Where were you?

"December 7, 1941, a date which will live in infamy..."

9/11/01.

I'm not the first to play compare/contrast with these two events.

But let's add two more:

11/22/63.

1/28/86.

I bet even if you don't recognize either date immediately, you can figure both of them out without looking them up.

Each of these events defines a generation. I'm just old enough to remember two. There are still people alive who remember all four.

So what do the raid on Pearl Harbor, JFK's assassination, the Challenger tragedy, and the 9/11 attacks have in common?

Well, aside from being massive media events, almost nothing.

It's easy for me to dismiss the middle two as not being in the same category as the first and last, but I don't. The loss of life was tiny - orders of magnitude lower, in fact. The real, immediate consequences were far less - neither event started a war (accepting the War on Terror as a war, despite the lack of a formal, and legally required, declaration to that effect).

But each event, in its own way, was a greater tragedy. In both cases, a tragedy of lost potential, rather than lost lives.

On 11/22/63, we lost one of if not the best President of the United States of the 20th century. He'd already set us on the path to the moon and defused one of the most serious crisis of the Cold War. He still had a full year left in office, and it is hardly a stretch to imagine him being re-elected had he lived. What might he have done?

On 1/28/86, a combination of cowardly management, hasty engineering, and bad luck broke the dream of space into pieces. The Space Shuttle, already questionable on its technical and economic merits, received the final nail in its coffin, and in a very real sense mankind turned its back on space. It has yet to truly return. What if the culture of yes-men in aerospace management had broken the ranks formed only two generations ago and said STOP? Might we have recovered from our stumble and continued on our path to the stars?

We'll never know, of course, just as we'll never know what a crewman on the USS Arizona or a passenger on United Flight #93 might have done with the balance of their life.

About midway between Pearl Harbor and 9/11 sits a positive event that will also be remembered. Optimistically, I think it will be remembered even when all four of the others are forgotten. That assumes the human race survives the death of Sol, but, well, hence the optimism.

Know what I'm talking about?

7/20/69. How about now?

"One small step for man..." What Neil Armstrong and 'Buzz' Aldrin did that day was, admittedly, a stunt. They were on the moon for less than 24 hours, and they never returned. But they were the first humans to set foot on the ground of someplace other than Earth.

So remember 2011 as the 10th Anniversary of 9/11, the 70th Anniversary of Pearl Harbor, or even the Centennial of the Colt 1911 if you will.

But remember also it is the 42nd Anniversary of "...one giant leap for mankind."

Where were you?

Rights or Reason?

The 'occupy' movement is getting a lot of press. A lot of quite favorable press, in fact, and a lot of people loudly claiming that they're simply exercising their First Ammendment rights.

I think a lot of those people need to go read the Constitution, or accept that they must then also be fine with me walking down Wall Street with a full-auto M16 slung over my shoulder.

"But a firearm is dangerous!" Many would cry loudly.

Yeah? Ever seen what a mob can do? And that's all the 'occupy' movement is, is a mob. They have no leadership, no coherent agenda - and quite clearly many of them are more than willing to resort to violence.

Now, the First Ammendment prohibits Congress from ..."abridging... the right of the people peacefully to assemble..."

Please note. CONGRESS. Via the Tenth, that means the States aren't bound, and I haven't seen anywhere a single Federal uniform doing a darn thing to the 'occupy' mob. The Constitution is being fully observed.

So what if I want to walk down Wall Stree with that rifle? Well... "...the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." No clarifier that Congress shan't do this, please note. Go ahead, look it up yourself. Again, via the Tenth, since this right is granted to the people, not simply denied to Congress, the States ARE bound.

Let's note anothe key word of the First. Peacefully. Peacefully to assemble. Punching cops is NOT peaceful. We could debate whether violating local ordinances is peaceful, and I'm not entirely sure myself, but as a former member of public safety, I can assure you that punching uniformed public safety personnel in the performance of their duty is NOT peaceful.

Cops aren't perfect, and do get carried away. Part of that, in this case, is because any long-serving cop in a major city has seen very clearly what a mob can do, and they know that you can't appeal to a mob's better nature. Once a mob is in full howl reason is out the window. You can reason with a person, even a very angry or even unstable person. Reasoning with two is a dozen times as hard. Reasoning with ten? Once their blood is up, don't bother. A good orator can still steer them, channel them, but he's not REASONING with them, he's FEEDING them.

Now let's apply the cop test to the Second. Are cops on guard around people with firearms? Surely. If you haven't seen a gunshot wound first hand, you haven't been a cop or a medic in a major city very long. They don't wear those optimistically titled 'bullet proof' vests because they're fashionable. But you can still reason with someone with a firearm. Quite often, even someone who's already drawn a firearm. Again, cops do this - they talk down people who are armed and dangerous.

So, do you support the 'occupy' movement's 'right' to camp out on a mix of public and private property while they wait for a miraclulous solution to occur to one of their number?

Elements

Something occurred to me tonight - why are the four classic elements (earth, air, fire, and water) the four classic elements?

It is an easy game of 'one of these things is not like the others'. So who thought fire belonged with the other three?

Really, there are three basic elements - not coincidentally, there are also three basic states of matter. OK, once you get a fair amount of energy or the ability to look at really small things a fourth one shows up, but plasma is a latecomer at best and a stretch at worst.

Even if you do insist on four elements, why fire? Why not the one stable thing you can have in a primitive world that is not like earth, air, or water... life.

You can't, at least not in a primitive world, have a bucket of fire. True, it is hard to conceptualize that an empty bucket is a bucket of air, but once you do it becomes clear that fire doesn't belong, yet there is one thing in your world that is not earth, not air, not water, and yet can fill a bucket: living things. Flesh and leaf, blood and feather. Life becomes the fourth element that weaves through the other three, while most fire can only survive in one.

Auto Work

OK, I give up, why does anything on a car cost so @%^^@#! much to do?

The parts are unreasonably expensive - AIRCRAFT PARTS often don't cost that much, and anything that flies gets a huge cost penalty from the fact that one must deal with the FAA. Trust me on this, that ain't cheap.

I used to assume that much of what had to be done must require extremely skilled technicians. Slowly I've ruled out most of the tasks however, and this weekend I ruled out body work requiring high skill/experience.

This weekend with a spray can of paint, a bottle of rubbing alcohol, a sanding pad, and a roll of paper towels I eliminated a score of minor scratches, scrapes, etc. in Lupae's paint job. You really can't tell the new from the old at a distance of more than a few feet anywhere, and in some cases I have a hard time spotting the new paint from an inch away.

I'm hardly what you'd call a spray-can master, so what's the deal?

Is there anything that gets done to a car that isn't a ripoff when done by professionals?

December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part XXII

Aftermath

Admiral Halsey was publically hailed as a hero, but his seniors felt he was too reckless. He was decorated, promoted, and then quietly transferred to a shore post. Admiral Spruance was also recognized for his role in the battle, and succeeded Halsey as the Navy’s senior forward commander.

The destruction of the IJN gave the US great freedom in pursuing its future campaigns. The old battleships were dispatched to the Atlantic, where in July they helped shoot ashore the massive amphibious assault on Normandy. Throughout the fall and winter of 1944 the US along with the rest of the Allies rolled forward in both the Pacific and Europe.

Germany surrendered on June 20th, 1945, as Soviet and Canadian forces reached Berlin.

By the summer of 1945, Japan was starving inside a blockade of submarines and aircraft. Only desperate attacks by the infamous Kamikazes and other suicide troops seemed able to even slow the US advance, and nothing could stop it. In August, the world’s first atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Kokura, the final act in a strategic bombing campaign that had gutted Japan’s cities. Japan formally signed an unconditional surrender on September 1st, 1945.

The Second World War was over.

USS Lexington had served in almost every major engagement of the war and countless minors ones. Her aircraft had often played a key role in those battles. The ship herself was called the “Lady Lex” “Lucky Lex” and “Lady Luck” by her crew for the numerous times she had escaped damage, and in recognition of the fact that she was the only pre-war US carrier to survive the war. She remains the most decorated ship ever to serve in the US Navy. She was decommissioned in 1947 and became a museum ship in New York. Her name lived on – the USN’s first atomic-powered aircraft carrier was named the USS Lexington, and in the 1960’s a popular TV series featured a space ship with the same name. While the series only ran for three years, spin offs, sequels, and movies made it into one of the largest TV franchises in history.

The Japanese had their own-mega franchise, which began in the 1970’s with an anime show about using a raised and rebuilt Yamato as a space ship. Sequels would eventually bring Shinano and even Musashi (after lengthy reassembly) into space as well.

The six Iowa-class battleships were retained after the war, though all were cycled through the reserve fleet in mothballs at some point. Still, there were always at least two in service up until the end of the 1980s, when they were finally replaced by the new Montana-class battleships. At least one Iowa-class participated in every conflict the US was involved in from WWII until their retirement.

December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part XXI

The Death of a Navy

At 1255 Yamato opened fire at 38,000 yards, aiming for USS New Jersey (visible only from mast to mast by the Japanese). By 1300 the other six ships of the IJN line had followed suit, aiming for the USN column leaders. The first hit was scored on USS Alabama at 1258, but the IJNs gunnery was erratic due to the range and hits were few. At 1306 the USN line turned to open their broadsides, forming a single line of eight ships angling slightly towards the Japanese.

The lighter ships, meanwhile, had their own fight. Here the US was the first to open fire, the initial salvo from the USS Boston actually straddling Kumano at 1252. At 1311 the US screen ceased fire, due mainly to lack of targets – while a few of the IJN cruisers and destroyers still lived, smoke from their burning consorts completely obscured them. The Japanese had simply been smothered under high-rate, devastatingly well directed fire. USS Quincy, USS Columbia, USS Philadelphia, and USS St. Louis had been seriously damaged and six destroyers had been sunk, but the Japanese had lost four heavy cruisers, five light cruisers, and seven destroyers sunk and most of the rest crippled. USS Quincy would eventually sink while being towed back to Pearl Harbor.

While the lighter ships hammered at each other, the battle lines ponderously closed.

At 1308 USS South Dakota veered out of line, both her bridge and rudder destroyed.

At 1309 Hyuga lost all power.

At 1311 a shell from Iowa slipped though a pair of armor plates deformed by previous hits and found Musashi’s aft 18” magazine and half the ship vanished in a tremendous explosion.

At 1312 Kirishima fired her last shot; she had been pounded into floating scrap by USS North Carolina and USS Washington.

At 1313 USS Alabama, fires raging out of control, flooded her forward magazines and turned to withdraw from the line.

At 1314 Ise ceased fire as her last turret was knocked out by USS Massachusetts.

At 1315 a 5” magazine on Nagato exploded, followed seconds later by another, and her damage control center ordered all magazines flooded in a panic. Her main battery fired its last rounds and then went silent. Only Yamato and Shinano were still firing at the US, while six US battleships returned fire.

At 1317 Kirishima broke in half, her structure fatally weakened by fires, explosions, and flooding.

At 1318 a shell from USS New Jersey sprayed steel splinters across Yamato’ flag bridge, killing Admiral Yamamoto instantly.

At 1320 Yamato and Shinano turned away, their rear turrets firing parting shots.

At 1322 Spruance ordered the US battleline to turn to pursue. As they did, USS Indiana lost helm control and rammed USS North Carolina, seriously damaging both ships.

