Monday, May 16, 2011

December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part V

Note: yes, I know I have a lot of issues with changing tense (past/present, etc.).

Coral Sea

Yamamoto had been arguing for months that it was vital to bring the remaining USN carriers to battle and destroy them. After the Doolittle raid, opposition to this objective vanished. The Japanese had been planning a second offensive campaign, aimed at Port Moresby, the Solomons, and New Caladonia. While initially this campaign was to be supported only intermittently by one or two divisions of Kido Butai’s fleet carriers at a time, now Kido Butai would operate as a unit from Truk, spending as much time at sea as possible. Yamamoto proposed instead that the USN should be lured out by an attack on Midway, but his proposal was rejected. Land-based aircraft could cover the IJN from bases throughout the region while operating in the Coral Sea, while Midway could hold only a few aircraft.

Damage and air group losses incurred in the opening months of the war, especially the Indian Ocean raid, were almost completely made good by May 6th, and accordingly the start date for the offensive was set for May 28th.

Problems, however, continued to crop up. Truk was not yet a forward base capable of supporting Kido Butai, the battle fleet, and the invasion force at the same time. As the US was expected to counter-attack, the battle fleet would remain in home waters until Port Moresby was taken.

The US, through signals intelligence, became aware of this offensive almost as soon as major planning began in Japan. When Truk was informed that the IJN battle-line would arrive after the invasion of Port Moresby, Nimitz saw the opportunity to hit back at the Japanese.

The USN, however, also lacked the logistical capability to support its entire force so far forward. All three fleet carriers would be sent to break up the invasion, along with the three New Mexico-class battleships, ten heavy cruisers (two of them from the Royal Australian Navy), and five light cruisers.

Japanese OrBat:

Kido Butai:
CV Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu, Shokaku, Zuikaku
BC Kongo, Hiei, Kirishima, Haruna
CA Tone, Chikuma
CL Abukuma, Nagara
16 DD

Invasion Force
CVL Shoho, Zuiho
CVS Chitose, Nisshin
CA Atago, Chokai, Myoko, Haguro
CL Jintsu, Sendai, Oi, Kitakami
16 DD
19 SS
Numerous transports, auxiliaries, and tenders

Land-based air
150 land-based carrier-type aircraft

Allied OrBat:

TG 17.1
1 AS
17 SS

TG 17.2 (Fletcher)
CV USS Lexington
BB USS New Mexico, USS Mississippi, USS Idaho
CA USS Minneapolis, USS New Orleans, USS Astoria, USS San Francisco
CL USS Phoenix, USS St Louis, USS Honolulu, USS Helena
14 DD

TG 17.3
1 AV
24 PBY-5

TG 17.5 (Halsey)
CV USS Yorktown, USS Hornet
CA USS Northampton, USS Chester, USS Louisville, USS Portland, HMAS Australia, HMAS Canberra
CL USS Atlanta
9 DD

TG 17.9
4 DD
4 AO

USAAF, Australia (Brett)
34 Heavy Bombers (B-17)
110 Twin-Engine Bombers (B-25, B-26, A-20)
200 Fighters (P-39, P-40)

On the morning of June 2nd, 1942, the Coral Sea contained over 100 warships from three nations in four major groups and numerous minor ones. The Japanese invasion force bound for Port Moresby had left Rabaul the previous day. Kido Butai was just to the west of Bouganville, enroute from Truk to cover the landings. The two Allied task forces were south of the Solomon Islands, with Admiral Fletcher’s TG17.2 some 30 miles to the north of Admiral Halsey’s TG17.5.

The American plan was to surprise the Japanese carriers and sink them with air strikes from the carriers and from land-based bombers. The Japanese were not expecting a major hostile naval presence, but launched an aerial search as a routine precaution and in hopes of snapping up any Allied units that happened to be nearby.

At 0803, an E13A “Jake” from CA Tone spotted Halsey’s carriers and radioed a contact report. Just 20 minutes later, an SBD “Dauntless” from the USS Lexington spotted Kido Butai. Although the Japanese were surprised, CV Akagi and Kaga had aircraft already armed and spotted for an anti-shipping strike. The other four carriers hastily began to ready their own strikes, but judging time to be of the essence Nagumo ordered what was ready to be launched.

Less than 200 miles to the East, all three American carriers began to launch. Here, again, the strike would be less than what might have been ideal; USS Lexington’s Scouting Squadron 2 was out on search, as was part of USS Yorktown’s Scouting Squadron 5. Medium bombers from Port Moresby were also taking off, however, with a mix of torpedoes and bombs.

