb Mount Niitaka, 1229.”
*
On the morning of December 28th, 1941, over two-thirds of the US Pacific Fleet was in port in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The ships present included two aircraft carriers, eight battleships, four heavy cruisers, seven light cruisers, and over thirty destroyers.
Cryptanalysts in Washington D.C. had decoded a message to the Japanese embassy, and a war warning was sent to all commands. Due to poor radio conditions, the message did not reach Pearl Harbor until ten minutes after the attack began.
Pearl Harbor’s only warning was from the Army radar teams, which picked up the 1st attack wave as it approached the island almost an hour before the attack. However the operators initially believed the blip, the largest any of them had ever seen, to be a malfunction, and failed to pass word to the brand-new fighter direction center for 6 vital minutes. The senior officer there, apparently also believing this must be a mistake of some sort, ordered a single flight of fighters to be sent up to check out the blip, and did not send out a general alert. He was later court-martialed and discharged. A quartet of P-40B’s from the 73rd Interceptor Squadron were the first to make contact with the enemy just minutes before the 1st wave arrived over their targets.
Fuchida, who had prepared for the possibility that complete surprise would not be achieved, fired two smoke signals to order his dive-bombers and fighters to attack first in order to draw fire from the torpedo bombers. The torpedo bombers failed to see one of the signals, and thus believed surprise had been achieved. All of the 1st wave aircraft thus attacked at once. The torpedo bombers did the most damage, hitting both carriers, four battleships, a heavy cruiser, and the target ship USS Utah with a total of 20 torpedoes from 40 aircraft. USS Saratoga, USS Enterprise, USS Oklahoma, and USS Utah were capsized, and USS Nevada was sunk, though heroic damage control efforts allowed her to settle on an even keel.
The most spectacular damage was later determined to have been caused by a single bomb, actually a modified 16” shell, which penetrated the deck armor of USS California and caused an explosion in her forward magazine. Over 1,000 men were killed and the ship began to sink rapidly.
The second wave of IJN aircraft encountered much increased resistance from anti-aircraft fire and the few aircraft which managed to get off the ground, but were able to bomb the capsized hulls of USS Saratoga, USS Enterprise, and USS Utah, ensuring that these ships could not be salvaged later. Two bombs from the second wave struck USS Craven (DD382), which exploded and sank in less than 5 minutes with the loss of 170 of her crew.
Of nearly 600 aircraft present, 135 were destroyed and 144 were damaged. Particularly high losses were taken by the Navy Patrol Wings; every single aircraft on the ground at the start of the attack was destroyed or damaged.
Japanese losses were 37 aircraft destroyed, with 61 aircrew killed.
Capital ships & cruisers present:
USS Saratoga CV3 – sunk by 4 torpedoes, unsalvageable
USS Enterprise CV6 – sunk by 3 torpedoes, unsalvageable
USS Nevada BB36 – sunk by 3 torpedoes
USS Oklahoma BB37 – sunk by 4 torpedoes, unsalvageable
USS Pennsylvania BB38 – lightly damaged
USS Arizona BB39 – damaged by torpedo and bombs
USS Tennessee BB43 – damaged by 2 torpedoes and bombs
USS California BB44 – sunk by bomb, unsalvageable
USS Maryland BB46 – damaged by bombs
USS West Virginia BB48 – lightly damaged
USS Northampton CA26
USS Chester CA27 – damaged by torpedo
USS Louisville CA28 – lightly damaged
USS Portland CA33
USS Raleigh CL7
USS Detroit CL8
USS Phoenix CL46
USS Boise CL47 – lightly damaged
USS Honolulu CL48
USS St. Louis CL49
USS Helena CL50
Other ships damaged or destroyed:
USS Tucker DD374 – damaged by bombs
USS Craven DD382 – sunk by bombs, unsalvageable
USS Blue DD387 – damaged by bombs
USS Whitney AD4 – lightly damaged
USS Utah AG16 – sunk by 2 torpedoes, unsalvageable
A few notes are in order. First, the international date line makes dates somewhat complicated. For TTL, the Japanese will, as they historically did, refer to Tokyo time unless explicitly stated otherwise. The US will generally refer to local time.
The PoD is the IJN deciding to conduct underway replenishment exercises prior to the fleet sailing for the Pearl Harbor operation. These do not go well (casualties occurred during the OTL raid), and as shown above the end result is that the raid will take place on 12/28, not 12/7. According to CINCPAC File No. A4-3/FF12/(13), Serial 01254, US Pacific Fleet, August 13th, 1941, Task Forces 1 and 2 (with all the battleships plus USS Saratoga CV3 and USS Enterprise CV6) were scheduled to be in port that day. USS Saratoga would have returned from the refit on the Pacific Coast that kept her out of Pearl IOTL, and USS Enterprise will be back from her delivery run. As far as I can tell, the quarterly employment schedule’s contents were known to the Japanese, though further details (like USS Saratoga’s refit) were not. IOTL USS Enterprise’s ferry mission departed on November 28th, per the schedule, partly in order not to arouse suspicion.
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/410813apac.html
This timeline will mostly be in “textbook” form; but I felt the introduction should be a little more personal.
Questions, comments, suggestions, and constructive criticism are welcome.
Terrorists: 5, USA: 1
Just days after 9/11/01 I posted on a BBoard at Carnegie Mellon noting that the terrorists had not yet won. Today some people are celebrating because Osama Bin Laden is dead. I'm not, because even with his death the terrorists are still winning.