As the Japanese fled USS Gridley and USS Maury, closing from the north, fired sixteen torpedoes at the fleeing Japanese superbattleships, turned hard to open their other beam and fired sixteen more. The Japanese ships, their upper works shredded and still under fire from four US battleships, did not notice the torpedoes until the first hit. Eight fish hit Yamato, and seven hit Shinano, all on their starboard sides near the waterline. The two ships began listing almost immediately and soon capsized. Ise and Nagato were pounded under the waves by the US battleline, while Hyuga was finished off by torpedoes from USS Walker.

Throughout the afternoon, fleeing destroyers and cruisers were hunted down by follow-up strikes from the US carriers.

By sunset on the 20th, the Imperial Japanese Navy had been destroyed. Sixty-three warships had sailed to battle. Only five limped back to Truk – the battered survivors of the Carrier Force.

Food Tablets, Day 3 (Final)

Sunday morning weight: 188lbs
Monday morning weight: 186lbs
Tuesday morning weight: 183lbs
Final weight: 181 lbs
Comment: with my fourth data point showing a continued decline at an unhealthy rate, I'm stopping the experiment.

Steps Sunday: 8,789
Steps Monday: 9,652
Steps Tuesday: 7,979
Comment: half a mile of jogging yesterday; steps below average but well above my minimum goal. The average of the three days is above my baseline average.

Tablets taken: 12 (total 36 over three days)

Notes: again, minimal hunger, good energy level and alertness, no negative effects except the weight loss noted above. No odd dreams. I'll post a follow-up tomorrow about how going back onto normal food goes.

Summary: assuming no ill effects today, I'm calling this experiment a minimal success. The tablets seem to have the ability to keep energy up for a day or so without ill effects, which would be useful for 'patrol' situations or perhaps as an ultralight emergency food ration (for an EDC, perhaps). Having a bottle on hand as part of a comprehensive emergency preparedness package is probably worth it, more than one bottle per family or other small group is probably overkill. For my part, I'm going to keep a bottle on-hand.

Thanks to everyone who made suggestions or comments. I hope I've provided some useful data.

December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part XX

The Last Command

Some 400 USN aircraft, a quarter of them damaged to some degree, now attempted to locate their fleet and land in the dark. Halsey had authorized all carriers to turn on their deck lights when the strike returned, but gave no explicit authorization of any other breaches of normal light discipline. Admiral Mitscher, commanding TG 51.3, ordered his carriers to turn on not only their deck lights and running lights but also searchlights to provide a visual beacon for the returning planes. This was so successful that many aircraft from TG 51.1 and TG 51.2 wound up landing on Mitscher’s carriers. Even so, a hundred and fifty American planes were lost at sea or crash-landed. Almost all of the pilots and crews were recovered over the next several days.

Once the strike was recovered, Halsey continued west. Members of his staff protested yet again, reminding him of the disastrous night action at Midway. Halsey set half his destroyers out as a long-range radar screen, but otherwise ignored these warnings. TF 55 followed slightly behind TF 51.

Yamamoto’s Battle Force, for its part, continued east towards the Americans. It is notable that this was due not to any order on Yamamoto’s part but simply a lack of orders to change course, even as the messages detailing the destruction of the Carrier Force came in. Yamamoto knew that only a miracle would bring him within gun range of the US fleet at dawn, and that no other outcome could bring any result except destruction for his force. Still, he also knew that with his fleet carriers and their irreplaceable trained cadres of pilots and crews gone no other fleet action could be expected to yield any better result.

Yamamoto very nearly got his miracle. Halsey’s aggressive course brought his picket destroyers within 100 miles of the IJN Battle Force at dawn. Both sides sighted each other almost immediately, and across three thousand square miles of ocean a hundred ships went to flank speed.

May 20th, 1944, would be the last large-scale naval action of the war.

The Japanese drew first blood as an F1M off CVS Nisshin shot down an OS2U from USS New Jersey in one of the few floatplane vs. floatplane duels of the war. It would not be the last oddity of the day’s action.

Halsey’s carriers raced east as they frantically spotted their strike aircraft, then turned west at 0900 and began to launch. Just spotting the strikes had been a challenge; the disruptions of the night landing piled on top of the previous day’s fighting had left no carrier with all its remaining planes on board, and most had aircraft from multiple ships. The USS Ticonderoga CV16 had aircraft from eight different ships including the lost Yorktown and two CVLs on board, from all three task groups.

Fighters from the dawn CAP were already engaging the Japanese as the strikes launched, and each task group was directed to attack on its own. With so little time for briefing and planning, and so little cohesiveness in the strike groups, a virtue was made of necessity and most carrier’s groups were directed to attack at will; a lamed Japanese ship at this point could easily be finished off later.

The result was a chaotic death dance played out around and above the Japanese Battle Force as it steered towards TF 51.

At dawn on the 20th the IJN Battle Force had three carriers, two seaplane carriers, seven battleships, one battlecruiser, eight heavy cruisers, one torpedo cruiser, nine light cruisers, and seventeen destroyers. Yamamoto had detached CL Kiso and three destroyers to screen his aviation ships. This group was attacked by most of the aircraft launched by TG51.3; well over half the US aircraft launched that morning. By noon six of the nine ships were sunk and the rest sinking.

Aircraft from TG51.2 spread their attacks across the rest of the IJN force. They sank cruisers Myoko, Furutaka, Naka, and Yubari along with five destroyers and damaged many other ships.

Admiral Sherman, commanding the battered TG51.1, kept the aircraft lifting from his remaining carriers under much tighter control. He wanted to kill a battleship, and Commander Dixon of the USS Lexington, his senior pilot, was determined to oblige him. Sixty-eight strike aircraft, just over half of them TBF Avengers, converged on Fuso and scored five bomb and an incredible eight torpedo hits. Fuso capsized half an hour later.

By noon the sky was empty of Japanese aircraft. The US fleet’s Hellcats began strafing the dwindling ranks of the Japanese fleet. Their Browning .50cal machineguns couldn’t sink ships, but they could rip up exposed equipment on deck and kill unprotected crewmen. A TBF from CVE Sangamon was the last aircraft to attack before the battle lines engaged, hitting Shinano with a bomb that jammed her “B” turret pointed forward.

TF55, meanwhile, had split in two, Spruance leading his six fast battleships, four light cruisers, and 27 destroyers forward. At 1130 they linked up with TG51.4 – the two Iowa-class battleships and their screen – along with half a dozen cruisers detached from the carrier groups, and steered towards the Japanese. In all Spruance had eight fast battleships, four brand-new heavy cruisers, eight light cruisers, and three dozen destroyers, none of them damaged.

Yamamoto still had six battleships, one battlecruiser, thirteen cruisers and nine destroyers, almost all of them damaged to some extent. His battle line actually had a greater displacement than the US battleships and he had more heavy cruisers, but Yamamoto must have been well aware he was heavily outmatched. His battle-line formed north-to-south, the three massive Yamato-class BBs in the lead and Kirishima in the rear with the old Nagato, Ise, and Hyuga in between, and sent his cruisers and destroyers forward in two groups north and south of his line to engage the enemy now visible on the horizon.

The USN battleships were in four columns of two sailing west; North Carolina leading Washington furthest to the south, then Alabama leading Massachusetts, South Dakota leading Indiana, and finally New Jersey leading Iowa at the northern end. The battlewagons were flanked by cruisers and destroyers to the north and south, just like the Japanese. Spruance sent his own screen forward to engage the Japanese while his battleships closed the distance, scouting planes already circling overhead to report.

OrBat, Final Phase:

Battle Force (Yamamoto)
BB Yamato, Musashi, Shinano, Nagato, Ise, Hyuga
BC Kirishima
CA Mogami, Kumano, Haguro, Aoba, Kinugasa, Kako
CLTT Oi
CL Agano, Jintsu, Yahagi, Oyodo, Yura, Noshiro
9 DD

TF55.1/TF51.4, Fast Battle Force (Spruance)
BB Iowa, New Jersey, South Dakota, Indiana, Massachusetts, Alabama, North Carolina, Washington
CA Baltimore, Boston, Houston CA70, Quincy
CL Columbia, Mobile, Wichita CL81, Miami, Philadelphia, Phoenix, St. Louis, Helena
36 DD

At 1241 Yamamoto, inspired by history on the eve of what he seems to have realized would be his last battle, ordered a message sent, explicitly via flag signal, to the rest of his force:

The Emperor expects that every man will do his duty.

Food Tablets, Day 2

Sunday morning weight: 188lbs
Monday morning weight: 186lbs
Tuesday morning weight: 183lbs
Comment: ok, that's not a good trend. I'm going to go for one more day to see if it levels out (note I was fairly dehydrated this morning, which might account for a pound or so). If it doesn't, I'm going to abort.

Steps Sunday: 8,789
Steps Monday: 9,652
Comment: quite a bit above average, and includes one mile of jogging.

Tablets taken: 12

Notes: as with Sunday, only minor hunger now and again. I actually felt a little more awake and alert than normal, possibly unrelated. I went to bed much later than normal for me, though I'm pretty sure that there wasn't a causal link with the food tablets.

December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part XIX

The Marshals Campaign, Part II

Just before noon on the 19th, Admiral Ozawa’s carriers, still undetected, launched a maximum effort strike at extreme range towards the US carriers. Two hundred assorted dive and torpedo bombers escorted by one hundred and forty fighters were spotted by an SBD returning from patrol, which radioed off a frantic contact report before being picked off by a pair of Zeros. Ensign George Bush was the only survivor of his crew, but his contact report gained the fleet twenty vital minutes warning before the Japanese first appeared on radar. Hanger crews actually managed to get Hellcats fueled, armed, and launched in time to intercept the Japanese directly over the fleet – an effort that would save many lives.

The USS Enterprise had her Hellcats aloft as the CAP, and they were thus the first to make contact. Poor coordination by the Japanese allowed the twenty-two F6Fs to blow though the fighter screen and get in among the bombers. The Zeros became disorganized, some turning to pursue the Enterprise’s group while others continued on to meet the hastily launched reserve from the USS Hancock and USS Adams. By the time the Japanese bombers began their attack runs Hellcats from almost every carrier in TF51 had joined the defense, along with six from the escort carrier USS Santee in TF55. Roughly thirty Zeros and fifty bombers were gone.

TF 51 was operating in four slightly separated task groups; TG51.1 took the brunt of the attack while roughly twenty IJN bombers attacked TG51.4 (USS Iowa, New Jersey, and their screen).

TG51.1 had fleet carriers Lexington, Yorktown, and Saratoga (II), light carriers Wasp, Ranger, and Intrepid, heavy cruisers Salt Lake City, Pensacola, Baltimore, and Boston, light cruisers Atlanta, Denver, and Mobile, and nine destroyers. One hundred and thirty aircraft attacked 22 ships, concentrating on the carriers. Scores were downed by AA fire, and others to Hellcats that followed them down, but over half of the attackers were able to release their bombs and torpedoes, scoring fourteen hits.

USS Yorktown was hit by six bombs, two torpedoes, and one Val that crashed into her flight deck. There was probably no better trained and certainly no more experienced crew in the world at managing battle damage than hers, but the explosions and fires simply overwhelmed them. Yorktown, ablaze from stem to stern and beam to beam, was ordered abandoned at 1645 and sank twenty minutes later, taking over 1,200 of her crew with her.

