December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part VI

Diversions and Raids

The USS Lexington was, once again, the only operational US carrier in the Pacific. Once again, the Atlantic fleet would solve the problem. USS Wasp arrived in the Pacific on June 15th, only a few days after the USS Yorktown finally limped into Pearl Harbor. USS North Carolina also arrived in June, and was welcomed with great enthusiasm due in no small part to her 27knot speed. Her sister USS Washington followed two months later, along with USS South Dakota and USS Juneau.

Neither side had been idle, however. The Japanese had occupied several islands in the Solomons, and began building airfields. The USN, primarily the USS Lexington, had conducted more pinprick raids against those and other islands. Both sides had also suffered additional losses. USS Chester, torpedoed once at Pearl Harbor and again at the Coral Sea, was sunk by torpedoes from I-26, though USS Gridley and USS Downes sank the submarine in turn. The scales were balanced a week later when USS Seawolf intercepted a force unloading troops on Guadalcanal and sank CA Nachi.

The latter incident would have far reaching consequences. The destruction of any major IJN unit was good news and received attention all the way up the chain of command, and Admiral Nimitz, almost as an afterthought, asked to review the USS Seawolf’s patrol report personally. An hour after receiving it he was angry and demanding an investigation to determine why USS Seawolf had fired 24 torpedoes for exactly three hits – all on the Nachi. Admiral Withers, confronted by an angry Nimitz, at first tried to blame LtCdr Warder for timidity, insisting that the Mk 14 torpedo was an excellent weapon. Nimitz refused to believe the first submarine skipper to bag an IJN heavy cruiser “demonstrated insufficient aggressiveness” when he fired 12 torpedoes at a single ship, interrupted by two rounds of being depth-charged by IJN destroyers. Something, Nimitz insisted, must be wrong with the torpedoes.

Nimitz, now coldly furious, sent a message to all flag officers inviting them to comment on the performance of the Mk 14. When he received a detailed list of incidents and problems from Admiral Lockwood in Australia, he decided he had found the right man for a job: a detailed investigation. Lockwood was recalled to Pearl Harbor, and immediately began a rigorous series of tests.

By the end of August Admiral Nimitz felt the fleet was strong enough to engage the IJN directly once again, with two fleet carriers, three fast battleships, four anti-aircraft light cruisers and a number of fleet oilers along with the pre-war battleships, heavy light cruisers, and lesser ships. This was fortunate, as throughout August signals intelligence indicated that the IJN was planning another major operation. The target, however, was uncertain. Indicators pointed from the Aleutians to Ceylon and many places in between.

Nimitz felt the most likely target was New Caledonia; a difficult target but a rich prize, whose French owners could be expected to be… adaptable to new overlords. The French authorities had already resisted or blocked some attempts to improve the facilities and station additional troops on the island, and the ABDA troops on the island consisted of a single reinforced regiment of infantry, a battalion of anti-aircraft artillery, a squadron of fighters, and a detachment of PBY’s – not nearly enough to hold the island against a determined assault. If the Japanese took New Caledonia communications with Australia would become extremely difficult.