By 1000 the Allies’ plan for a coordinated strike from multiple directions had already fallen apart. Despite being ordered to attack the IJN carriers, most of the land-based bombers engaged the invasion force when they spotted it enroute, hitting two transports and CA Myoko. Fighters from the light carriers accompanying the force shot down four of the strike aircraft at the loss of a single one of their own. The different cruising speeds of the SBD dive bombers and TBD torpedo bombers led to both naval strikes splitting into two, and in the case of Halsey’s strike three, groups. USS Hornet’s Torpedo Squadron 8 veered off course and failed to find the enemy at all.

In contrast, the 70-strong strike from CV Akagi and Kaga arrives over Halsey’s carriers as a single unit, and are met by a dozen F4F “Wildcats” of Fighting Squadron 5. They, in turn, are met by the 9 A6M “Zeros” escorting the strike. Although outnumbered, the Zeros shoot down five of the Wildcats while losing three of their own, and more importantly prevent the CAP from effectively engaging the attacking bombers; only five are lost.

34 of the attackers are torpedo-carrying B5N “Kates.” Approaching their targets low and slow, three are shot down by Wildcats and eleven are plucked out of the sky by anti-aircraft fire, but all the rest launch a textbook multi-angle torpedo attack on the two US carriers. They maneuver frantically, but three torpedoes strike home on the USS Yorktown and two on USS Hornet. A single torpedo passes astern of Hornet and hits USS Chester amidships. Above, 27 D3A “Vals” tip over into their dives. Two of those dives become death spirals as a single Wildcat shoots past, and twelve more fall to anti-aircraft fire as they run through a heavy barrage dominated by the USS Atlanta. Four bombs hit USS Yorktown, two more bracket USS Hornet at less than ten yards distance, and three planes for no apparent reason attack USS Northampton, scoring two more hits.

The Japanese strike has suffered heavily, but as they depart they can see two carriers and a heavy cruiser on fire and apparently doomed; a good trade for 31 aircraft.

The first American strike, twenty SBDs of Bombing Squadron 8 with no fighter escort, arrive over the Japanese carriers and are promptly torn apart by Zeros. Thirteen aircraft are lost and five more damaged; the survivors jettison their bombs and run for it. Bombing Squadron 5 arrives only minutes later but achieves little more: eight aircraft are lost to fighters and anti-aircraft in return for a single hit on CV Zuikaku, which however starts a serious fire among the spotted aircraft. Next on the scene is Torpedo Squadron 5, which suffers eleven aircraft destroyed but achieves nothing more than disorganizing the Japanese formation as the ships turn to avoid the incoming fish. As they make their runs, however, Fighting Squadrons 8 and 2 make a belated appearance and engage the IJN CAP, now with reduced ammunition, fuel, and altitude. Eleven Zeros are shot down in trade for only two Wildcats, but far more importantly the melee draws attention away from the real threat: Bombing Squadron 2 from the USS Lexington has just arrived. Twenty-one SBDs dive on CV Hiryu and Soryu, and put three bombs into each for the loss of five aircraft. Both carriers have just launched a strike, but the bombs explode among a second wave arming and fueling in their hanger decks. Within minutes both ships are ablaze from stem to stern, punctuated by flashes from secondary explosions. In a frustrating anti-climax, Torpedo Squadron 2 loses five aircraft for zero hits ten minutes later.

Back at Halsey’s group, the Yorktown-class carriers are gaining a reputation for toughness. The fires are out, the flooding controlled, and USS Hornet is even capable of flight operations. USS Yorktown breaks off to begin the long trip to Pearl Harbor along with the badly damaged USS Northampton and two destroyers. A refreshed CAP greets the main Japanese strike of over 100 aircraft, two of whom know their parent carriers are doomed. Both sides have blood in their eyes, but the Japanese also have superior numbers and more experience. USS Hornet takes five additional torpedoes, at least six bomb hits, and two dive-bombers crash on her deck. USS Portland catches a pair of torpedoes, and HMAS Canberra is hit by another and two bombs. Two destroyers are damaged by near-misses. Thirty-nine more Japanese aircraft are lost, and six Wildcats. Just after being hit by the sixth bomb, USS Hornet explodes and sinks in less than ten minutes, taking with her over 1,500 of her crew.

As the strikes return, the losses appear to be roughly equal. The IJN aircraft report that both American carriers and two cruisers are definitely sunk, and also claim two additional cruisers probably sunk. The Japanese have lost CV Hiryu and Soryu, and Zuikaku is damaged. A hundred aircraft have been destroyed, but scores of American planes are claimed as well and more will have been unable to reach land bases or trapped aboard the sinking carriers.