Two bombs hit the Saratoga, wrecking her forward flight deck and elevator. Wasp was hit by a single bomb amidships that holed her flight deck and burst in her hanger, starting a fire that took over an hour to bring under control. Intrepid was hit by a torpedo aft that destroyed one engine room. Pensacola was hit by two bombs, which smashed her “B” turret and started a serious fire aft. Ranger took a near miss that opened a seam and killed one crewman. Lexington was soaked by a pair of near-misses but took no damage and reported no casualties – the only one of the six carriers in the group to emerge unscathed.

One hundred and ninety-three IJN aircraft failed to return to their carriers. Twenty-one Hellcats were shot down, mostly from among those hastily launched individually or in pairs as the Japanese approached.

Even before USS Yorktown sank, SBDs from TG51.2 were aloft, searching for the Japanese. TF 51 had detached its damaged ships along with a destroyer squadron for protection and was charging west. Halsey had blood in his eye, and was determined to hit back.

The position of the Japanese fleet, when finally located, posed a problem. By the time the US strike could finish being prepared, launch, fly to the target, attack, and fly back it would be dark. Night landings by massed, and in many cases damaged, aircraft would be sure to result in additional casualties. Further, most of the USN pilots had already flown one mission earlier in the day against Kwajalein. Pilot fatigue would be a danger on top of the hazards of combat and flying at night.

Halsey, however, overruled his staff’s concerns. 183 dive bombers, 97 TBFs, and 204 Hellcats reached the Japanese Carrier Force an hour and a half before dusk. Sixty Zeroes were aloft, and despite being outnumbered over 3:1 by the US fighters managed to shoot down eleven bombers. Japanese AA fire, nowhere near as heavy or capable as its US equivalent, downed some thirty more aircraft before they could release their ordnance. The Americans ignored the IJN light cruisers and destroyers, scoring 49 bomb and torpedo hits on the nine carriers (including the two seaplane carriers) and two heavy cruisers.

Half the hits were scored on the five IJN fleet carriers, causing severe fires and flooding that would sink or destroy all of them. CV Shokaku was the last to go, her flight deck beginning to dip under water just as the sun set on the Japanese fleet. Light carriers Zuiho and Shoho along with seaplane carrier Chitose joined them, Shoho being totally destroyed in a massive explosion just seconds after being hit by a pair of 1,000lb bombs amidships. Heavy cruiser Tone was wrecked and set afire by bomb strikes, although she would survive the night and be scuttled shortly after dawn. CVS Chiyoda was hit by a pair of torpedoes that ruined her main power plant, however the ship’s odd design allowed her to limp away on her secondary diesel plant. She was joined by CA Chikuma, three of her main battery turrets out of action and her seaplane handling facilities wrecked but her propulsion system almost miraculously intact. Admiral Ozawa, barely able to stand unsupported due to his wounds but still erect on Sendai’s bridge, ordered the two cripples, his new flag ship, and two destroyers to turn back for Truk. The other three light cruisers and seven destroyers were ordered to join the Battle Force.

Kido Butai was dead, but Combined Fleet yet lived.

Food Tablets, Day 1

Sunday morning weight: 188lbs
Monday morning weight: 186lbs
Comment: within normal variation so far.

Steps Sunday: 8,789
Comment: actually a little above my average, though pretty much all walking or mowing the lawn.

Tablets taken: 12

Notes: I felt a little hungry now and then, but it never exceeded the normal "hmm, I should think about eating soon" level.

December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part XVIII

The Marshalls Campaign, Part I

Nimitz had long and carefully planned for the US offensive launched towards Kwajalein in May of 1944. Most of his staff had suggested a more cautious approach, hitting several of the outer islands first. Nimitz overruled them, sure that was what the Japanese would expect and determined to “hit ‘em where they ain’t.”

The Japanese fleet was divided. Yamamoto was at Truk with the battle line, but Ozawa and Kido Butai were enroute from Japan with their newly worked-up air groups and the newly commissioned fleet carrier Taiho, the latter still with workmen aboard fixing the minor problems of her hurried working-up cruise. The IJN had rushed almost every pilot in the training pipeline into service and scraped up a mix of old and new aircraft for them to fly, but Ozawa’s decks were nearly full. However, both Yamamoto and Ozawa were keenly aware that those pilots, planes, and carriers were all Japan would be able to field for a year or more. Between the two forces, Yamamoto had with him every carrier except a few escort carriers, every battleship and battlecruiser, every heavy cruiser, and most of the remaining light cruisers and modern destroyers left in the IJN. Yamamoto was fully aware of this, but far from confident, writing in a private letter: “I have every confidence that Combined Fleet will do all in its power to defeat the enemy, and every hope that I will do all in my power as their commander, but I fear that only Divine intervention can bring us victory.”

Yamamoto sortied from Truk even as the USN launched its first air strikes against Kwajalein. His plan was to draw the US attention with his force, then have Ozawa surprise them from the northwest.

OrBat

IJN
Battle Force (Yamamoto)
CV Ryujo, Ryuho, Hiyo (80 A6M, 30 D3A, 20 B5N)
CVS Mizhuo, Nisshin (32 F1M, 8 E13A)
BB Yamato, Musashi, Shinano, Nagato, Ise, Hyuga, Fuso
BC Kirishima
CA Mogami, Kumano, Myoko, Haguro, Aoba, Kinugasa, Furutaka, Kako
CLTT Oi
CL Agano, Naka, Kiso, Jintsu, Yahagi, Oyodo
11 DD

Carrier Force (Ozawa)
CV Akagi, Kaga, Shokaku, Zuikaku, Taiho (150 A6M, 60 D4Y, 40 D3A, 50 B6N, 50 B5N)
CVL Zuiho, Shoho (30 A6M, 20 B5N)
CVS Chitose, Chiyoda (32 F1M, 8 E13A)
CA Tone, Chikuma
CL Sendai, Yubari, Yura, Noshiro
9 DD

USN

TF 51, Carrier Force (Halsey)
CV Lexington, Yorktown, Saratoga CV9, Ticonderoga CV16, Bataan CV10, Bunker Hill, Concord CV11, Princeton CV18, Belleau Wood CV12 (324 F6F, 216 SBD, 108 SB2C 162 TBF)
CVL Independence, Enterprise CVL23, Hornet CVL24, Wasp CVL25, Ranger CVL26, Intrepid CVL28, Franklin CVL27, Hancock CVL29, Adams CVL30 (216 F6F, 81 TBF)
BB Iowa, New Jersey
CA Salt Lake City, Pensacola, Louisville, Chicago, Indianapolis, New Orleans, Minneapolis, San Francisco, Baltimore, Boston, Houston CA70, Quincy
CLAA Atlanta, San Diego, Oakland, Reno
CL Cleveland, Columbia, Denver, Santa Fe, Birmingham, Mobile, Wichita CL81, Miami
63 DD

TF 55, Battle Force (Spruance)
CVE Sangamon, Suwanee, Chenango, Santee (72 F6F, 48 TBF)
BB South Dakota, Indiana, Massachusetts, Alabama, North Carolina, Washington, New Mexico, Idaho, Colorado, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Arizona
CL Philadelphia, Nashville, Phoenix, Honolulu, St. Louis, Helena
45 DD

TF 53, Amphibious Force (Turner)
Did not participate in the naval battle

IJN USN
8 CV* 9 CV
2 CVL 9 CVL
4 CVS 4 CVE**
7 BB 14 BB
1 BC
10 CA 12 CA
1 CLTT 4 CLAA
10 CL 14 CL**
20 DD 108 DD**
610 A/C*** 1,227 A/C***

*Using the term somewhat loosely; for example Ryuho could carry a group a third the size of a US fleet carrier, and Hiyo could only make 25kts.
**Not counting units in the Amphibious Force, which did not participate in the naval battle.
***Not counting floatplanes on surface combatants.

Note: I’ve decided to apply author’s prerogative and make USN carrier naming conventions what they should have been in my sole opinion. Yes, I realize this isn’t all that likely, but all alternate-name ships will appear with hull numbers so you can mentally replace them with OTL’s names if you wish.

Yamamoto’s plan was based on hope, but Halsey’s was based on something much more dangerous: false confidence. US intelligence had carefully analyzed Japanese carrier flight operations and losses to date and was highly confident that the Japanese would be unable to supply their seven known carriers with full air groups until at least July. The Japanese were assumed to know the strength of the US carrier force in at least rough terms. Putting these two pieces of information together, the Japanese were expected to hold their remaining fleet in reserve until they could fight under heavy air cover.

Halsey, accordingly, held much of his air strength in reserve and launched extensive searches until his initial attacks revealed only minimal Japanese air power was deployed in the Marshals. Thereafter, he used his air power to pound every target in the chain, hoping to ensure that the Japanese would be unable to bring forces from other islands to contest Kwajalein.

The US force was also, for the first time in a major operation, unsupported by a submarine picket line. While these had varied in strength, at least a few boats had always been present and were expected to provide warning of any large fleet approach. While Halsey was aware the picket line did not exist (due to their value in commerce raiding), it is generally accepted that he was subconsciously expecting there was a backup to his limited air searches that did not in fact exist.

Halsey’s sole preparations for an enemy fleet presence thus consisted of operating his carriers west of Kwajalein and ordering his battle line to keep armor-piercing shells aboard and be ready to move at high speed on an hour’s notice.

On May 19th, an E13A from Chitose located the US fleet and radioed a contact report. It was shot down, but mis-identified as a flying boat by the fighter that made the kill. Such a contact did not imply the presence of enemy ships, and Halsey was not even informed.

Experiment, D-4

I am going to conduct an experiment. I am going to try to eat nothing except food tablets ( http://www.survivaltabs.com/ ) for a week, starting July 10th. If you have suggestions on how to conduct this experiment better, please comment here before the 10th.

Why? I’m trying to determine if these things actually work, and if so how well. If they do, they’re an ideal ‘patrol’, survival, or hiking ration (lightweight, long shelf life, no preparation, cheap). However, their claims make me skeptical that they will, in fact, work. Hence, the experiment. :-)

Process:
I will take by mouth each day only water, prescription medication, and the tablets. No juice, alcohol, or anything else that has calories.
I will put one tablet in my mouth each hour and let it dissolve (manufacturer directed method). I will drink water as I routinely do (several quarts per day).
Each morning I will record my weight.
I will wear a pedometer, and record my total steps each day. This is intended to be a rough measure of my activity level. I’ve been wearing the pedometer for three weeks to give me a baseline to work from. My minimum level is 7,500 steps per day (yes, I work a desk job).

Variations and limitations:
I will start by taking the recommended 12 tablets per day. Should this seem to be insufficient, I will increase this up to 24 tablets per day. I will record how many tablets I actually consume each day.
If I experience a rapid weight loss or any adverse medical condition (dizziness, nausea, etc.) I will abort the experiment.

Results:
This experiment will be considered a partial success if I can go for at least three days on not more than 24 tablets per day with no ill effects and no real reduction in my activity level. The food tablets would still work as a patrol or hiking ration, or a supplemental survival ration. I would keep a few bottles in stock for these purposes.
This experiment will be considered a complete success if I can go for the full week on not more than 12 tablets per day with no ill effects and no real reduction in my activity level. The food tablets would be exactly what they’re advertized as: a survival ration, and a good one. I’d keep a reasonable number of bottles in stock along with my other emergency food stocks. At ~$30 for a 15 day supply with a ten-year shelf life they’re much cheaper to stock than most foods.

