December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part VII

Midway, Part I

Nimitz was wrong. Admiral Yamamoto had been given the go ahead to attack Midway with almost every available major unit of the IJN, heavily because the operation would require no Army units. The IJA begrudged every soldier committed to the IJN’s operations, and without major IJA units operations against Ceylon or New Caledonia were impossible. It was believed that Midway, however, could by taken by SNLF troops already under the IJN’s control.

Midway was expected to be the decisive battle which would destroy the USN, and the Japanese believed they had learned from their mistakes at the Coral Sea. This time the battle-line would be deployed from the beginning, and would keep close to the carriers. If American battleships offered battle again, it would be accepted. Scouting would be increased, and carriers provided with each force to provide CAP and ASW patrols. This ambitious goal was met, but only in part: the carrier air groups on the operation were at only 70% of authorized strength, and many pilots were barely-trained novices at carrier operations. The US, in contrast, was able to supply full-strength groups for her carriers including a squadron of the new TBF torpedo bombers, although the USN groups too were short on veterans.

Signals intelligence finally revealed Midway as the target on August 25th, after the Japanese forces had sailed from Truk. US forces sailing for New Caledonia from Pearl Harbor quickly altered their courses northward, and elements of the 5th and 11th Bomb Groups with 24 B-17’s were hastily dispatched to Midway.

Japanese OrBat:

Carrier Force (Kido Butai, Nagumo):
CV Akagi, Kaga, Shokaku, Zuikaku (total of 56 A6M, 70 D3A, 76 B5N)
CVL Zuiho, Shoho (total of 24 A6M, 13 B5N)
BC Kongo, Hiei, Kirishima, Haruna
CA Tone, Chikuma
CL Isuzu, Yura
16 DD

Battle Force (Yamamoto):
CV Junyo (24 A6M, 8 B5N)
CVS Nisshin, Chitose (total of 26 F1M, 7 E13A)
BB Yamato, Nagato, Mutsu, Ise, Hyuga, Fuso, Yamashiro
CA Mogami, Mikuma, Suzuya, Kumano, Takao, Maya, Chokai
CL Nagara, Kinu, Tama, Kitakami, Oi
22 DD

Transport Force (Kondo):
CV Ryujo (20 A6M, 6 B5N)
CVS Chiyoda (12 F1M, 3 E13A)
CA Myoko, Haguro, Ashigara
CL Yubari
7 DD
14 Transports & Freighters
2 SNLF Battalions

Support Force:
4 DD
11 AO
1 AE

Advance Force:
21 SS

Allied OrBat:

TF 17 (Halsey)
CV USS Lexington (36 F4F, 36 SBD, 12 TBF), USS Wasp (36 F4F, 36 SBD)
CA USS Minneapolis, USS New Orleans, USS Louisville, USS Quincy, USS Vincennes, USS Wichita
CL USS Atlanta, USS Juneau
15 DD

TF 16 (Fletcher)
BB USS South Dakota, USS North Carolina, USS Washington
CL USS San Diego, USS San Juan, USS St. Louis, USS Helena
9 DD

TF 19 (Anderson)
BB USS New Mexico, USS Mississippi, USS Idaho, USS Colorado, USS Maryland, USS West Virginia, USS Pennsylvania, USS Arizona
CL USS Phoenix, USS Boise
12 DD

TF 7
5 SS

TF 11
4 DD
4 AO

Midway:
36 PBY (Patrol Wing 2)
24 B-17
27 F4F (VMF-221)
27 SBD (VMSB-241)
6th Marine Defense Battalion (Reinforced)

On August 27th a PBY searching from Midway spotted the approaching Japanese Battle Force and radioed a contact report. 20 minutes later it spotted the Carrier Force to the north and sent a second report. Five minutes after that it was shot down by a pair of Zeros. The Carriers were attacked later that day by B-17s from Midway, but the bombers stayed high to avoid the IJN CAP and scored no hits. That evening, I-71 spotted TF 17 southeast of Midway, sent off its own report, maneuvered as close as it could to the fast-moving force, and fired four torpedoes. One came within ten yards of the USS Lexington’s stern, but none hit. I-71 was pounced on by USS McCall and USS Maury and never heard from again. Less than an hour later, I-69 spotted and reported TF 19, and managed to put a pair of torpedoes into USS Arizona before being driven off. The damaged battlewagon turned back for Pearl in company with two destroyers.