On 9/11 I was an undergraduate at C-MU; I saw a note that the first tower had been hit by a plane on the AP news wire and forwarded it to several bboards; several people told me later that my post was the first word they had of the attacks. I remember watching the towers fall, over and over again. I remember hearing an airplane and being one of scores of people who went outside to look up at the sky, and look for reassurance in each other. I remember great relief identifying the plane as a fighter, not an airliner. I was scared on 9/11.
But not as scared as I was when I heard President Bush tell the world 'you are either with us or against us.' That was a victory for the terrorists: they had just been recognized as a global power by the most powerful nation on earth. Not even in WWII, fighting some of the most evil monsters ever to wear human skin, did the allies lay such a declaration before the world.
The disgustingly named Patriot Act and the formation of the TSA were another pair of victories: the terrorists had made us sacrifice our essential liberties for an illusion of security.
Then the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Why those countries? Why not pick the nation in the Mid East that had done more than any other to aid in the 9/11 attacks? Why Saudi Arabia's immunity? Or why not the nation(s) Osama was believed to be hiding in? Even in October of 2001 it was an open secret that Pakistan was a possible location - perhaps he was not there then, of course, but with what we know now it is hard to believe that officials, many of them quite senior, in Pakistan were not aware of his general location.
But now, almost ten full years after the 9/11 attacks, we have finally killed the ring leader. Rejoice! So will the TSA be stood down? No, our current administration is already warning us that this may lead to retaliatory attacks. So those 'temporary' 'emergency' measures turn out to have been neither temporary nor effective, and the 'emergency' appears to be permanent.
Don't get me wrong, some things have improved since 9/11: the armored cockpit doors on commercial aircraft and the measures to prevent people from rushing the cockpit are good, effective steps that have the added bonus of in no way compromising our rights. But groping by the TSA in no way adds to our security and is yet another erosion of our liberty.
It is a sign of the times that when I was thinking of the scorecard for the title I considered assigning three points for the TSA and their escalating steps along the road to bureaucratic waste and ineffectiveness. Then I couldn't decide if it should actually be four, or five, and finally decided to simply award them one for simplicity's sake.
So we've won a single battle, but we are still loosing the war.
On the bright side, we haven't lost yet. In commemoration both of the 100th anniversary of its adoption as the US Army's principle sidearm and the 10th anniversary of 9/11, this summer I am going to purchase a Colt 1911. Because while the right to keep and bear arms has been eroded, it still remains. Because while we are loosing, we have not yet lost. We can still win.
We can repeal the ill-named Patriot Act's provisions, and all other legislation contrary to the US Constitution. We can disband the TSA entirely, and let the airlines, individually, decide what they will allow on their planes and bear any expenses they choose to spend searching. We can punish the nations that actually bore responsibility for 9/11.
On 9/11 I was an undergraduate at C-MU; I saw a note that the first tower had been hit by a plane on the AP news wire and forwarded it to several bboards; several people told me later that my post was the first word they had of the attacks. I remember watching the towers fall, over and over again. I remember hearing an airplane and being one of scores of people who went outside to look up at the sky, and look for reassurance in each other. I remember great relief identifying the plane as a fighter, not an airliner. I was scared on 9/11.
But not as scared as I was when I heard President Bush tell the world 'you are either with us or against us.' That was a victory for the terrorists: they had just been recognized as a global power by the most powerful nation on earth. Not even in WWII, fighting some of the most evil monsters ever to wear human skin, did the allies lay such a declaration before the world.
The disgustingly named Patriot Act and the formation of the TSA were another pair of victories: the terrorists had made us sacrifice our essential liberties for an illusion of security.
Then the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Why those countries? Why not pick the nation in the Mid East that had done more than any other to aid in the 9/11 attacks? Why Saudi Arabia's immunity? Or why not the nation(s) Osama was believed to be hiding in? Even in October of 2001 it was an open secret that Pakistan was a possible location - perhaps he was not there then, of course, but with what we know now it is hard to believe that officials, many of them quite senior, in Pakistan were not aware of his general location.
But now, almost ten full years after the 9/11 attacks, we have finally killed the ring leader. Rejoice! So will the TSA be stood down? No, our current administration is already warning us that this may lead to retaliatory attacks. So those 'temporary' 'emergency' measures turn out to have been neither temporary nor effective, and the 'emergency' appears to be permanent.
Don't get me wrong, some things have improved since 9/11: the armored cockpit doors on commercial aircraft and the measures to prevent people from rushing the cockpit are good, effective steps that have the added bonus of in no way compromising our rights. But groping by the TSA in no way adds to our security and is yet another erosion of our liberty.
It is a sign of the times that when I was thinking of the scorecard for the title I considered assigning three points for the TSA and their escalating steps along the road to bureaucratic waste and ineffectiveness. Then I couldn't decide if it should actually be four, or five, and finally decided to simply award them one for simplicity's sake.
So we've won a single battle, but we are still loosing the war.
On the bright side, we haven't lost yet. In commemoration both of the 100th anniversary of its adoption as the US Army's principle sidearm and the 10th anniversary of 9/11, this summer I am going to purchase a Colt 1911. Because while the right to keep and bear arms has been eroded, it still remains. Because while we are loosing, we have not yet lost. We can still win.
We can repeal the ill-named Patriot Act's provisions, and all other legislation contrary to the US Constitution. We can disband the TSA entirely, and let the airlines, individually, decide what they will allow on their planes and bear any expenses they choose to spend searching. We can punish the nations that actually bore responsibility for 9/11.
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