Reporting:
I’ll do my best to post status updates here daily (tablets eaten, steps taken, weight, and any comments).

December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part XVII

The Silent Service

While Japanese forces fought in the Solomon Islands, others were fighting an increasingly desperate battle to keep them supplied. The improved performance of US torpedoes, coupled with slowly improving tactics and assignment of operational zones – hunting grounds, as the sub skippers called them – were making the US submarine force one of the most deadly weapons being wielded against Japan.

By the end of 1943 over a third of the Japanese pre-war merchant fleet had been sunk, the vast majority of the losses being inflicted by submarines. During 1943 Japanese merchant ships were being sunk ten times faster than they could be built. Dozens of destroyers, numerous lighter combatants, and several major combatants had been lost as well.

In November of 1943 Yamamoto recommended that construction on all ships larger than destroyers not at least 50% complete be suspended, work being shifted to escorts and merchant ships. Condemned by some as defeatist, this recommendation was supported at least in part by others, who noted that at the present rate the Japanese destroyer force would cease to exist by the end of 1945, despite new construction.

The reasons for Japan’s plight were many. Convoys had been slow to form and even at the end of 1943 many ships sailed alone. Escorts were scarce due to low pre-war priorities, and only so many destroyers could be withdrawn from Combined Fleet for escort work. The need for light forces to fight in the Solomons had further drained the escort pool. What escorts were available were poorly trained for ASW and equipment varied dramatically. In particular depth-charge patterns were usually set fairly shallow, meaning that a US submarine that managed to evade the initial attack was typically able to break contact without damage. This stood in sharp contrast to Allied ASW, who were able to prosecute-to-kill on a regular basis.

The US ability to mass-produce good fleet boats also played a key part. While Japan seldom built more than half a dozen boats to a single design, the US built over 30 Gato-class boats in 1942 and again in 1943, along with two dozen Balao-class boats that had only slight modification from the Gato-class. This standardization was a tremendous benefit in training crews and applying tactical lessons.

The vaunted U-boats loudly threatened Britain. The Gatos silently strangled Japan.

December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part XVI

Bougainville

On December 16th the US decoded Japanese signals that indicated a major convoy would be running from Rabaul to Bougainville. The troops and supplies would then be ferried to New Georgia by barges. The Navy decided to intercept the convoy just short of Bougainville with MTBRons 1, 9, and 11, with 29 PT boats between them. The PTs would attack during the night of the 17th/18th, delaying the convoy so that aircraft from New Georgia could destroy them before they could unload at Bougainville.

The US plan fell apart almost from the beginning. The senior officer of the three squadrons, newly promoted CDR Taylor, had to return to base due to an engine failure on his boat. Taylor ordered a message to be relayed via blinker light to LtCDR Kelly of MTBRon 9, informing him that he was in command, but the message never reached him. Most of MTBRon 11 had been informed, however, and waited for orders from Kelly which never came. The two squadrons missed a planned course change, and it was an hour before Kelly discovered he was in command and attempted to rectify the situation.

MTBRon 1 had taken a different course from the other two squadrons, intending to catch the Japanese in a crossfire. Its 12 boats were under the command of LT John F. Kennedy and had only arrived a few weeks earlier. Taking advantage of lessons learned by the earlier PT actions the boats had been heavily refitted. The heavy torpedo tubes with the mediocre MkVIII torpedoes had been landed and replaced with MkXIII aircraft torpedoes in roll-off mounts. The weight savings had been used to heavily upgrade the gun armament – each boat carried a 37mm M4 cannon forward, single 20mm Oerlikon cannons forward and aft, and the usual pair of twin 0.50cal machineguns.

The Japanese convoy consisted of three old Minekaze class DDs, two small Wakatake class DDs, five Type A patrol boats, four Momi class fast tranports, three minesweepers, and 19 cargo ships of one to six thousand tons displacement. Kennedy’s squadron was outnumber three to one in hulls, and heavily outgunned.

MTBRon 1 made contact just after midnight. The twelve boats, unaware that they were unsupported, accelerated to flank speed and charged the Japanese force. Gunfire shattered the night, and 48 torpedoes rolled into the sea. The PTs briefly turned away, then turned back in to follow their torpedoes. The plan had been to actually pass through the Japanese formation, relying on the superior maneuverability of the PTs to avoid collision, while hopefully creating additional chaos in the Japanese formation and causing them to fire on their own ships.

Eleven torpedoes found targets, one of them hitting a 1C type freighter loaded with ammunition. The explosion lit up the entire battle, and rained burning debris onto several nearby ships. MTBRon 1 raced through the Japanese formation, already beginning to unravel, at over 40 knots. Two boats were lost, one to gunfire and one to ramming. The ten survivors realized at this point that they were alone. Kennedy quickly ordered his boats to penetrate the formation once again, and this time to fire flares while in the enemy’s midst. Kennedy hoped to provide a visual signal for the other two squadrons to home in on, and perhaps make the Japanese think that heavier forces were nearby waiting for a signal.

The second attack threw the Japanese into chaos. At least two collisions occurred, and several PTs reported Japanese ships firing on each other. Kennedy’s PT314 scored a direct hit with 37mm fire on Sawakaze’s bridge, and the destroyer veered off course and rammed a 1TS type tanker.

Three more PTs were lost, and two more suffered casualties. Kennedy himself was lightly wounded by shrapnel but remained at his post and led his seven remaining boats home.

The Japanese convoy scattered, and many were sunk during the day by aircraft from New Georgia. Only a tenth of the convoy’s supplies reached Bougainville.

For successfully disrupting the convoy and for “exceptional bravery and decisive action under fire” Lt Kennedy was awarded the Navy Cross.

December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part XV

The Solomons Campaign, Part IV

At dawn, as the Japanese turned to depart, they were surprised by nine PT’s of MTB Squadron 11 and five from MTBRon 9. Under the Squadron 11 CO LtCDR Taylor, who had gathered the various anti-barge patrols during the night, the 14 wooden boats came charging out of the rising sun at over 40 knots. The Japanese, tired from the high speed run, earlier engagement, and hours of sustained gunnery, were slow to notice the attack. Only two destroyers and one cruiser managed to open fire before the PT’s salvoed their deadly fish at close range. Fifty-three torpedoes raced through the water. Thanks to tender modifications to their firing pins and an almost unhindered firing run, the torpedoes achieved excellent results: twelve hits on eight targets, with every hit detonating. Kongo had been hit twice more, Haruna three times, Takao twice, Chokai once, and four destroyers had been hit once each. Only one destroyer sank as a direct result of the torpedo attack, but the Japanese had been hamstrung; most of their heavy ships were damaged - Haruna and Takao could barely make 10 knots and still keep ahead of the flooding. PT160 from MTBRon 9 was the only loss to the US, though two other boat’s, including Taylor’s, were damaged by near-misses. Taylor had deliberately spread his attacks in hopes of achieving this exact result: Halsey’s force was moving to cut off their escape at flank speed, and no damaged Japanese ship could hope to avoid them. LtCDR Taylor would be awarded the Navy Cross for this action.

From dawn to dusk a furious running air battle shifted and eddied around New Georgia and the waters nearby as the Japanese threw every plane available into action in a desperate effort to save their exposed capital ships. Suicidal attacks were made on the US carrier force and only slightly better odds were faced by fighters trying to break through escorting Hellcats to engage Dauntless and Avenger bombers as they methodically crushed the Bombardment Force. Almost 100 Japanese aircraft were lost in the effort in trade for a dozen US aircraft and a pair of hits on US ships; one bomb that exploded on the edge of USS Yorktown’s flight deck, smashing one of her anti-aircraft galleries but leaving her able to operate aircraft and a torpedo that struck USS San Francisco midships, causing major flooding and forcing the ship to turn for home. The losses to the Japanese were far worse. Air attacks sank Kongo, Haruna, Takao, and Maya along with three of the six remaining destroyers. Chokai, badly damaged, was finished off by gunfire from USS Iowa and USS Massachusetts the next day.

Only Kirishima, Agano, and three destroyers managed to reach Rabaul, all but Agano damaged to some extent.

Two IJN submarines were swept aside by the US fleet’s screen without loss.

Halsey was eager to capitalize on this victory, and proposed to his staff a strike on Rabaul, which he noted must have been emptied of aircraft in the day’s fighting. His staff, while agreeing with his analysis of the situation, to a man counseled caution. Follow up on the victory with the planned bombardment of New Georgia and sail for home with a solid victory. Halsey, reluctantly, ordered this course of action.

With Japanese air power in the area devastated and rotating cover from US carriers, the Marines were able to resume their advance in New Georgia. In early November reinforcements and supplies began to arrive in large numbers, while air and sea patrols increasingly isolated the Japanese. Smith was promoted to Lt. General and placed in command of the newly formed I Amphibious Corps, consisting initially of the 2nd and 3rd Marine Divisions, 1st Marine Air Wing, and various support and combat support units. By the end of November organized resistance on New Georgia had ended. The island began fulfilling its intended function, though well behind schedule: serving as a base to attack Japanese forces in the area and prevent them from conducting additional operations.

On December 3rd the first squadron of B-24 Liberators landed on New Georgia, followed over the next week by the rest of the 25th Bombardment Group (Heavy). Liberators raided Rabaul for the first time on the 10th, beginning a series of regular attacks on Japanese bases. The 17th Bombardment Group (Medium) followed with B-25 Mitchells. The 95th Bomb Squadron from this group was the first to use skip-bombing in combat on the 18th, sinking an IJN destroyer transport near Bougainville.

With operations in the Solomon Islands now running smoothly and in US favor, Nimitz turned his attention to the next major target.

Yamamoto was forced to accept the neutralizing of the Solomons, but his carrier and battleship forces were once again ready for action. The next major move by the USN would be countered in force.

December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part XIV

The Solomons Campaign, Part III

While light forces and aircraft fought a series of duels around the clock in the shallow waters of the Solomons, the US carrier, battleship, and amphibious forces were re-fitting at Pearl Harbor. Halsey believed that Rabaul could be crushed by the fleet and advocated dispatching the fleet to conduct air strikes and shore bombardment to smash it. Turner proposed loading those units of the 3rd Marine Division that had already arrived in Hawaii and using them to reinforce New Georgia, with the carriers providing cover against the possible emergence of the Japanese fleet. Spruance proposed bringing the 1st Marine Division forward from Tarawa, either to reinforce New Georgia or to take Guadalcanal, the largest Japanese base in the SE Solomon Islands.

In addition to all these plans, King was insistent that the schedule for the planned 1944 campaigns not be jeopardized. The New Georgia campaign had been intended to provide a base for operations to counter Japanese activities in the Coral Sea and the nearby islands. If it instead tied down US forces it would be a strategic failure no matter the attrition ratio achieved.

Meanwhile, Yamamoto was modifying his own plans. The fragile hold the US had on New Georgia might be broken if the main US airfield and the limited port facilities could be destroyed. On October 21st, the three remaining Kongo-class battlecruisers accompanied by three Takao-class heavy cruisers, light cruiser Agano, and seven destroyers left Truk for Rabaul. There they would refuel, then make a high-speed dash to New Georgia.

