December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part IX

Midway, Part III

Yamamoto had been more than satisfied with the night action. Leaving behind his carriers, the damaged Yamashiro and Yamato, and most of his screen he had shifted to his old flagship Nagato and led the rest of his battleships forward at flank speed. No attempt was made at a carrier strike. Yamamoto had less than 70 bombers left from eight different air groups, too many of his pilots were green, and he needed what he had for ASW patrols until his screen could rejoin.

Two hours after dawn the first USN strike arrived. The Lucky Lex’s pieced-together air group was not in much better shape than the IJN’s, but the American pilots were filled with rage and determination. Disregarding their losses the SBDs broke through the IJN CAP and focused their efforts on Mutsu and Hiei. Mutsu’s fore-most turret was smashed and her upper works set on fire but she continued to steam on. Hiei staggered out of formation, her thinner armor ripped open in multiple places by 1,000 pound bombs. Half an hour later a fire reached her forward magazine, and attempts to flood it failed. The forward half of the ship blew up, and the rest sank quickly.

The B-17s arrived next. They found Yamato and Yamashiro and unloaded their bombs from 10,000 feet, unhindered by Zeros as no one had thought to put a CAP over the pair of battleships. Yamato shrugged off her damage, but Yamashiro once again caught fire. Just before 1100 Yamamoto ordered her abandoned. She was finished off by torpedoes from DD Amagiri and sank at noon.

At 1000 Admiral Halsey, realizing that a surface battle could no longer be avoided, ordered Admiral Spruance to take command of the least-damaged battleships, cruisers, and destroyers and engage the pursuing Japanese. USS Lexington and the worst-damaged ships would continue to run east.

Spruance had the USS North Carolina, USS Washington, USS New Mexico, USS Colorado, USS West Virginia, USS Pennsylvania, USS Minneapolis, USS New Orleans, USS St. Louis, USS Helena, USS Phoenix, and 11 destroyers; 6 BB, 2 CA, 3 CL, and 11 DD, almost all damaged.

Yamamoto had the Nagato, Mutsu, Ise, Hyuga, Fuso, Kongo, Kirishima, Haruna, Mogami, Suzuya, Kumano, Maya, Chokai, Haguro, Kinu, Yura, and14 destroyers; 5 BB, 3 BC, 6 CA, 2 CL, and 14 DD, most of them intact or nearly so.

Spruance knew that the odds were against him in a traditional slugging match, and his torpedo-damaged ships were slower than the IJN battleships. Spruance did, however, have a card up his sleeve.

USS Triton was one of just five USN submarines near Midway during the battle. She had run at speed on the surface all morning, then dived shortly before 1000. Aided by constant position reports from “Seagulls” off the battleships and cruisers, she achieved a good attack position and at 1045 launched six torpedoes at Nagato from less than 1,000 yards off her port bow. LtCdr Kirkpatrick had ordered all his torpedoes set for minimum depth. All six hit, but in the ongoing tragedy of the Mk 14 only four detonated. Nagato, however, rapidly took on a list and fell out of formation. Despite two IJN destroyers charging towards her, USS Triton came about and fired her stern torpedoes at Ise. Three hit, but only one detonated.

Spruance’s card had turned out to be an ace.

Yamamoto, aboard the stricken Nagato, elected not to shift his flag just minutes before the battle lines engaged and passed command to VADM Mikawa.

Spruance had placed his heavy ships in a north-south battleline, cruising ahead slow while the Japanese approached in two parallel lines; battlecrisers to the north and battleships to the south. The Japanese plan had been to have each line turn in succession northward, engage in long range fire, and use their superior speed and their battlecruisers to pull ahead of the USN line and eventually cross its T.

Mikawa, however, had barely escaped the Hiei before she exploded and most of his staff had not. When he ordered the turn north the signal was not passed to Mutsu. Ise, Hyuga, and Fuso turned shortly afterward when they saw the battlecruisers had, leaving Mutsu steaming directly towards the USN formation alone. USS North Carolina opened fire at 1058, followed at 1059 by USS Washington. USS North Carolina’s second salvo straddled Mutsu, which belatedly began to turn. By the time she had reached her intended course she was under fire from the entire US line. Two turrets were put out of commission, and a near-miss aft jammed her rudder. The other six IJN ships turned to close with the US line in an attempt to cover her, but by the time they came into range she was already a wreck.

The battle lines began to engage their opposite numbers in line. At 1120 USS Pennsylvania scored a hit on Kirishima that killed Mikawa and Captain Iwabuchi. The IJN no longer had a flag officer anywhere in the battle line. Unsure of the status of the rest of the line, the executive officer ordered a turn away from the US line in hopes of re-establishing the chain of command. When Yamamoto arrived aboard the DD Nenohi he realized his numerical advantage was gone, his fleet battered and far from home, and his carrier striking power gone.

The Japanese fleet turned towards Truk, and Spruance had no choice but to let them go.

Total Losses, Battle of Midway:
CV Junyo
BB Mutsu, Yamashiro
BC Hiei
CA Mikuma, Ashigara
CL Tama, Isuzu
9 DD
1 SS
11 Transports & Freighters
180 Aircraft

CV USS Wasp
BB USS Mississippi, USS Maryland
CA USS Quincy, USS Vincennes, USS Wichita
CL USS Juneau, USS San Juan, USS Boise
14 DD
110 Aircraft

Both sides claimed the battle as a victory. After the war, historians would point out that the battle smashed the last of the IJN’s carefully trained pre-war carrier pilots. Others would counter that after the battle the US did not have a single undamaged capital ship in the Pacific, which would result in the transfer of USS Ranger and most of the Atlantic Fleet’s remaining modern cruisers to the Pacific. It is certain that in the aftermath of the battle neither side was able to mount a large operation. The war became a waiting game.