Both sides had been detected and knew it. Halsey quickly conferred with his staff, and then ordered that the fleet advance. The choice was a difficult one, but there were several points in favor of seeking battle. Morale was extremely low after the long string of defeats the US had been handed, including the final surrender of Corregidor early that month. Midway’s position between the fleets gave the US a major scouting and striking force that the Japanese couldn’t sink. Most importantly, however, “tactical surprise,” Halsey stated “may yet be achieved.”

TF 19 was ordered to steam straight for Midway, while TF 16 and TF 17 drew together and turned slightly to the west. Halsey also sent orders to Midway: tomorrow, the aircraft there were to attempt to locate and sink the Japanese transports as their first priority. If the Japanese could be denied Midway the battle could be declared a victory and the fleet need not be risked.

Yamamoto also had decisions to make and orders to give, though his were much easier. The Carrier Force was shifted from the north of the Battle Force to the south and ordered to maximum speed. There would still be time for a preparatory strike on Midway early in the morning before the carrier forces came in range of each other in the mid-afternoon.

Midway’s PBYs launched again before sunrise, hunting for the Japanese. They found them quite easily, and more or less where they expected to find them. The Japanese, for their part, were not surprised to be located, having maintained fairly steady courses towards Midway throughout the night.

It would be one of the last things that day that went as both sides expected.

A 120-strong strike escorted by 31 Zeros arrived over Midway to find the sky apparently empty of the expected defenders.

The commander of VMF-221, Major John Smith, had set a trap. Expecting an attack, he had ensured that every aircraft on the island was aloft and away from the island. Due to a combination of luck, educated guesses, radar direction, and skill, he had managed to position his squadron and VMSB-241 above and up-sun of the IJN bombers just before they arrived over their targets. 54 Marine aircraft came diving in at high speed on bombers focused on their targets.

Surprise was total. Post-war analysis indicates that 34 Japanese aircraft were destroyed or crippled in the first pass alone. The Zeros, some of whom had removed their radios to save weight, were slow to realize there was a threat behind them. Several of the green Japanese pilots panicked, jettisoned their bombs, and broke formation. It was the worst thing they could have done. VMF-221 came about to make another pass at the main formation while VMSB-241 gleefully split into flights and elements to hunt down the cripples and loners.

By the time the Japanese aircraft withdrew, 59 had been lost in trade for 12 of the defenders. Midway’s facilities had been damaged, but its runways were still open, and well to the east its aircraft were about to deliver their own attack.

The Japanese had developed a mixed opinion of the B-17. On the one hand, it could fly high enough and was tough and well defended enough that shooting one down was extremely rare. On the other hand, flying so high made its bombs little threat to warships and not very accurate in general. The 30 B-17’s flying from Midway were a scratch team, but they managed to form a very tight box on the 28th, and each was carrying sixteen 250-lb bombs instead of the normal eight 500-lb bombs. The 480 bombs mostly missed. In fact, only 8% hit anything but the ocean. Thirty-eight bombs hit a group that only contained 27 ships, nine of which (including the destroyers, CL Yubari and CA Myoko) were able to escape the target zone before the bombs reached it. The two other heavy cruisers suffered only trivial damage from the light bombs. The transports were another story. The immediate casualties on the packed transports were bad enough, but the fires started on most of the ships were worse. Only one was sunk by the bombs outright, but ten more succumbed to fires and flooding. A third of the SNLF troops were lost, and many of the rest lost all of their equipment. Ryujo and Chiyoda also suffered light damage, but both were still capable of aircraft operations.

The battle was far from over.