Nimitz worked out a compromise. The USN would conduct limited operations and raids with a third of the fast carrier force at a time, rotating forces to provide continuous coverage. Rabaul and Truk were judged too heavily defended (post-war analysis would reveal that this was not the case, but Intelligence opinions at the time were nearly unanimous) for what was in essence a strongly reinforced carrier division, but bases in the Solomons would be attacked in hopes of relieving the pressure on New Georgia. Just hours before the Japanese Bombardment Force sailed from Truk, TF 51 sailed from Pearl Harbor with USS Lexington, USS Yorktown, USS Enterprise CVL23, USS Iowa, USS Indiana, USS Massachusetts, USS New Orleans, USS San Francisco, USS San Diego, USS Phoenix, USS Helena, USS Cleveland, USS Santa Fe, and 24 destroyers under Admiral Halsey.

On October 27th, the US task force launched a pair of carrier strikes at Bougainville, destroying a number of Japanese aircraft for little loss to themselves. The Japanese correctly guessed that the strike represented only a part of the US fleet, and ordered the Bombardment Force to leave Rabaul on schedule that afternoon.

Halsey, however, was not content with a single carrier strike. The Hellcat and the strength of US AA fire between them seemed fully capable of handling the limited land-based air threats to the task force. Halsey had been provided with solid intelligence that the IJN fleet carriers were in home waters, an edge the Japanese were completely unaware of. Secure in his local superiority, Halsey closed with New Georgia, intending to use his battleships to pound known Japanese positions the next afternoon day. This would boost the Marine’s morale and hopefully have a material benefit as well.

A patrol of three PT boats from MTB Squadron 9 keeping watch for Japanese barge traffic spotted the IJN Bombardment Force shortly before midnight on the 27th. They attacked, inflicting only a single torpedo hit on Kongo for the loss of two boats, but were able to make a surprisingly accurate assessment of the Japanese force and warn New Georgia.

Well before dawn on the 28th the Japanese Bombardment force began hurling shells into the Marine positions on New Georgia. To the 2nd Marine Division it would simply be called The Night thereafter, and for those who survived it little more needed to be said. For two hours three battlecruisers, three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and eight destroyers pounded the US positions, shooting from the map but well aware of US concentrations from observations by land units during the previous weeks. Losses were heavily, especially among the 105mm howitzer batteries and what remained of the air base. General Smith’s headquarters were hit by an 8” shell, wounding the general and killing a number of his staff. Smith, however, had already broadcast the MTB report, which Halsey’s force had picked up.

Outrageous!

This is just sick:

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=137198108

http://www.npr.org/2011/06/15/137205543/atf-scandal-heats-up-in-congressional-hearing

The BATF sold over 1,800 weapons to illegal buyers, knowing many of them were headed for Mexican drug cartels, and DIDN'T ARREST THE BUYERS. To put icing on the cake, they stopped tracking the weapons well before they reached the Mexican border.

This past weekend, I had to fill out three forms, present two forms of government-issued ID, and wait while my SSI was run through a government database in order to buy two firearms. I should have bought from an undercover ATF agent and saved myself a lot of paperwork! Its not like there would have been a downside - they wouldn't arrest me or track me or anything like that.

Seriously, even a semi-auto rifle goes for over $1,000, easy. That means the BATF sold over TWO MILLION DOLLARS worth of weapons ILLEGALLY. For NOTHING. Wait, that's not fair. They did it to put weapons in the hands of PROBABLE CRIMINALS.

Support Gun Control! So the Government can sell weapons to criminals while denying them to law-abiding citizens.

December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part XIII

The Solomons Campaign, Part II

On the 10th the Japanese tried another series of air strikes, this time approaching in small groups at low altitude to minimize radar warning. While warning was indeed minimal, the low altitude made the strikes very vulnerable once they were spotted. Losses to Hellcats and flak were near total, and the only damage was done by a Ki-51 which crashed into the USS Idaho, putting her aft main battery turret out of action.

The invasion itself had its own problems. The preliminary bombardment was even heavier than at Tarawa, but after a brief attempt to contest the landing the majority of the Japanese troops faded back into the jungle on the 12th. New Georgia was much larger and much more difficult terrain than Tarawa, and the 2nd Marine Division had a difficult time advancing.

On the night of the 12th, Japanese forces approached the US anchorage. A dozen Otori and Tomozuru torpedo boats had slipped from island to island. At 0400 on the 13th they raced into the US anchorage. They fired 32 torpedoes; not the deadly Type 93s, but dangerous enough, and engaged anything they saw with gunfire. US escorts sank five of the raiders with gunfire, and as the Japanese had hoped fired off numerous star shells to illuminate the area. One transport and two destroyers were hit, but the Japanese raid had accomplished its real mission.

Miles away, a strike force consisting of the cruisers Oi and Kitakami along with six destroyers had just finished a high-speed run from Rabaul. The task force’s best lookouts were watching the horizon in the direction of the US fleet. Star shells from the US escorts soon provided an aiming point, and the fleet salvoed 134 torpedoes at near-maximum range then turned back for Rabaul. Just as the Americans were settling down from the torpedo boat raid, the Type 93s arrived. Some 80 transports, landing ships, and auxiliaries along with 30 escorts were in the target area. Fifteen torpedoes hit five transports, an LST, a tanker, two cargo ships, a seaplane tender, two destroyers and a destroyer escort. Two of the transports and one cargo ship were saved, all the rest were sunk or destroyed.

The Japanese strike force had counted on land-based air cover to protect them when daylight came, but US carrier planes found them first. Kitakami and four destroyers were sunk by scores of SBDs and TBFs, and Oi and the other two destroyers were damaged.

Halsey was unwilling to risk his carriers close to New Georgia after the night of the 12th/13th. With only distant cover from the carriers, the battle-line pulled back to Tarawa to replenish ammunition, and the airbase on New Georgia itself incomplete, the Japanese were able to maintain parity in the air and near parity on the ground. The Marine advance slowed to a crawl. Japanese troops were brought in from other islands in the chain, escorted by light combatants. The US countered with its own light forces, including two squadrons of Motor Torpedo Boats, but they could not stop the reinforcements. On October 15th Halsey pulled the carrier force back to Pearl to replenish munitions, spares, and replace lost aircraft. The last surviving transports had been unloaded and withdrew with them.

General Julian Smith, commanding the 2nd Marine Division, found his forces under strength, with only minimal Navy support, and with only a single muddy field and two depleted Marine fighter squadrons for air support. It was not an enviable position. The Japanese ground forces seemed to grow stronger by the day, while his own forces could expect no major reinforcement for weeks at the least.

Smith, however, did not give in to despair. While his troops had difficulty advancing through the jungle, the Japanese had demonstrated a tendency to assault strong points without regard for losses. Smith setup a series of feint attacks, staged retreats, and deceptively quiet sectors of the front to trick the Japanese into attacking well-prepared and heavily equipped forces. The Japanese frequently believed they had encountered only a hasty defense, and accepted high losses to continue doomed attacks. Smith particularly encouraged the heavy use of all available automatic weapons; a gamble with his fragile logistic tail, but one that paid off. Cautious Japanese commanders advanced only slowly after encountering a few ambushes. The bold commanders often died leading their men. Japanese infiltration tactics proved far less successful then they had even in the Philippines: Smith seldom missed a chance to remind his rear-echelon units that every Marine was a rifleman first. Well-drilled volunteers with M1 Garand semi-automatic rifles proved a far greater challenge to the Japanese infiltrators than conscripts armed with bolt-action weapons at best.

It was in the jungles of New Georgia that the Marines “wrote the book” on jungle warfare.

It was in the jungles of New Georgia that the Japanese Army learned to fear the US Marines.

December 28th - the Day of Infamy, Part XII

The Solomons Campaign, Part I

After Tarawa, there were some officers and many civilians who wanted to charge ahead. Admirals King and Nimitz, however, realized that the US would do better to proceed cautiously until they had built up an overwhelmingly superior force of ships and aircraft. Accordingly, only one more major offensive was planned for 1943. It would occur in October, and the target would be to seize a base in the Solomon Islands: New Georgia.

The US was not idle in the meantime. US Navy Construction Battalions and US Army Engineers built airfields on Tarawa, and by June heavy bombers began using them to attack targets in the Marshall Islands. US submarines continued to bleed the Japanese merchant marine, and in July USS Darter sank the escort carrier Unyo while she was ferrying aircraft to Truk.

In August the Japanese seized Attu and Kiska in the Aleutians and attempted to land a battalion of SNLF troops on New Caledonia in support of a pro-Axis coup. While the landing on New Caledonia was successful, the island quickly declared for the Free French. By the time a mixed force of US and Australian troops arrived a week later the Japanese had withdrawn with heavy casualties.

With New Caledonia now firmly in friendly hands Nimitz proposed calling off the Solomons offensive, but King directed that the attack should proceed.

The one benefit for the Japanese from the New Caledonia attack was that Yamamoto was convinced the US would follow up their success there with an offensive in the Solomons, and accordingly concentrated all available land-based aircraft, submarines, and some light surface units in the area. Once again, the goal was attrition.

The US invasion force was spotted on October 8th as it approached the Solomon Islands. Hours later, it was visited by 94 G4M “Betty” medium bombers from Rabaul. An escort of 30 Ki-43 “Oscar” fighters was sent from Guadalcanal, which arrived ten minutes before the bombers. The US fleet, however, had a surprise waiting: the fleet and light carriers were now carrying the F6F “Hellcat”. 56 of the new fighters were airborne by the time the Oscars met the CAP, with more launching. Despite the odds against them the Oscars refused to break off until the Bettys had dropped their loads. The fighters paid a heavy price: only four survived, and only seven Hellcats were lost.

The Japanese bombers were carrying a mix of torpedoes and bombs. It would be the last time the Japanese attempted to employ two-engine bombers as torpedo planes against a major US formation. US flak, by now well-supplied with proximity fuses, downed every single torpedo bomber – all but six of them before they released their torpedoes. Not one hit. The conventional bombers did little better; US fighters and flak broke up their formation, and there were too few bombs to saturate the target area. Still, they achieved three bomb hits, one each on USS Bataan CV10, USS Indianapolis CA35, and USS Montpelier CL57. Only USS Montpelier’s damage was severe enough to warrant retiring from the action. The surviving Japanese bombers were pursued by Hellcats. Only 15 of them made it home, though three more Hellcats were lost.

On the 9th twelve IJN submarines engaged the US force. Radio messages allowed them to coordinate their attack, but also alerted the US to their presence. The purge of the IJN submarine force had achieved one desired result: aggression. It had achieved this, however, at the expense of a certain amount of prudence and skill. Ten of the twelve IJN subs were lost, and the other two damaged. They hit six ships. USS Ticonderoga CV16 was hit square on the bow as she combed a spread of six torpedoes. Although flooding was relatively minor, her ability to operate aircraft was nearly eliminated. USS Indiana took two hits, which slowed her enough that she was transferred from the Carrier Force to the Bombardment Force for the rest of the action. The escort carrier USS Copahee was surprised at close range and hit by four torpedoes. Fires reached her bomb magazine thirteen minutes later and she exploded and sank with a loss of all but 102 of her crew, also damaging destroyers USS Forest and USS Fitch which had closed to render assistance. Destroyers USS Laub and USS Ellyson were sunk, the latter after a six-hour struggle to keep her afloat. The worst loss however was the USS General John Pope, which was carrying some 5,000 troops. She took at least three hits shortly after 1800 and sank with the loss of over 2,000 men. The ship had been in commission only three months and six days, and had been carrying several engineering units as well as other support troops. The casualties were a major blow to plans to quickly set up airfields and harbor facilities on New Georgia.