As night falls, the Japanese steam on, convinced that they have smashed a major US force for heavy but acceptable losses, and that Port Moresby will soon be theirs.

What is left of Halsey’s force is indeed retiring, but Fletcher’s is closing with the Japanese as fast as the battleships are able. The battle is not yet over.

On the morning of June 3rd the Japanese again launched a fairly relaxed, routine search pattern. Just minutes later a frantic E13A reported an American fleet only miles beyond the horizon from the Japanese carrier force, bearing NE and heading almost directly towards them. Nagumo was about to order a turn into the wind to launch a strike when an update arrived: three battleships and six cruisers.

Nagumo faced a cruel choice; he could turn into the wind to launch his strike, thus moving his carriers directly toward enemy battleships at a closing speed of 50 knots, or he could run, using his force’s superior speed to slowly open the range. He chose the latter. With only a light CAP and ASW patrol aloft Kido Butai turned SW to run.

The USS Lexington faces no difficult choices. Breaking off from the battleships with two heavy cruisers and four destroyers she begins launching aircraft. Aboard that morning are 22 operational Wildcats from all three fighter squadrons, 46 Dauntlesses from two bombing and three scouting squadrons, and nine Devastators from two torpedo squadrons; a total of 77 aircraft drawn from ten squadrons on three different carriers. Ten Wildcats are put up on CAP, the rest escort a massed strike of Dauntlesses. Determined to launch a single, coordinated strike and taking advantage of the short range to target (reported by SOC “Seagulls” launched before dawn from the cruisers), Fletcher gives strict orders to Captain Sherman: the strike aircraft are to orbit the ship until EVERY SBD is aloft, then move in a single group to strike the enemy. Although the need to bring up aircraft from the hanger after the first wave is launched will delay the strike, Fletcher believes the added weight will be decisive.

The state of confusion and communications in the Japanese fleet is seldom better illustrated than by the simple fact that it was 25 minutes after the turn SW that VADM Mikawa, commanding the IJN battlecruisers, learned that the fleet was running from three American battleships. Mikawa immediately requested permission to turn about and engage the enemy, pointing out that he has 4:3 odds in his favor.

Nagumo at first refuses. He is fully aware that the Kongo-class have only 2/3 the armor and heavy guns of the American battleships, meaning that even a straight fight between them would hardly be a clear advantage for the Japanese. Worse, he has only two heavy cruisers of his own, while six have been reported with the American force. Nagumo’s plan is far safer: open the range throughout the morning, then turn back and launch a heavy strike in the afternoon to cripple the Americans, and finish them off with his surface units before nightfall.

Mikawa repeats his request, pointing out the benefit of a joint air/surface attack. Nagumo reluctantly agrees 15 minutes after Mikawa’s initial request.

Kido Butai’s deck crews have not wasted those 40 minutes. A full-deck strike is spotted on all four carriers, ready to go if the situation should change, every pilot praying for the wind to shift, even just a few points. Their prayers seem to be granted as the ships turn about, and the launches begin.

First off are the fighters, as they need the least space. This will prove critical, as barely are the last of the reinforcements for the CAP and the strike escorts aloft when the American strike arrives. The IJN on the surface and in the air shatter, and 58 USN aircraft find themselves facing almost as many Zeros. The result is a slaughter. Eleven Zeros are lost, but not a single Wildcat survives, and three-quarters of the SBDs are lost to fighters or AA. The few survivors manage to put one bomb each into Kaga and Shokaku.

Those two bombs, however, are decisive. The hit on Kaga is among the spotted strike, starting a major fire and destroying or damaging many of her aircraft before it can be brought under control. The hit on Shokaku holes her flight deck forward, preventing her from launching aircraft. Now knowing that at least one American carrier yet lives, with his Zeros low on ammunition and fuel, hit fleet disorganized by maneuvers, and with only half his strike able to be launched, Nagumo orders his ships to turn away once again. He will regroup, lick his wounds, and cover the tranports approaching Port Moresby.

Fletcher also orders his ships to turn away. His bombers, even counting those on the crippled USS Yorktown or able to be repaired, are too few to strike with, and his fighters are almost gone. His battleships are too slow to catch the enemy, and he can not risk them without support from his carriers. Land based aircraft will have to defend Port Moresby as best as they are able. He has sunk two Japanese carriers in trade for USS Hornet; that will have to be enough for now.

Land based aircraft are not enough. CA Atago and four transports are sunk, two more cruisers, a destroyer, and three more transports are damaged, but the Japanese land enough troops to capture Port Moresby.

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