Wednesday, May 4, 2011

December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part II

“When this war is over, the Japanese language will be spoken only in Hell.” Adm. Halsey, surveying the wreckage of USS Enterprise from Ford Island, December 28th, 1941.

“The USS Lexington just became the most important ship in the world.” Capt. Sherman, upon receiving word of the losses at Pearl Harbor.

The IJN aircraft flying away from Pearl Harbor left behind them a shattered Pacific Fleet and an atmosphere of panic tempered only by rage. Admiral Kimmel had woken up in the morning in command of twelve capital ships. By the time the sun set, only one was fully operational: the USS Lexington. Four would never fight again, and five would be in yard hands for months, or in one case years.

Only hours after the Pearl Harbor raid, 36 G3M bombers approached Wake. Here, the new radar was manned by equally green but far more aggressive personnel, and the island’s entire force of aircraft - 12 F4F Wildcats of VMF 211 – scrambled aloft to meet them. The Marine pilots managed to shoot down eight of the “Nells” and damaged several others, but the Japanese pressed the attack and did moderate damage to the base facilities.

Three days later the Japanese invasion force arrived. Major Devereux ordered his gunners to hold their fire until the enemy ships closed into effective range. His patience was rewarded by the destruction of DD Hayate and heavy damage to CL Yubari. Minutes later, bombs from VMF 211 destroyed DD Kisaragi. The Japanese invasion force withdrew. Two weeks of air attacks followed, including carrier aircraft from CV Hiryu and Soryu returning from the Pearl Harbor raid. VMF 211’s kills continued to mount until they met A6M’s from Hiryu and Soryu. The Marine squadron was destroyed in nine furious minutes of combat, though they took three Zeros with them.

Several senior officers, notably Adm. Halsey, proposed a relief expedition be sent to Wake covered by a task force built around the USS Lexington. Before this expedition could be sent, on January 5th Admiral Nimitz replaced Admiral Kimmel as commander, Pacific Fleet, and quickly vetoed any suggestion to risk the Pacific Fleet’s only operational capital ship so far from any possible support.

On January 15th the Japanese launched their second amphibious assault. The Marine defenders once again destroyed several ships and inflicted heavy losses on the landing force, but three days later the defenders were out of ammunition and water. Over 300 of the island’s defenders had been killed. Japanese ground losses alone were over 1,000. The defense of Wake, while ultimately a defeat, would claim the first IJN warship sunk and the first Japanese defeat of the war.

“We shall return.” Gen. Wainwright, just before boarding PT 34 to leave the Philippines.

While a small island north of Luzon had been occupied on the 28th, the invasion of the Philippines is generally recorded as beginning on the 30th, with the first landing on Luzon. Officially, Gen. MacArthur’s plans called for a forward defense, taking advantage of the nearly 400 aircraft available to him including what was perceived as his ace: over 70 B-17’s of the 7th and 19th Bombardment Groups (Heavy). Also available were the 27th Bombardment Group (Light) of A-24 dive-bombers, which would wind up being equally useful, and over 100 P-40’s. Ground forces were also substantial, with 12 divisions, several independent infantry regiments, the 1st Provisional Tank Group, and an assortment of independent artillery units. On paper, The US Armed Forces, Far East, and the Philippine Army appeared capable of holding indefinitely against the few divisions the Japanese could spare.

The reality on the ground, however, was quite different. Many of the Philippine Army units had only been allowed to fire their rifles for the first time less than two weeks before the outbreak of war, so short had been stocks of ammunition. Drill had been all but non-existent and language barriers were many.

Worst of all, however, was the commander himself. While no proof has survived to the present day, it now seems clear that MacArthur was, at least, aware that President Quezon hoped to keep the Philippines neutral and was willing to aid in that endeavor. To repeated requests from Gen. Brereton to allow the FEAF to attack Formosa, MacArthur made no response. As a result, many of the FEAF aircraft were on the ground or circling their fields when the Japanese air attacks arrived on the first day of the war. Almost half of the vaunted B-17’s and numerous other aircraft were destroyed in under an hour, without dropping a single bomb.

MacArthur’s plan of forward defense fared little better. Although reports from the front consistently praise the fighting spirit and determination of the Philippine and US troops, especially the Philippine Scouts, command failures existed at every level. Co-ordination was poor to non-existent and complicated when it occurred by multiple language barriers. Japanese forces, by contrast, were able to execute a number of complex flanking and encircling attacks, chopping the defenders into bits and forcing them to retreat. By late February, it was clear that the Philippines were doomed.

One of MacArthur’s last acts (in early March, 1942) was to accept half a million dollars from Quezon’s government, just before Quezon and his family were evacuated from the Philippines at MacArthur’s orders. Two days later MacArthur, along with Chief of Staff Gen. Sutherland, were killed in a Japanese air attack. Command passed to Gen. Wainwright.

Gen. Wainwright proved to be a quite different commander from MacArthur. While MacArthur never visited the front lines, earning him the nickname “Dugout Doug”, Wainwright “appeared to be everywhere – at the front, at his headquarters, in conference with the Navy, or right behind you if you weren’t doing your job,” as one staff officer related. While MacArthur had retreated under pressure, Wainwright counter-attacked at every perceived opportunity. He ordered aggressive use be made of the remnants of the FEAF, particularly the A-24’s in a close-air support role. The Japanese, who had begun to withdraw forces as the campaign appeared to wind down, were caught by surprise and were forced to pull forces from everywhere they could just to hold their lines.

Although some criticized his attacks as reckless, Wainwright had a deeper plan. MacArthur’s uncoordinated retreat had involved few preparations for a siege at Corregidor, but called for such a siege in any case. Wainwright, by throwing the Japanese off balance, hoped to create a window of opportunity. In the process, he became a hero: the Lion of the Philippines.

Roosevelt decided that a hero was necessary, and accordingly ordered Wainwright to remove himself and his staff from the Philippines in late April, when the Japanese again began to push the defenders back. Wainwright fought against this order almost as hard as he fought the Japanese; he ordered his signals section to lose messages and report others garbled, and appealed to everyone in his chain of command, as well as senior naval officers, to be allowed to remain with his troops.

The end, however, was not in doubt. Bataan fell on July 3rd, and Wainwright received an order direct from Roosevelt, specifying the exact times and means by which he would be transported to Australia. Just before boarding PT 34 for the first leg of his journey, Wainwright addressed a group of US and Philippine army officers and men with just three words: “We shall return.”

On August 8th, the troops on Corregidor surrendered, and the last organized defense ended. Guerrilla warfare would continue, involving almost a third of the US personnel in the Philippines and hundreds of thousands of natives, until the islands were liberated.

2 comments:

Elizabeth R said...

Your description of MacArthur agrees with your grandparents' opinion. How many parts are you planning?

Gridley said...

The whole thing is a little over 22,000 words and was originally posted in 39 parts. I'm currently posting two parts at a time, though I'm going to be varying that as I go on.