December 28th - the Day of Infamy, Part XI

The Gilberts Campaign

The objective of the first US offensive of the Pacific Theater was Tarawa. The island was a logical stepping stone either towards the Marshall Islands or the Solomon Islands; allowing either a direct route to Japan or a base to relieve the pressure on Australia. Tarawa’s isolated location seemed to make it an ideal proving ground for the doctrine and equipment being developed for the offensive across the Pacific, while still being close enough to future targets to function as a forward base.

Yamamoto had expected a US offensive, and Tarawa was one of the three targets he had judged most likely. Each of these were picketed by submarines, with most of Japan’s long-range boats ready to sail as soon as the target was revealed. Yamamoto had been urged to keep his fleet at Truk, ready to sortie against the US offensive, but while his ships were all repaired from the damage at Midway, his air groups were still badly under strength. Yamamoto hoped to keep up the attrition of the US fleet with submarines and land-based aircraft until his own fleet was once again ready. His private conversations with his staff, and especially Admiral Ozawa, who had recently replaced Nagumo as the commander of Kido Butai, indicate that he believed success was highly improbable. However, no other course of action could be expected to yield better results.

Six IJN submarines were off Tarawa when the US invasion force arrived on May 24th, 1943, and 28 more were dispatched within hours of the first spotting of the US fleet by patrol aircraft. Almost as many more would follow over the next few days.

The campaign did not begin well for the Japanese. US signals intelligence had located one of the two IJN patrol lines, and as the main body approached it was attacked on the 23rd by a squadron of destroyers supported by aircraft. I-55 and I-56 were sunk and I-59 was damaged and driven off without loss to the US force.

On the 24th the IJN’s luck was much better. I-176, I-177, and I-178 approached the US fleet. I-178 was sunk by USS Gridley as she approached and I-177 driven off by USS Conway, but I-176 managed to put two torpedoes into USS Yorktown before being sunk by USS Knight and USS Butler. One torpedo detonated on the port inboard propeller, destroying it and damaging the rudder and port outboard prop. USS Yorktown’s crew had demonstrated great skill at damage control at the Coral Sea and did so again, but the speed and handling limits imposed by her underwater damage would prevent her from operating aircraft. USS Salt Lake City took her in tow towards Pearl Harbor, later being relieved by fleet tugs USS Navajo and USS Sioux. A crewman from USS Sioux is believed to have given the carrier her infamous nickname: the Yardtown.

Over the next five days, 48 IJN submarines closed on the US forces off Tarawa. The Japanese submarines knew the US fleet’s approximate location, and several carried their own float planes for aerial reconnaissance. Despite this, 17 boats completely failed to make contact. Of the rest, 20 were sunk and five damaged in trade for hits on four US ships.

The escort carrier USS Altamaha was hit by three torpedoes on the 27th and sunk with a loss of over 500 men. USS Brooklyn’s bow was blown off by one torpedo and was hit by another aft on the 26th, but she made it halfway back to Pearl Harbor under tow before sinking in rough weather. USS Mervine was hit by a single torpedo while depth-charging a probable submarine contact on the 28th. The hit broke her back and she sank half an hour later. Transport USS George F. Elliot took a single hit on the 27th but survived.

Yamamoto was furious. Despite inflated kill claims from the submarines that returned, it was clear that little damage had been done to the US fleet. “6th Fleet,” Yamamoto wrote in a message to the Navy General Staff, “has failed to do their duty to the Emperor.” Admiral Nagano quite evidently agreed. By the end of June every single submarine commander who had returned without making contact had been relieved, along with 6th Fleet’s commander and chief of staff, and the commanders of Submarine Squadrons 1, 3, 4, and 5. Several of those relieved later committed suicide.

Tarawa’s defenders fared little better. On the 25th the island was bombarded by twelve battleships, four heavy cruisers, seven light cruisers, and scores of destroyers and lighter ships. Air attacks from the four fleet carriers, two light carriers, and eight escort carriers of the force added to the pounding. Most of the naval officers believed that this bombardment would crush the defenses, leaving the Marines nothing to do but mop up a few shell-shocked survivors. The Marines commanders, remembering the massive bombardments of the First World War, felt that stiff resistance could still be expected and planned accordingly.

Two regiments were committed to the first wave on the 26th, roughly half of them in the new LVT “Amtracks”. Despite attempts to blow gaps in the reef, only the amtracks proved able to make it across and land their troops, the rest having to wade ashore under heavy fire. The Japanese were far from crushed, but their chain of command had been disrupted and their communications badly damaged by the bombardment. The 1st Marine Division advanced slowly but steadily, and the Japanese never managed to organize a counter-attack. On the 29th, the island was declared secured. The Japanese had lost almost 4,000 men killed, with less than a hundred taken prisoner (almost all wounded) along with roughly a hundred Korean forced laborers. Eight hundred Marines had been killed and thousands wounded.

The first major US offensive had been a success, and many valuable lessons had been learned.

December 28th - the Day of Infamy, Part X

Pacific: adj., peaceful, calm…

The lack of large operations did not mean the Pacific was living up to its name. The vital but often forgotten campaigns to protect and destroy commerce and supply lines continued. In November, RADM Lockwood issued a report concluding that there was not one, but at least three problems with the Mk 14 torpedo and its components. It ran too deep, the magnetic fuse did not function reliably, and the contact fuse was too fragile to function in a square impact – the ideal shot otherwise. As temporary workarounds, the magnetic fuse was disabled, torpedoes were to be set to run shallow, and depots and tenders throughout the Pacific fleet made field modifications to the contact fuses. By the end of December, US submarine kills began to increase rapidly, and BuOrd finally concluded that there might be problems. Even with strong backing from ADM Nimitz, it would be almost a year before the Pacific Fleet’s temporary fixes were given official approval by BuOrd and adopted by other commands.

The Japanese were also taking a toll on Allied shipping traffic. From bases in the Solomon Islands aircraft and surface raiders drove the convoys from the US to Australia and New Zealand ever further south and east. The French authorities on New Caledonia became less and less cooperative with the Allies, further complicating the problems in that area.

The China/Burma/India theater was becoming a stalemate. An attempted counter attack by the British towards Burma in October made little progress, and was finally thrown back with heavy losses in the spring of 1943. China had no land or sea connection to the Allies, and the air route over the Himalayas could only have supplied a fraction of its needs even if the Allies had been able to supply a large number of aircraft. The Chinese army was increasingly unable to meet the IJA in the field, but the IJA increasingly controlled only the territory they were standing on.

The USS Ranger arrived in the Pacific in late September, after a heated debate in Washington D.C. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral King had strongly advocated that she remain in the Atlantic for limited operations, while one or more Royal Navy carriers filled the gap in the Pacific. Anglo-American relations, however, were at a low point due to arguments about the coming campaign in the Atlantic theater.

The US favored invading France to establish a foothold for future operations, while the UK favored a peripheral campaign in the Mediterranean, optimally a landing in North Africa. The US finally conceded that the Allies were not yet strong enough to face Germany on the mainland, and accepted the invasion of Algeria. The Royal Navy insisted they would need every ship available for the invasion, slated for November, in case the Italian Navy sortied. The US countered by proposing that the invasion be delayed until early 1943, by which time USS Lexington and USS Yorktown would be repaired and able to cover the Pacific, or invade Morocco, which would reduce the threat from the Italians. Largely at the insistence of the Soviets for an earlier counterblow and General Montgomery for an offensive geographically closer to his own, these options too were rejected. The US tried to pry loose a Royal Navy carrier by highlighting the commitment of the three old battleships of BatDiv5 to the operation, but even this proved insufficient.

USS Ranger was made the centerpiece of a series of three raids in October, November, and December, each involving carrier strikes and shore bombardments; the first against the Solomons, the second against the Marshalls, and the third against New Britain.

USS Tuscaloosa and USS Concord were lost in a night action during the Solomons raid. USS Ranger herself was lost to a pair of torpedoes from I-21 as she was slowly steaming home from the New Britain raid in late December. Fortunately the USS Lexington and USS Yorktown had finished their repairs in early December and were already working up their new air groups. Nimitz, however, suspended the carrier raids; they had proven far too costly for too little result.

The major elements of the US Pacific Fleet spent the early months of 1943 training, conduction exercises between Hawaii and the West Coast, and waiting for either the next move by the IJN or the increasing number of new ships joining the fleet to permit their own major offensive to begin.

Shipping

OK, let me get this straight...

I ordered a safe. Being large and heavy as safes tend to be, it is coming by truck.

But not just one truck. In fact, not even just one trucking company.

Southwestern Motor Transport Lines picked up the safe. I was kindly provided with a tracking number. Cool! They don't really provide much information, but hey.

Until they transferred the safe to Daylight Transport. SMTL provided another tracking number to use with Daylight Transport. Hmmm. Well, OK, maybe they're the ones doing the actual delivery.

Nope.

Daylight Transport will be delivering the safe to Air Van. I fully expect a third tracking number.

How many trucking companies does it take to move a single object 2,100 miles?

December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part IX

Midway, Part III

Yamamoto had been more than satisfied with the night action. Leaving behind his carriers, the damaged Yamashiro and Yamato, and most of his screen he had shifted to his old flagship Nagato and led the rest of his battleships forward at flank speed. No attempt was made at a carrier strike. Yamamoto had less than 70 bombers left from eight different air groups, too many of his pilots were green, and he needed what he had for ASW patrols until his screen could rejoin.

Two hours after dawn the first USN strike arrived. The Lucky Lex’s pieced-together air group was not in much better shape than the IJN’s, but the American pilots were filled with rage and determination. Disregarding their losses the SBDs broke through the IJN CAP and focused their efforts on Mutsu and Hiei. Mutsu’s fore-most turret was smashed and her upper works set on fire but she continued to steam on. Hiei staggered out of formation, her thinner armor ripped open in multiple places by 1,000 pound bombs. Half an hour later a fire reached her forward magazine, and attempts to flood it failed. The forward half of the ship blew up, and the rest sank quickly.

The B-17s arrived next. They found Yamato and Yamashiro and unloaded their bombs from 10,000 feet, unhindered by Zeros as no one had thought to put a CAP over the pair of battleships. Yamato shrugged off her damage, but Yamashiro once again caught fire. Just before 1100 Yamamoto ordered her abandoned. She was finished off by torpedoes from DD Amagiri and sank at noon.

At 1000 Admiral Halsey, realizing that a surface battle could no longer be avoided, ordered Admiral Spruance to take command of the least-damaged battleships, cruisers, and destroyers and engage the pursuing Japanese. USS Lexington and the worst-damaged ships would continue to run east.

Spruance had the USS North Carolina, USS Washington, USS New Mexico, USS Colorado, USS West Virginia, USS Pennsylvania, USS Minneapolis, USS New Orleans, USS St. Louis, USS Helena, USS Phoenix, and 11 destroyers; 6 BB, 2 CA, 3 CL, and 11 DD, almost all damaged.

Yamamoto had the Nagato, Mutsu, Ise, Hyuga, Fuso, Kongo, Kirishima, Haruna, Mogami, Suzuya, Kumano, Maya, Chokai, Haguro, Kinu, Yura, and14 destroyers; 5 BB, 3 BC, 6 CA, 2 CL, and 14 DD, most of them intact or nearly so.

Spruance knew that the odds were against him in a traditional slugging match, and his torpedo-damaged ships were slower than the IJN battleships. Spruance did, however, have a card up his sleeve.

USS Triton was one of just five USN submarines near Midway during the battle. She had run at speed on the surface all morning, then dived shortly before 1000. Aided by constant position reports from “Seagulls” off the battleships and cruisers, she achieved a good attack position and at 1045 launched six torpedoes at Nagato from less than 1,000 yards off her port bow. LtCdr Kirkpatrick had ordered all his torpedoes set for minimum depth. All six hit, but in the ongoing tragedy of the Mk 14 only four detonated. Nagato, however, rapidly took on a list and fell out of formation. Despite two IJN destroyers charging towards her, USS Triton came about and fired her stern torpedoes at Ise. Three hit, but only one detonated.

Spruance’s card had turned out to be an ace.

Yamamoto, aboard the stricken Nagato, elected not to shift his flag just minutes before the battle lines engaged and passed command to VADM Mikawa.

Spruance had placed his heavy ships in a north-south battleline, cruising ahead slow while the Japanese approached in two parallel lines; battlecrisers to the north and battleships to the south. The Japanese plan had been to have each line turn in succession northward, engage in long range fire, and use their superior speed and their battlecruisers to pull ahead of the USN line and eventually cross its T.

Mikawa, however, had barely escaped the Hiei before she exploded and most of his staff had not. When he ordered the turn north the signal was not passed to Mutsu. Ise, Hyuga, and Fuso turned shortly afterward when they saw the battlecruisers had, leaving Mutsu steaming directly towards the USN formation alone. USS North Carolina opened fire at 1058, followed at 1059 by USS Washington. USS North Carolina’s second salvo straddled Mutsu, which belatedly began to turn. By the time she had reached her intended course she was under fire from the entire US line. Two turrets were put out of commission, and a near-miss aft jammed her rudder. The other six IJN ships turned to close with the US line in an attempt to cover her, but by the time they came into range she was already a wreck.

The battle lines began to engage their opposite numbers in line. At 1120 USS Pennsylvania scored a hit on Kirishima that killed Mikawa and Captain Iwabuchi. The IJN no longer had a flag officer anywhere in the battle line. Unsure of the status of the rest of the line, the executive officer ordered a turn away from the US line in hopes of re-establishing the chain of command. When Yamamoto arrived aboard the DD Nenohi he realized his numerical advantage was gone, his fleet battered and far from home, and his carrier striking power gone.

The Japanese fleet turned towards Truk, and Spruance had no choice but to let them go.

Total Losses, Battle of Midway:
CV Junyo
BB Mutsu, Yamashiro
BC Hiei
CA Mikuma, Ashigara
CL Tama, Isuzu
9 DD
1 SS
11 Transports & Freighters
180 Aircraft

CV USS Wasp
BB USS Mississippi, USS Maryland
CA USS Quincy, USS Vincennes, USS Wichita
CL USS Juneau, USS San Juan, USS Boise
14 DD
110 Aircraft

Both sides claimed the battle as a victory. After the war, historians would point out that the battle smashed the last of the IJN’s carefully trained pre-war carrier pilots. Others would counter that after the battle the US did not have a single undamaged capital ship in the Pacific, which would result in the transfer of USS Ranger and most of the Atlantic Fleet’s remaining modern cruisers to the Pacific. It is certain that in the aftermath of the battle neither side was able to mount a large operation. The war became a waiting game.

December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part VIII

Midway, Part II

Funding for this story is provided by the IJN society for things that begin with the string “Yama” and end with the letter “o.”

Halsey was very pleased with the morning’s results. The Japanese had been battered, and with their amphibious force mangled they would surely withdraw. Halsey would pursue and pick off any cripples.

Yamamoto, however, never considered withdrawal. He was very clear on the objective of the battle, and it was not Midway. Midway had only been a means to draw the US fleet out so it could be destroyed, and the US fleet was here. Despite the morning’s losses against Midway his carriers retained considerable striking power. He ordered Ryujo, Chiyoda, and all but three destroyers of the Tranport Force’s escorts to close up with the main body, while the transports themselves and their token escort turned back for Truk.

Both sides sent out early-afternoon searches to locate their enemies. The US did this with the PBY’s from Midway, while the IJN used float planes off its various seaplane carriers, battleships, and cruisers. Both sides were conserving their carrier aircraft for the expected strikes, and both sides launched their attacks less than 20 minutes apart.

The IJN strike arrived first. A total of 141 aircraft, including 44 Zeros, met 36 Wildcats on CAP over the joint TF 16 and 17. The Zeros had only a small numerical edge, but the nature of air combat attrition and the total Japanese commitment to the campaign meant many of them were veterans of every battle all the way back to Pearl Harbor. Only a few of the American pilots matched their experience. Only ten bombers and eleven Zeros were lost to the Wildcats, which lost 19 of their own in trade.

Eighty-seven bombers got past the fighters to attack the fleet, all of them targeting the carriers and battleships.

The three battleships and four Atlanta-class cruisers alone mounted 100 5”/38 DP guns. Almost half the attackers were shot down, though some of those were able to launch their bombs or torpedoes first. USS Wasp was targeted by some of the last veteran torpedo bombers of the Pearl Harbor raid in a perfectly executed hammer-and-anvil attack. She took three torpedo hits and began to list heavily even before four bombs started fires in her hanger. USS Lexington had torpedoes pass in front of her bow, behind her stern, and along both sides but took only a single fish forward and a near-miss from a bomb aft that damaged one of her propellers; she remained able to operate aircraft, though not able to achieve full speed. Her crew began to call her the “Lucky Lex.” USS South Dakota was only targeted by seven aircraft but five of them scored bomb hits, wrecking her starboard secondary battery, her aircraft handling facilities, badly damaging “A” Turret, and holing a fuel oil tank. Several fires were started, the worst in the starboard superstructure, but with help from USS Helena they were contained and extinguished. She turned to follow USS Arizona back to Pearl. Luck and extremely effective anti-aircraft fire prevented any damage to either of the other battleships.

The worst ship hit, USS Wasp, could not control her damage. Firefighting assistance from USS Minneapolis and USS New Orleans prolonged her struggle and saved most of her crew, but the ship herself was doomed. She sank two hours after the attack began.

One hundred and eighteen USN aircraft were about to land their own blows. 71 SBDs and the 12 new TBFs, escorted by 35 Wildcats, were out looking for the IJN carriers. Kido Butai, however, was covered by a rain squall and the strike was unable to locate them. Continuing on, near the extreme edge of their range, they spotted the IJN battle force and attacked.

37 Zeros were up over the formation. In sharp contrast to the strike escorts, these were the greenest pilots the IJN had ever deployed. The two squadrons of Wildcats shot down 19 for the loss of only five of their own. Only one SBD was downed by fighters.

USS Lexington’s Torpedo Squadron 2 focused their attack on the biggest ship any of them had ever seen – the Yamato. Four were killed by anti aircraft fire, but nine torpedoes closed on the battleship. Three missed and three more were duds, but three hit and detonated. Two did minimal damage, but one struck on the starboard outboard shaft, wrecking it. Scouting Squadron 2 also targeted the flagship, hitting her with five bombs. These smashed a number of her secondary and anti-aircraft guns, but the main battery and vitals of the ship took no damage from the bombs.

Bombing Squadron 2 concentrated their attacks on Junyo and hit her with three bombs. Fires on the converted liner quickly raged out of control and she was abandoned two hours later.

The two squadrons from the Wasp attacked the Fuso, scoring two hits, and the Yamashiro, scoring three. The hits on Fuso damaged her upper works but impaired her ability to steam not at all. Yamashiro was another story. One bomb blasted a hole in her deck armor, and a second hit almost the exact same spot, penetrating into her engineering spaces. One boiler room was blown apart, and the fires would put three more of her six boilers out of commission before they were put out.

Eleven SBDs were lost to anti-aircraft fire.

Yamamoto now faced his own difficult choice. His strike aircraft were almost gone, and two of hit battleships were lamed. His strike had brought word that three more battleships were on hand than previously believed, and these were the newer, more powerful ships of the US battle line. One was claimed sunk, but that left nine USN battleships to face his eleven. Yamamoto was also fully aware that four of his ships would more properly be rated as battlecruisers, and that the USN seemed to still have strike aircraft to weaken him. To seek battle would be to risk disaster. To abandon the Yamato, flagship of the Combined Fleet, and flee leaving it and Yamashiro to their fate would forever seal the IJN’s fate, however; if his fleet was not superior now, it never would be.

Yamamoto chose to gamble. First, he drew his forces together. Every cruiser except Tone and Chikuma and all but a single squadron of destroyers were detached, formed a patrol line and turned east at high speed. The remainder of the force except for the transports and one destroyer division followed them at the best speed the battered Yamashiro could manage, Yamato still leading the formation despite her wounds. If the Americans pursued they would find themselves in a night gunnery and torpedo action. If the US fleet was crippled, Yamato’s own battleline could finish them off. Even if they were only lamed, he might be able to catch and finish off several cripples cheaply.

Halsey was indeed giving chase, but not until morning. The loss of USS Wasp and the damage to USS South Dakota were regrettable, but the US had given as good as it got and there were almost certainly cripples ahead he could kill. He would not do so recklessly, however. Like Yamamoto he drew his forces together, but essentially held them in place. Tomorrow morning would be soon enough to begin the chase in earnest, and ran no risk of blundering into a night action. Tomorrow morning his thirsty destroyers would refuel, along with as much of the rest of the force as could be managed, and then his task force would follow the Japanese at high speed. USS Lexington packed aboard a full wing, making up her own losses from USS Wasp’s wing. The remaining aircraft landed on Midway, ready to fill gaps in USS Lexington’s wing as the next day’s action progressed. Several damaged aircraft that would normally have eventually been repaired were pushed over the side. Halsey only had one deck left, and he wanted it fully loaded.

OrBat, 2nd Phase:

Main Body (Yamamoto):
CV Akagi, Kaga, Shokaku, Zuikaku, Ryujo
CVL Zuiho, Shoho
Total, all carriers: 63 A6M, 25 D3A, 43 B5N
CVS Nisshin, Chitose, Chiyoda (total of 35 F1M, 7 E13A)
BB Yamato, Nagato, Mutsu, Ise, Hyuga, Fuso, Yamashiro
BC Kongo, Hiei, Kirishima, Haruna
CA Tone, Chikuma
8 DD
5 AO

Attack Force (Kondo):
CA Mogami, Mikuma, Suzuya, Kumano, Takao, Maya, Chokai, Myoko, Haguro, Ashigara
CL Nagara, Kinu, Tama, Kitakami, Oi, Isuzu, Yura, Yubari
37 DD

Auxiliary Force:
4 DD
3 Transports & Freighters
6 AO
1 AE


TF 16 (Halsey):
CV USS Lexington (41 F4F, 40 SBD, 7 TBF)
BB USS North Carolina, USS Washington, USS New Mexico, USS Mississippi, USS Idaho, USS Colorado, USS Maryland, USS West Virginia, USS Pennsylvania
CA USS Minneapolis, USS New Orleans, USS Louisville, USS Quincy, USS Vincennes, USS Wichita
CL USS Atlanta, USS Juneau, USS San Diego, USS San Juan, USS St. Louis, USS Helena, USS Phoenix, USS Boise
32 DD

TF 11
4 DD
4 AO

Midway:
33 PBY (Patrol Wing 2)
24 B-17
12 F4F (VMF-221)
21 SBD (VMSB-241)
6th Marine Defense Battalion (Reinforced)
Sunset on the 28th was at 1915 hours local. The moon rose at 2120, and the sun would rise at 0626 the next day.

Quite a few sailors would not live to see that sunrise.

The Japanese force was now at full extension; a line of destroyers running north-south for 50 miles, with pairs of cruisers at intervals behind them.

First contact was reported at 0510 by a lookout on DD Hatsukaze. Right behind her were CL Kitakami and Oi, which had each been refitted before the war to carry 40 torpedo tubes. While still 15 nautical miles from the US screen, the two cruisers volleyed their starboard-side tubes, came about, and launched their portside tubes. Within five minutes four heavy cruisers and ten destroyers added their own fish. Despite a speed of over 40 knots, it would be 22 minutes before they reached their targets. Still unspotted, the cruisers withdrew below the horizon, while those ships that could began reloading their torpedo tubes. Kitakami turned north and Oi turned south, running up and down the IJN line and alerting the ships by blinker light to the position of the US fleet. The Japanese picket line began to form into three groups, all but a few destroyers below the horizon from the US force.

A naval formation has far more empty space than ships, and at 30,000 yards even the finest torpedoes in the world could not have been expected to hit any single ship. The Japanese hadn’t even tried. Eight torpedoes ran short and roughly 70 ran wide even of the US formation, spread out to minimize the risk of collision in the dark, but nearly 120 fish ran through the US task force. Starting at 0547, 19 of them found targets.

USS San Juan took two hits and blew up almost instantly as one found her forward 5” magazine. USS Wichita took three hits and capsized in less than 20 minutes. USS Maryland took two hits and lost all power as fires raged in her engineering spaces.
USS Lexington, USS North Carolina, USS Mississippi, USS Quincy, USS Boise, USS Juneau, and six destroyers were hit by one torpedo each. Five of the destroyers sank within minutes.

The IJN closed on the formation, now maneuvering franticly and firing at shadows, from three sides. More torpedoes slipped into the water. USS O’Brien finally reported a radar contact at 0558. The US formation exploded with gunfire, obliterating the CA Mikuma with an avalanche of battleship and cruiser shells. The Japanese charged in, and a furious, twisting, half-blind melee spread across an area of almost nine hundred square miles. The Japanese fired over 400 torpedoes before sunrise.

By 0630, the rising sun illuminated the IJN survivors fleeing west, chased out of range by 14” and 16” shells, and a sea dotted with burning and sinking ships.

Sunk or destroyed, morning action on August 29th, 1942:

IJN
CA Mikuma, Ashigara
CL Tama, Isuzu
9 DD

USN
BB USS Mississippi, USS Maryland
CA USS Quincy, USS Vincennes, USS Wichita
CL USS Juneau, USS San Juan, USS Boise
14 DD

Yamamoto’s gamble had paid off. Every US battleship except the USS Pennsylvania had been hit. USS Idaho could only make eight knots. Halsey ordered the shattered, disorganized fleet to head due east.

The one bright spot was the USS Lexington. Despite having been hit by a torpedo for the second time in the battle, she could, barely, get up enough speed to operate aircraft. The first Wildcat left he deck even as DD Oboro was pounded under by the USS Washington, the last Japanese casualty of the early-morning action. Minutes later, a PBY from Midway, launched in the moonlight shortly after word arrived of the raging night action arrived, spotted the Japanese battle-line 70 miles west of the US force.

Even more sailors would not live to see the sunset.

December 28th - The Day of Infamy, Part VII

Midway, Part I

Nimitz was wrong. Admiral Yamamoto had been given the go ahead to attack Midway with almost every available major unit of the IJN, heavily because the operation would require no Army units. The IJA begrudged every soldier committed to the IJN’s operations, and without major IJA units operations against Ceylon or New Caledonia were impossible. It was believed that Midway, however, could by taken by SNLF troops already under the IJN’s control.

Midway was expected to be the decisive battle which would destroy the USN, and the Japanese believed they had learned from their mistakes at the Coral Sea. This time the battle-line would be deployed from the beginning, and would keep close to the carriers. If American battleships offered battle again, it would be accepted. Scouting would be increased, and carriers provided with each force to provide CAP and ASW patrols. This ambitious goal was met, but only in part: the carrier air groups on the operation were at only 70% of authorized strength, and many pilots were barely-trained novices at carrier operations. The US, in contrast, was able to supply full-strength groups for her carriers including a squadron of the new TBF torpedo bombers, although the USN groups too were short on veterans.

Signals intelligence finally revealed Midway as the target on August 25th, after the Japanese forces had sailed from Truk. US forces sailing for New Caledonia from Pearl Harbor quickly altered their courses northward, and elements of the 5th and 11th Bomb Groups with 24 B-17’s were hastily dispatched to Midway.

Japanese OrBat:

Carrier Force (Kido Butai, Nagumo):
CV Akagi, Kaga, Shokaku, Zuikaku (total of 56 A6M, 70 D3A, 76 B5N)
CVL Zuiho, Shoho (total of 24 A6M, 13 B5N)
BC Kongo, Hiei, Kirishima, Haruna
CA Tone, Chikuma
CL Isuzu, Yura
16 DD

Battle Force (Yamamoto):
CV Junyo (24 A6M, 8 B5N)
CVS Nisshin, Chitose (total of 26 F1M, 7 E13A)
BB Yamato, Nagato, Mutsu, Ise, Hyuga, Fuso, Yamashiro
CA Mogami, Mikuma, Suzuya, Kumano, Takao, Maya, Chokai
CL Nagara, Kinu, Tama, Kitakami, Oi
22 DD

Transport Force (Kondo):
CV Ryujo (20 A6M, 6 B5N)
CVS Chiyoda (12 F1M, 3 E13A)
CA Myoko, Haguro, Ashigara
CL Yubari
7 DD
14 Transports & Freighters
2 SNLF Battalions

Support Force:
4 DD
11 AO
1 AE

Advance Force:
21 SS

Allied OrBat:

TF 17 (Halsey)
CV USS Lexington (36 F4F, 36 SBD, 12 TBF), USS Wasp (36 F4F, 36 SBD)
CA USS Minneapolis, USS New Orleans, USS Louisville, USS Quincy, USS Vincennes, USS Wichita
CL USS Atlanta, USS Juneau
15 DD

TF 16 (Fletcher)
BB USS South Dakota, USS North Carolina, USS Washington
CL USS San Diego, USS San Juan, USS St. Louis, USS Helena
9 DD

TF 19 (Anderson)
BB USS New Mexico, USS Mississippi, USS Idaho, USS Colorado, USS Maryland, USS West Virginia, USS Pennsylvania, USS Arizona
CL USS Phoenix, USS Boise
12 DD

TF 7
5 SS

TF 11
4 DD
4 AO

Midway:
36 PBY (Patrol Wing 2)
24 B-17
27 F4F (VMF-221)
27 SBD (VMSB-241)
6th Marine Defense Battalion (Reinforced)

On August 27th a PBY searching from Midway spotted the approaching Japanese Battle Force and radioed a contact report. 20 minutes later it spotted the Carrier Force to the north and sent a second report. Five minutes after that it was shot down by a pair of Zeros. The Carriers were attacked later that day by B-17s from Midway, but the bombers stayed high to avoid the IJN CAP and scored no hits. That evening, I-71 spotted TF 17 southeast of Midway, sent off its own report, maneuvered as close as it could to the fast-moving force, and fired four torpedoes. One came within ten yards of the USS Lexington’s stern, but none hit. I-71 was pounced on by USS McCall and USS Maury and never heard from again. Less than an hour later, I-69 spotted and reported TF 19, and managed to put a pair of torpedoes into USS Arizona before being driven off. The damaged battlewagon turned back for Pearl in company with two destroyers.

Both sides had been detected and knew it. Halsey quickly conferred with his staff, and then ordered that the fleet advance. The choice was a difficult one, but there were several points in favor of seeking battle. Morale was extremely low after the long string of defeats the US had been handed, including the final surrender of Corregidor early that month. Midway’s position between the fleets gave the US a major scouting and striking force that the Japanese couldn’t sink. Most importantly, however, “tactical surprise,” Halsey stated “may yet be achieved.”

TF 19 was ordered to steam straight for Midway, while TF 16 and TF 17 drew together and turned slightly to the west. Halsey also sent orders to Midway: tomorrow, the aircraft there were to attempt to locate and sink the Japanese transports as their first priority. If the Japanese could be denied Midway the battle could be declared a victory and the fleet need not be risked.

Yamamoto also had decisions to make and orders to give, though his were much easier. The Carrier Force was shifted from the north of the Battle Force to the south and ordered to maximum speed. There would still be time for a preparatory strike on Midway early in the morning before the carrier forces came in range of each other in the mid-afternoon.

Midway’s PBYs launched again before sunrise, hunting for the Japanese. They found them quite easily, and more or less where they expected to find them. The Japanese, for their part, were not surprised to be located, having maintained fairly steady courses towards Midway throughout the night.

It would be one of the last things that day that went as both sides expected.

A 120-strong strike escorted by 31 Zeros arrived over Midway to find the sky apparently empty of the expected defenders.

The commander of VMF-221, Major John Smith, had set a trap. Expecting an attack, he had ensured that every aircraft on the island was aloft and away from the island. Due to a combination of luck, educated guesses, radar direction, and skill, he had managed to position his squadron and VMSB-241 above and up-sun of the IJN bombers just before they arrived over their targets. 54 Marine aircraft came diving in at high speed on bombers focused on their targets.

Surprise was total. Post-war analysis indicates that 34 Japanese aircraft were destroyed or crippled in the first pass alone. The Zeros, some of whom had removed their radios to save weight, were slow to realize there was a threat behind them. Several of the green Japanese pilots panicked, jettisoned their bombs, and broke formation. It was the worst thing they could have done. VMF-221 came about to make another pass at the main formation while VMSB-241 gleefully split into flights and elements to hunt down the cripples and loners.

By the time the Japanese aircraft withdrew, 59 had been lost in trade for 12 of the defenders. Midway’s facilities had been damaged, but its runways were still open, and well to the east its aircraft were about to deliver their own attack.

The Japanese had developed a mixed opinion of the B-17. On the one hand, it could fly high enough and was tough and well defended enough that shooting one down was extremely rare. On the other hand, flying so high made its bombs little threat to warships and not very accurate in general. The 30 B-17’s flying from Midway were a scratch team, but they managed to form a very tight box on the 28th, and each was carrying sixteen 250-lb bombs instead of the normal eight 500-lb bombs. The 480 bombs mostly missed. In fact, only 8% hit anything but the ocean. Thirty-eight bombs hit a group that only contained 27 ships, nine of which (including the destroyers, CL Yubari and CA Myoko) were able to escape the target zone before the bombs reached it. The two other heavy cruisers suffered only trivial damage from the light bombs. The transports were another story. The immediate casualties on the packed transports were bad enough, but the fires started on most of the ships were worse. Only one was sunk by the bombs outright, but ten more succumbed to fires and flooding. A third of the SNLF troops were lost, and many of the rest lost all of their equipment. Ryujo and Chiyoda also suffered light damage, but both were still capable of aircraft operations.

The battle was far from over.